

PHILOSOPHIC CLASSICS

From Plato to Derrida

EDITED BY FORREST E. BAIRD



SEVENTH EDITION

PHILOSOPHIC CLASSICS: FROM PLATO TO DERRIDA

Philosophic Classics: From Plato to Derrida includes essential writings of the most important philosophers from almost two millennia of Western philosophy. In updating this Seventh Edition, editor Forrest E. Baird has continued to follow the same criteria established by the late Walter Kaufmann when the *Philosophic Classics* series was first established: (1) to use complete works or, where more appropriate, complete sections of works (2) in clear translations (3) of texts central to each thinker's philosophy or widely accepted as part of the "canon." To make the works more accessible to students, most footnotes treating textual matters (variant readings, etc.) have been omitted and important words from antiquity have been transliterated and put in angle brackets. In addition, each thinker is introduced by a brief essay composed of three sections: (1) biographical (a glimpse of the life), (2) philosophical (a résumé of the philosopher's thought), and (3) bibliographical (suggestions for further reading).

A timeline places important philosophers alongside other important thinkers, world leaders, and major global events. Photos and paintings with explanatory captions illuminate the ideas, debates, and places discussed in the text.

New to the Seventh Edition

- New translations: Plato, *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phaedo*; Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*; Epicurus, *Letter to Menoeceus* and *Principal Doctrines*; Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*; Anselm, *Proslogion*; Giovanni Pico Della Mirandola, *Oration on the Dignity of Man*; René Descartes, *Correspondence with Princess Elizabeth*; Gottfried Leibniz, *Monadology*; Jean-Jacques Rousseau, *The Social Contract*; Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* and *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*.
- Additional material: Porphyry's *Life of Plotinus* (in part); Francis Bacon, *Aphorisms* (selections from *Novum Organum*); Karl Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach*; A.J. Ayer, *Language, Truth, and Logic* (in part).
- Updated, annotated bibliographies with each bibliography now broken into two sections, one for beginning and another for advanced students.

Forrest E. Baird was Professor of Philosophy at Whitworth University in Spokane, WA, USA from 1978 until he retired in 2021. He taught a wide range of courses focusing on the history of Western intellectual thought as well as logic and philosophy of religion. Baird has a B.A. from Westmont College, an M.Div. from Fuller Theological Seminary, and an M.A. and Ph.D. from Claremont Graduate University. His most recent publication is *How Do We Reason: An Introduction to Logic* (IVP, 2021). His other works include *Human Thought and Action: Readings in Western Intellectual History* (UPA, 1992) and *Introduction to Philosophy: A Case Study Approach* (Harper & Row, 1981, co-authored with Jack Rogers).



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From Plato to Derrida

Seventh Edition

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FORREST E. BAIRD

 **Routledge**
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NEW YORK AND LONDON

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Preface

Walter Kaufmann began his 2-volume *Philosophic Classics* anthology—on which this current series is based—by pointing out that “There is no better introduction to philosophy...than to read some of the great philosophers. But few books are more difficult to read than Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* or Spinoza’s *Ethics*...Even works that are less puzzling are sometimes like snippets of a conversation that you overhear on entering a room: What is said is clear, only you cannot be sure you have got the point because you do not know just what has gone before. A slight point may be crucial to refute some earlier suggestion, and a seemingly pointless remark may contain a barbed allusion.” As a result of this difficulty, some students of philosophy cry out for a simple summary of the “central doctrines” of the great philosophers. Yet “carving up great books to excerpt essential doctrines is one of the sins against the spirit of philosophy. If the reading of a whole Platonic dialogue leaves one more doubtful and less sure of oneself than the perusal of a brief summary,” so much the better. “It is part of the point of philosophy to make us a little less sure about things. After all, Socrates himself insisted that what distinguished him from other persons was not that he knew all, or even most, answers but rather that he realized his ignorance.”*

Still, one need not despair of joining this ongoing conversation. In the first place, you can get in near the beginning of this conversation by starting with Plato and moving on from there. Given that they are over two thousand years old, his early dialogues are surprisingly easy to follow. The later Platonic dialogues, Aristotle, and much that follows will be more difficult, but by that point, you will have some idea of what the conversation is about.

Secondly, the structure of this book is designed to make this conversation accessible. There are section introductions and introductions to the individual philosophers. These latter introductions are divided into three sections: (1) biographical (a glimpse of the life), (2) philosophical (a resume of the philosopher’s thought), and (3) bibliographical (suggestions for further reading). To give a sense of the development of ideas, there are short representative passages from some of the less important, but transitional, thinkers. To make all the works more readable, most footnotes treating textual matters (variant readings, etc.) have been omitted and all Greek words have been transliterated and put in angle brackets. My goal throughout this volume is to be unobtrusive and allow you to hear, and perhaps join in, the ongoing conversation that is Western philosophy.

* Walter Kaufmann, *Philosophic Classics, Volume I: Thales to Ockham* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1961), pp. v–vi.

WHAT'S NEW IN THIS EDITION?

- New translations: Plato, *Euthyphro*, *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Phaedo*; Aristotle, *Nichomachean Ethics*; Epicurus, *Letter to Menoeceus* and *Principal Doctrines*; Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*; Anselm, *Proslogion*; Pico Della Mirandola, *Oration on the Dignity of Man*; Rene Descartes, *Correspondence with Princess Elizabeth*; Gottfried Leibniz, *Monadology*; Rousseau, *The Social Contract*; Immanuel Kant, *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics* and *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*
- Additional material: Porphyry's *Life of Plotinus* (in part); Francis Bacon, *Aphorisms* (selections from *Novum Organum*); Karl Marx, *Theses on Feuerbach*; A.J. Ayer, *Language, Truth, and Logic* (in part).
- Updated and reorganized bibliographies
- To allow for all these changes, the selection from Charles Sanders Peirce has been dropped.


Throughout the editing of this edition, I have tried to follow the editorial principles established by Professor Kaufmann: (1) to use complete works or, where more appropriate, complete sections of works (2) in clear translations (3) of texts central to the thinker's philosophy or widely accepted as part of the "canon." While little remains of Professor Kaufmann's introductions or editing—and the series has now grown to 7 volumes—his spirit of inclusion and respect for ideas continues. Those who use this volume in a one-term introduction to philosophy, history of philosophy, or history of intellectual thought course will find more material here than can easily fit a normal semester. But this embarrassment of riches gives teachers some choice and, for those who offer the same course year after year, an opportunity to change the menu.



I would like to thank the many people who assisted me in this volume, including the library staff of Whitworth University, especially Hans Bynagle, Gail Fielding, and Jeanette Langston; my colleagues, E. Dale Bruner, who made helpful suggestions on all the introductions, Barbara Filo, who helped make selections for the artwork, and Corliss Slack and John Yoder, who provided historical context; Crystal Downing, Wheaton College, who wrote the first draft for the Derrida introduction; Stephen Davis, Claremont McKenna College; Jerry H. Gill, The College of St. Rose; Rex Hollowell, Spokane Falls Community College; Arthur F. Holmes, Wheaton College; Stanley Obitts, Westmont College; Wayne Pomerleau, Gonzaga University; Timothy A. Robinson, The College of St. Benedict; Glenn Ross, Franklin & Marshall College; and Charles Young, The Claremont Graduate School, who each read some of the introductions and gave helpful advice; Edward Beach, University of Wisconsin, Eau Claire, and John Justice, Randolph-Macon Women's College who graciously called my attention to errors in previous editions; my former secretary, Michelle Seefried; my editor, Andrew Beck, and my former managers and production managers, Shiny Rajesh, Sarah Holle, Cheryl Keenan, Mical Moser, Ross Miller, Karita France, Angela Stone, and Ted Bolen. I would also like to acknowledge the following reviewers who made helpful suggestions: Marianina Alcott, San Jose State University; James W. Allard, Montana State University; David Apolloni, Augsburg College; Robert C. Bennett, El Centro College; Sarah Borden, Wheaton College; Herbert L. Carson, Ferris State University; Mary T. Clark, Manhattanville College; Stuart Dalton, Monmouth College; Sandra S. Edwards, University of Arkansas; Steven M. Emmanuel, Virginia Wesleyan College; David Griesedieck, University of Missouri, Saint Louis; John Hurley, Central Connecticut State University; Stephen E. Lahey, LaMoyné College; Helen S. Lang, Trinity College; R. James Long, Fairfield University; Scott MacDonald, University of Iowa; Angel Medina, Georgia State University; Nick More, Westminster College; Paul Newberry, California State University—Bakersfield; Eric Palmer, Allegheny College; David F.T. Rodier, American University; Katherine Rogers, University of Delaware; Gregory Schultz, Wisconsin Lutheran College; Stephen Scott, Eastern Washington University; Daniel C. Shartin, Worcester State College; Walter G. Scott, Oklahoma State University; Howard N. Tuttle, University of New Mexico; Richard J. Van Iten, Iowa State University; Donald Phillip Verene, Emory University; Tamara Welsh, University of Tennessee—Chattanooga; Sarah Worth, Allegheny College; and Wilhelm S. Wurzer, Duquesne University. I would also like to thank the anonymous peer reviewers of this new edition.

I am especially thankful to my wife, Joy Lynn Fulton Baird, and to our children, Whitney, Sydney, and Soren, who have supported me throughout this enterprise.

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Hildegard of Bingen Moses Maimonides	Thomas Aquinas William of Ockham Pico della Mirandola Francis Bacon Thomas Hobbes René Descartes Princess Elizabeth of Bohemia Blaise Pascal Baruch Spinoza John Locke Gottfried Leibniz George Berkeley David Hume Jean-Jacques Rousseau Immanuel Kant G.W.F. Hegel Mary Wollstonecraft	John Stuart Mill Søren Kierkegaard Karl Marx William James Friedrich Nietzsche Edmund Husserl W.E.B. DuBois Bertrand Russell Martin Heidegger Ludwig Wittgenstein A.J. Ayer Jean-Paul Sartre Simone de Beauvoir Willard Van Orman Quine Jacques Derrida		
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ANCIENT GREEK PHILOSOPHY



Something unusual happened in Greece and in the Greek colonies of the Aegean Sea some twenty-five hundred years ago. Whereas the previous great cultures of the Mediterranean had used mythological stories of the gods to explain the operations of the world and of the self, some of the Greeks began to discover new ways of explaining these phenomena. Instead of reading their ideas into, or out of, ancient scriptures or poems, they began to use reason, contemplation, and sensory observation to make sense of reality.

The story as we know it began with the Greeks living on the coast of Asia Minor (present-day Turkey). Colonists there, such as Thales, tried to find the one common element in the diversity of nature. Subsequent thinkers, such as Anaximenes, sought not only to find this one common element, but also to find the process by which one form changes into another. Other thinkers, such as Pythagoras, turned to the nature of form itself rather than the basic stuff that takes on a particular form.

With Socrates, the pursuit of knowledge turned inward as he sought not to understand the world, but himself. His call to “know thyself,” together with his uncompromising search for truth, inspired generations of thinkers. With the writings of Plato and Aristotle, ancient Greek thought reached its zenith. These giants of human thought developed all-embracing systems that explained both the nature of the universe and the humans who inhabit it.

All these lovers of wisdom, or *philosophers*, came to different conclusions and often spoke disrespectfully of one another. Some held the universe to be one single entity, whereas others insisted that it must be made of many parts. Some believed that human knowledge was capable of understanding virtually everything about the world and the self, whereas others thought that it was not possible to have any knowledge at all. But despite all their differences, there is a thread of continuity, a continuing focus among them: the *human* attempt to understand the world and the self, using *human* reason. This fact distinguishes these philosophers from the great minds that preceded them.

The philosophers of ancient Greece have fascinated thinking persons for centuries, and their writings have been one of the key influences on the development of Western civilization. The works of Plato and Aristotle, especially, have defined the questions and suggested many of the answers for subsequent generations. As the great Greek statesman Pericles sagely predicted, “Future ages will wonder at us, as the present age wonders at us now.”



BASIC SECONDARY WORKS: Robert S. Brumbaugh, *The Philosophers of Greece* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1981) is an accessible introduction with pictures, charts, and maps. Also worth consulting are Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy: Volume I, Greece & Rome* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962); Robert S. Brumbaugh, *The Philosophers of Greece* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1981); J.V. Luce, *An Introduction to Greek Philosophy* (New York: Thames and Hudson, 1992); Julia Annas, *Ancient Philosophy: A Very Short Introduction*

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Anthony Kenny, *Ancient Philosophy: A New History of Western Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); and Christopher Shields, *Ancient Philosophy: A Contemporary Introduction*, 2nd edition (New York: Routledge, 2012).

More Detailed Secondary Works: W.K.C. Guthrie's authoritative *The History of Greek Philosophy*, six volumes. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962–1981) is surprisingly accessible given the depth of the scholarship. Julie K. Ward, ed., *Feminism and Ancient Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 1996) provides a feminist critique. For a clear introduction that focuses on the arguments of the philosophers, see Garrett Thomson, *Thales to Sextus: An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy* (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2016).

Socrates

470–399 B.C.

PLATO

428/7–348/7 B.C.

Socrates has fascinated and inspired men and women for over two thousand years. All five of the major “schools” of ancient Greece (Academics, Peripatetics, Epicureans, Stoics, and Cynics) were influenced by his thought. Some of the early Christian thinkers, such as Justin Martyr, considered him a “proto-Christian,” while others, such as St. Augustine (who rejected this view) still expressed deep admiration for Socrates’ ethical life. More recently, existentialists have found in Socrates’ admonition “know thyself” an encapsulation of their thought, and opponents of unjust laws have seen in Socrates’ trial a blueprint for civil disobedience. In short, Socrates is one of the most admired men who ever lived.

The Athens into which Socrates was born in 470 B.C. was a city still living in the flush of its epic victory over the Persians, and it was bursting with new ideas. The playwrights Euripides and Sophocles were young boys, and Pericles, the great Athenian democrat, was still a young man. The Parthenon’s foundation was laid when Socrates was twenty-two, and its construction was completed fifteen years later.

Socrates was the son of Sophroniscus, a sculptor, and of Phaenarete, a midwife. As a boy, Socrates received a classical Greek education in music, gymnastics, and grammar (or the study of language), and he decided early on to become a sculptor like his father. Tradition says he was a gifted artist who fashioned impressively simple statues of the Graces. He married a woman named Xanthippe, and together they had three children. He took an early interest in the developing science of the Milesians, and then he served for a time in the army.

When he was a middle-aged man, Socrates’ friend, Chaerephon, asked the oracle at Delphi “if there was anyone who was wiser than Socrates.” For once the mysterious oracle gave an unambiguous answer: “No one.” When Socrates heard of the incident, he was confused. He knew that he was not a wise man. So he set out to find a wiser man to prove the answer wrong. Socrates later described the method and results of his mission:

I went to ... one of the politicians, and considering him and speaking with him, men of Athens, I received an impression something like the following: it seemed to me that this man seemed to be wise to many human beings and most of all to himself, yet he was not. Then I attempted to show him that he thought he was wise but was not. From this I became hated by him and by many of those present. When I went away, I reasoned with respect to myself: “I am wiser than this human being for it is likely that neither of us know anything noble and good, but this one thinks he knows something while not knowing, whereas I, as I do not know, do not think

to know. At any rate, I am likely to be a bit wiser than this one with respect to this peculiar thing—that which I do not know, I do not think to know.”

From there, I went to another, one opined to be wiser than him, and these things seemed to me the same. And from that point, I incurred the hatred of both him and many others. (*Apology* 21 c-d)

As Socrates continued his mission by interviewing the politicians, poets, and artisans of Athens, young men followed along. They enjoyed seeing the authority figures humiliated by Socrates’ intense questioning. Those in authority, however, were not amused. Athens was no longer the powerful, self-confident city of 470 B.C., the year of Socrates’ birth. An exhausting succession of wars with Sparta (the Peloponnesian Wars) and an enervating series of political debacles had left the city narrow in vision and suspicious of new ideas and of dissent. In 399 B.C., Meletus and Anytus brought an indictment of impiety and corrupting the youth against Socrates. As recorded in the *Apology*, the Athenian assembly found him guilty by a vote of 281 to 220 and sentenced him to death. His noble death is described incomparably in the closing pages of the *Phaedo* by Plato.

Socrates wrote nothing, and our knowledge of his thought comes exclusively from the report of others. The playwright Aristophanes (455–375 B.C.) satirized Socrates in his comedy *The Clouds*. His caricature of Socrates as a cheat and charlatan was apparently so damaging that Socrates felt compelled to offer a rebuttal before the Athenian assembly (see the *Apology*, following). The military general Xenophon (ca. 430–350 B.C.) honored his friend Socrates in his *Apology of Socrates*, his *Symposium*, and, later, in his *Memorabilia* (“Recollections of Socrates”). In an effort to defend his dead friend’s memory, Xenophon’s writings illumine Socrates’ life and character. Though born fifteen years after the death of Socrates, Aristotle (384–322 B.C.) left many fascinating allusions to Socrates in his philosophic works, as did several later Greek philosophers. But the primary source of our knowledge of Socrates comes from one of those young men who followed him: Plato.



Plato was probably born in 428/7 B.C. He had two older brothers, Adeimantus and Glaucon, who appear in Plato’s *Republic*, and a sister, Potone. Though he may have known Socrates since childhood, Plato was probably nearer twenty when he came under the intellectual spell of Socrates. The death of Socrates made an enormous impression on Plato and contributed to his call to bear witness to posterity of “the wisest and justest, and the best man I have ever known.” (*Phaedo*, 118). Though Plato was from a distinguished family and might have followed his relatives into politics, he chose philosophy.

Following Socrates’ execution, the twenty-eight-year-old Plato left Athens and traveled for a time. He is reported to have visited Egypt and Cyrene—though some scholars doubt this. During this time he wrote his early dialogues on Socrates’ life and teachings. He also visited Italy and Sicily, where he became the friend of Dion, a relative of Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse, Sicily.

On returning to Athens from Sicily, Plato founded a school, which came to be called the Academy. One might say it was the world’s first university, and it endured as a center of higher learning for nearly one thousand years, until the Roman emperor Justinian closed it in A.D. 529. Except for two later trips to Sicily, where he unsuccessfully sought to institute his political theories, Plato spent the rest of his life at the Athenian Academy. Among his students was Aristotle. Plato died at eighty in 348/7 B.C.

Plato’s influence was best described by the twentieth-century philosopher Alfred North Whitehead when he said, “The safest general characterization of the European philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato.”



It is difficult to separate the ideas of Plato from those of his teacher, Socrates. In virtually all of Plato’s dialogues, Socrates is the main character, and it is possible that in the early dialogues Plato is recording his teacher’s actual words. But in the later dialogues, “Socrates” gives Plato’s views—views that, in some cases, in fact, the historical Socrates denied.

The first four dialogues presented in this text describe the trial and death of Socrates and are arranged in narrative order. The first, the *Euthyphro*, translated by R.E. Allen, takes place as Socrates has just learned of the indictment against him. He strikes up a conversation with a “theologian” so sure of his

holiness that he is prosecuting his own father for murder. The dialogue moves on, unsuccessfully, to define holiness. Along the way, Socrates asks a question that has vexed philosophers and theologians for centuries: Is something good because the gods say it is, or do the gods say it is good because it is?

The next dialogue, the *Apology*, translated by Mark Kremer, is generally regarded as one of Plato's first, and as eminently faithful to what Socrates said at his trial on charges of impiety and corruption of youth. The speech was delivered in public and heard by a large audience; Plato has Socrates mention that Plato was present; and there is no need to doubt the historical veracity of the speech, at least in essentials. There are two breaks in the narrative: one after Socrates' defense (during which the Athenians vote "guilty") and one after Socrates proposes an alternative to the death penalty (during which the Athenians decide on death). This dialogue includes Socrates' famous characterization of his mission and purpose in life.

In the *Crito*, also translated by R.E. Allen, Plato has Crito visit Socrates in prison to assure him that his escape from Athens has been well prepared and to persuade him to consent to leave. Socrates argues that one has an obligation to obey the state even when it orders one to suffer wrong. That Socrates, in fact, refused to leave is certain; that he used the arguments Plato ascribes to him is less certain. In any case, anyone who has read the *Apology* will agree that after his speech, Socrates could not well escape.

The moving account of Socrates' death is given at the end of the *Phaedo*, translated by Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage and Eric Salem, the last of our group of dialogues. There is common agreement that this dialogue was written much later than the other three and that the earlier part of the dialogue, with its Platonic doctrine of Forms and immortality, uses "Socrates" as a vehicle for Plato's own ideas.

There are few books in Western civilization that have had the impact of Plato's *Republic*—aside from the Bible, perhaps none. Like the Bible, there are also few books whose interpretation and evaluation have differed so widely. Apparently it is a description of Plato's ideal society: a utopian vision of the just state, possible only if philosophers were kings. But some (see the following suggested readings) claim that its purpose is not to give a model of the ideal state, but to show the impossibility of such a state and to convince aspiring philosophers to shun politics. Evaluations of the *Republic* have also varied widely: from the criticisms of Karl Popper, who denounced the *Republic* as totalitarian, to the admiration of more traditional interpreters, such as Francis MacDonald Cornford and Gregory Vlastos.

Given the importance of this work and the diversity of opinions concerning its point and value, it was extremely difficult to decide which sections of the *Republic* to include in this series. I chose to include the discussion of justice from Books I and II, the descriptions of the guardians and of the "noble lie" from Book III, the discussions of the virtues and the soul in Book IV, the presentations of the guardians' qualities and lifestyles in Book V, and the key sections on knowledge (including the analogy of the line and the myth of the cave) from the end of Book VI and the beginning of Book VII. I admit that space constraints have forced me to exclude important sections. Ideally, the selections chosen will whet the student's appetite to read the rest of this classic. The translation is by Joe Sachs.

The marginal page numbers are those of all scholarly editions.



SOCRATES:

BASIC SECONDARY WORKS: Good places to begin further study include Christopher Taylor's pair of introductions, *Socrates* and *Socrates: A Very Short Introduction* (both Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999 and 2000); Anthony Gottlieb, *Socrates* (London: Routledge, 1999); Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, *The Philosophy of Socrates* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2000); and Joseph P. Lawrence, *Socrates among Strangers* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2015).

MORE DETAILED SECONDARY WORKS: W.K.C. Guthrie, *Socrates* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971); Nalin Ranasinghe, *The Soul of Socrates* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000); James A. Colaiaco, *Socrates Against Athens* (London: Routledge, 2001); and Christopher Moore, *Socrates and Self-Knowledge* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015) are more in-depth studies.

COLLECTIONS OF ESSAYS: For collections of essays, see Gregory Vlastos, ed., *The Philosophy of Socrates* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1971); Hugh H. Benson, ed., *Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Terence Irwin, ed., *Socrates and His Contemporaries* (Hamden, CT: Garland Publishing, 1995); the multi-volume William J. Prior, ed., *Socrates* (Oxford: Routledge, 1996); Lindsay Judson and Vassilis Karasmanis, eds., *Remembering Socrates: Philosophical Essays* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); and Sara Ahbel-Rappe and Rachana Kamtekar, eds., *A Companion to Socrates* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009).

Plato:

BASIC SECONDARY WORKS: Books about Plato are legion. Paul Shorey, *What Plato Said* (Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, 1933), and G.M.A. Grube, *Plato's Thought* (London: Methuen, 1935) are classic treatments of Plato, while R.M. Hare, *Plato* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982); Bernard Williams, *Plato* (London: Routledge, 1999) and Julia Annas, *Plato: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) provide helpful, brief introductions.

MORE DETAILED SECONDARY WORKS: Once again the work of W.K.C. Guthrie is sensible, comprehensive, yet readable. See Volumes IV and V of his *The History of Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975 and 1978). Other more extensive general studies of Plato include Robert Brumbaugh, *Plato for a Modern Age* (New York: Macmillan, 1964); David J. Melling, *Understanding Plato* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987); Julius Moravcsik, *Plato and Platonism* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 2000); Mary Margaret McCabe, *Platonic Conversations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015); and Constance Meinwald, *Plato* (London: Routledge, 2016). For unusual interpretations of Plato and his work, see Werner Jaeger, *Paideia*, Vols. II and III, translated by Gilbert Highet (New York: Oxford University Press, 1939–1943); Karl R. Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies; Volume I: The Spell of Plato* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962); and Allan Bloom's interpretive essay in Plato, *Republic*, translated by Allan Bloom (New York: Basic Books, 1968).

COLLECTIONS OF ESSAYS: For collections of essays, see Richard Kraut, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Plato* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991); Nancy Tuana, ed., *Feminist Interpretations of Plato* (College Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Gregory Vlastos, ed., *Studies in Greek Philosophy, Volume II: Socrates, Plato, and Their Tradition* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Nicholas D. Smith, ed., *Plato: Critical Assessments* (London: Routledge, 1998); Hugh Benson, ed., *A Companion to Plato* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006); and Gail Fine, *The Oxford Handbook of Plato* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008).

STUDIES ON SPECIFIC DIALOGUES: C.D.C. Reeve, *Socrates in the Apology* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1989) and David Bostock, *Plato's Phaedo* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); give insights on their respective dialogues. For further reading on the *Republic*, see Julia Annas, *An Introduction to Plato's Republic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981); Nicholas P. White, *A Companion to Plato's Republic* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1989); Nickolas Pappas, *Routledge Guidebook to Plato and the Republic* (Oxford: Routledge, 1995); and D.J. Sheppard, *Plato's Republic: An Edinburgh Philosophical Guide* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009).

EUTHYPHRO

Characters

Socrates

Euthyphro

Scene—The Hall of the King^{*}

- 2 EUTHYPHRO: What has happened, Socrates, to make you leave your accustomed pastimes in the Lyceum and spend your time here today at the King's Porch^{*}? You can hardly have a suit pending before the King, as I do.

SOCRATES: In Athens, Euthyphro, it is not called a suit, but an indictment.

- b EUTHYPHRO: Really? Someone must have indicted you. For I will not suspect you of indicting someone else.

SOCRATES: Certainly not.

EUTHYPHRO: But someone you?

Plato, *The Dialogues of Plato, Volume I*, translated by R.E. Allen (Yale University Press, 1984). Reprinted by permission of Yale University Press.

^{*} The anachronistic title "king" was retained by the magistrate who had jurisdiction over crimes affecting the state religion.

SOCRATES: Yes.

EUTHYPHRO: Who is he?

SOCRATES: I do not know the man well, Euthyphro; it appears he is young and not prominent. His name, I think, is Meletus. He belongs to the deme of Pitthus, if you recall a Pitthean Meletus with lanky hair and not much beard, but a hooked nose.

EUTHYPHRO: I have not noticed him, Socrates. But what is the charge? c

SOCRATES: Charge? One that does him credit, I think. It is no small thing for him, young as he is, to be knowledgeable in so great a matter, for he says he knows how the youth are being corrupted and who is corrupting them. No doubt he is wise, and realizing that, in my ignorance, I corrupt his comrades, he comes to the City as to a mother to accuse me. He alone seems to me to have begun his political career correctly, for the right way to begin is to look after the young men of the City first so that they will be as good as possible, just as a good farmer naturally looks after his young plants first and the rest later. So too with Meletus. He will perhaps first seek out those of us who blight the young shoots, as he claims, and afterwards he will obviously look after their elders and become responsible for many great blessings to the City, the natural result of so fine a beginning. d

EUTHYPHRO: I would hope so, Socrates, but I fear lest the opposite may happen. He seems to me to have started by injuring the City at its very hearth in undertaking to wrong you. But tell me, what does he say you do to corrupt the youth?

SOCRATES: It sounds a bit strange at first hearing, my friend. He says I am a maker of gods, and because I make new ones and do not worship the old ones, he indicted me on their account, he says. b

EUTHYPHRO: I see Socrates. It is because you say the divine sign comes to you from time to time. So he indicts you for making innovations in religious matters and hauls you into court to slander you, knowing full well how easily such things are misrepresented to the multitude. Why I, even me, when I speak about religious matters in the Assembly and foretell the future, why, they laugh at me as though I were mad. And yet nothing I ever predicted has failed to come true. Still, they are jealous of people like us. We must not worry about them, but face them boldly. c

SOCRATES: My dear Euthyphro, being laughed at is perhaps a thing of little moment. The Athenians, it seems to me, do not much mind if they think a man is clever as long as they do not suspect him of teaching his cleverness to others; but if they think he makes others like himself they become angry, whether out of jealousy as you suggest, or for some other reason. d

EUTHYPHRO: On that point I am not very anxious to test their attitude toward me.

SOCRATES: Perhaps they think you give yourself sparingly, that you are unwilling to teach your wisdom. But I fear my own generosity is such that they think I am willing to pour myself out in speech to any man—not only without pay, but glad to pay myself if only someone will listen. So as I just said, if they laugh at me as you say they do at you, it would not be unpleasant to pass the time in court laughing and joking. But if they are in earnest, how it will then turn out is unclear—except to you prophets.

EUTHYPHRO: Perhaps it will not amount to much, Socrates. Perhaps you will settle your case satisfactorily, as I think I will mine.

SOCRATES: What about that, Euthyphro? Are you plaintiff or defendant?

EUTHYPHRO: Plaintiff.

SOCRATES: Against whom?

EUTHYPHRO: Someone I am again thought mad to prosecute. 4

SOCRATES: Really? Has he taken flight?

EUTHYPHRO: He is far from flying. As a matter of fact, he is well along in years.

SOCRATES: Who is he?

EUTHYPHRO: My father.

SOCRATES: Your *father*, dear friend?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, indeed.




SOCRATES: But what is the charge? What is the reason for the suit?

EUTHYPHRO: Murder, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Heracles! Surely, Euthyphro, the majority of people must be ignorant of what is right. Not just anyone would undertake a thing like that. It must require someone quite far gone in wisdom. b

EUTHYPHRO: Very far indeed, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Was the man your father killed a relative? But, of course, he must have been—you would not be prosecuting him for murder in behalf of a stranger.



a. The *Parthenon*, Athens, built 477–438 b.c. The *Parthenon*, dedicated to Athena, patron deity of Athens, was at one period rededicated to the Christian Virgin Mary and then later became a Turkish mosque. In 1687 a gunpowder explosion created the ruin we see today. The Doric shell remains as a monument to ancient architectural engineering expertise and to a sense of classical beauty and order. (Forrest E. Baird)

b. Restored plan of the Acropolis, 400 b.c. The history of the Acropolis is as varied as the style and size of the temples and buildings constructed atop the ancient site. (*Encyclopædia Britannica*, 1911)

c. This model of the Acropolis of Athens recreates the complexity of fifth century b.c. public space, which included centers for worship, public forum, and entertainment. (© Royal Ontario Museum)

d. Doric, Ionic, and Corinthian columns with their characteristic capitals. (Wilhelm Lübke e Max Semrau, *Grundriß der Kunstgeschichte*, 1908)

- EUTHYPHRO: It is laughable, Socrates, your thinking it makes a difference whether or not the man was a relative, and not this, and this alone: whether his slayer was justified. If so, let him off. If not, prosecute him, even if he shares your hearth and table. For if you knowingly associate with a man like that and do not cleanse both yourself and him by bringing action at law, the pollution is equal for you both. Now as a matter of fact, the dead man was a day-laborer of mine, and when we were farming in Naxos he worked for us for hire. Well, he got drunk and flew into a rage with one of our slaves and cut his throat. So my father bound him hand and foot, threw him in a ditch, and sent a man here to Athens to consult the religious adviser as to what should be done. In the meantime, my father paid no attention to the man he had bound; he neglected him because he was a murderer and it made no difference if he died. Which is just what he did. Before the messenger got back he died of hunger and cold and his bonds. But even so, my father and the rest of my relatives are angry at me for prosecuting my father for murder in behalf of a murderer. He did not kill him, they claim, and even if he did, still, the fellow was a murderer, and it is wrong to be concerned in behalf of a man like that—and anyway, it is unholy for a son to prosecute his father for murder. They little know, Socrates, how things stand in religious matters regarding the holy and the unholy.

SOCRATES: But in the name of Zeus, Euthyphro, do you think you yourself know so accurately how matters stand respecting divine law and things holy and unholy, that with the facts as you declare you can prosecute your own father without fear that it is you, on the contrary, who are doing an unholy thing?

- 5 EUTHYPHRO: I would not be much use, Socrates, nor would Euthyphro differ in any way from the majority of men, if I did not know all such things as this with strict accuracy.

SOCRATES: Well then, my gifted friend, I had best become your pupil. Before the action with Meletus begins I will challenge him on these very grounds. I will say that even in former times I was much concerned to learn about religious matters, but that now, in view of his claiming that I am guilty of loose speech and innovation in these things, I have become your pupil. "And if, Meletus," I shall say, "if you agree that Euthyphro is wise in such things, then assume that I worship correctly and drop the case. But if you do not agree, then obtain permission to indict my teacher here in my place for corrupting the old—me and his own father—by teaching me, and by chastising and punishing him." And if I cannot persuade him to drop charges or to indict you in place of me, may I not then say the same thing in court that I said in my challenge?

EUTHYPHRO: By Zeus, if he tried to indict me, I would find his weak spot, I think, and the discussion in court would concern him long before it concerned me.

SOCRATES: I realize that, my friend. That is why I want to become your pupil. I know that this fellow Meletus, and no doubt other people too, pretend not even to notice you; but he saw through me so keenly and easily that he indicted me for impiety. So now in Zeus's name, tell me what you confidently claimed just now that you knew: what sort of thing do you say the pious and impious are, with respect to murder and other things as well? Or is not the holy, just by itself, the same in every action? And the unholy, in turn, the opposite of all the holy—is it not like itself, and does not everything which is to be unholy have a certain single character with respect to unholiness?

EUTHYPHRO: No doubt, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then tell me, what do you say the holy is? And what is the unholy?

EUTHYPHRO: Well, I say that the holy I what I am doing now, prosecuting murder and temple theft and everything of the sort, whether father or mother or anyone else is guilty of it. And not prosecuting is unholy. Now, Socrates, examine the proof I give you that this is a dictate of divine law. I have offered it before to other people to show that it is established right not to let off someone guilty of impiety, no matter who he happens to be. For these same people worship Zeus as the best and most righteous of the gods. They agree that he put his own father in bonds for unjustly swallowing his children; yes, and that that father had in his turn castrated his father for similar reasons. Yet me they are angry at for indicting my father for his injustice. So they contradict themselves: they say one thing about the gods and another about me.

SOCRATES: I wonder if this is why I am being prosecuted, Euthyphro, because when anyone says such things about the gods, I somehow find it difficult to accept? Perhaps this is why people claim I transgress. But as it is, if even you who know such things so well accept them, people like me must apparently concede. What indeed are we to say, we who ourselves agree that we know nothing of them. But in the name of Zeus, the God of Friendship, tell me: do you truly believe that these things happened so?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, and things still more wonderful than these, Socrates, things the multitude does not know.

SOCRATES: Do you believe there is really war among the gods, and terrible enmities and battles, and other sorts of things our poets tell, which embellish other things sacred to us through the work of our capable painters, but especially the robe covered with embroidery that is carried to the Acropolis at the Great Panathenaea? Are we, Euthyphro, to say those things are so?

EUTHYPHRO: Not only those, Socrates. As I just said, I shall explain many other things about religion to you if you wish, and you may rest assured that what you hear will amaze you.

SOCRATES: I should not be surprised. But explain them another time at your leisure; right now, try to answer more clearly the question I just asked. For, my friend, you did not sufficiently teach me before, when I asked you what the holy is; you said that the thing you are doing now is holy, prosecuting your father for murder.

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, and I told the truth, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Perhaps. But, Euthyphro, are there not many other things you say are holy too?

EUTHYPHRO: Of course there are.

SOCRATES: Do you recall that I did not ask you to teach me about some one or two of the many things which are holy, but about that characteristic itself by which all holy things are holy? For you agreed, I think, that it is by one character that unholy things are unholy and holy things holy. Or do you not recall?

EUTHYPHRO: I do.

SOCRATES: Then teach me what this very character is, so that I may look to it and use it as a standard by which, should those things which you or someone else may do be of that sort, I may affirm them to be holy, but should they not be of that sort, deny it.

EUTHYPHRO: Well if you wish it so, Socrates, I shall tell you.

SOCRATES: I do indeed wish it.

7 EUTHYPHRO: Then what is dear to the gods is holy, and what is not dear to them is unholy.

SOCRATES: Excellent, Euthyphro. You have now answered as I asked. Whether correctly, I do not yet know—but clearly you will now go on to teach me in addition that what you say is true.

EUTHYPHRO: Of course.

SOCRATES: Come then, let us examine what it is we are saying. The thing and the person dear to the gods is holy; the thing and the person hateful to the gods is unholy; and the holy is not the same as the unholy, but its utter opposite. Is that what we are saying?

EUTHYPHRO: It is.

SOCRATES: Yes, and it appears to be well said?

b EUTHYPHRO: I think so, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Now, Euthyphro, we also said, did we not, that the gods quarrel and disagree with one another and that there is enmity among them?

EUTHYPHRO: We did.

c SOCRATES: But what is that disagreement which causes enmity and anger about, my friend? Look at it this way: If you and I disagreed about a question of number, about which of two sums is greater, would our disagreement cause us to become angry with each other and make us enemies? Or would we take to counting in a case like that, and quickly settle our dispute?

EUTHYPHRO: Of course we would.

SOCRATES: So too, if we disagreed about a question of the larger or smaller, we would take to measurement and put an end to our disagreement quickly?

EUTHYPHRO: True.

SOCRATES: And go to the balance, I imagine, to settle a dispute about heavier and lighter?

EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.

d SOCRATES: But what sort of thing would make us enemies, angry at each other, if we disagree about it and are unable to arrive at a decision? Perhaps you cannot say offhand, but I suggest you consider whether it would not be the just and unjust, beautiful and ugly, good and evil. Are not these the things, when we disagree about them and cannot reach a satisfactory decision, concerning which we on occasion become enemies—you, and I, and all other men?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates. This kind of disagreement has its source there.

SOCRATES: What about the gods, Euthyphro? If they were to disagree, would they not disagree for the same reasons?

EUTHYPHRO: Necessarily.

e SOCRATES: Then by your account, my noble friend, different gods must believe that different things are just—and beautiful and ugly, good and evil. For surely they would not quarrel unless they disagreed on this. True?

EUTHYPHRO: You are right.

SOCRATES: Now, what each of them believes to be beautiful and good and just they also love, and the opposites of those things they hate?

EUTHYPHRO: Of course.

8 SOCRATES: Yes, but the same things, you say, are thought by some gods to be just and by others unjust. Those are the things concerning which disagreement causes them to quarrel and make war on one another. True?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then the same things, it seems, are both hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and would be both dear to the gods and hateful to the gods.

EUTHYPHRO: It seems so.

SOCRATES: Then by this account, Euthyphro, the same things would be both holy and unholy.

EUTHYPHRO: I suppose so.

b SOCRATES: Then you have not answered my question, my friend. I did not ask you what same thing happens to be both holy and unholy; yet what is dear to the gods is hateful to the gods, it seems. And so, Euthyphro, it would not be surprising if what you are now doing in punishing your father were dear to Zeus, but hateful to Cronos and Uranus, and loved by Hephaestus, but hateful to Hera, and if any of the other gods disagree about it, the same will be true of them too.

EUTHYPHRO: But Socrates, surely none of the gods disagree about this, that he who kills another man unjustly should answer for it.

SOCRATES: Really, Euthyphro? Have you ever heard it argued among men that he who kills unjustly or does anything else unjustly should not answer for it? c

EUTHYPHRO: Why, people never stop arguing things like that, especially in the law courts. They do a host of wrongs and then say and do everything to get off.

SOCRATES: Yes, but do they admit the wrong, Euthyphro, and admitting it, nevertheless claim they should not answer for it?

EUTHYPHRO: No, they certainly do not do that.

SOCRATES: Then they do not do and say everything: for they do not, I think, dare to contend or debate the point that if they in fact did wrong they should not answer for it. Rather, I think, they deny they did wrong. Well? d

EUTHYPHRO: True.

SOCRATES: So they do not contend that those who do wrong should not answer for it, but rather, perhaps, about who it is that did the wrong, and what he did, and when.

EUTHYPHRO: True.

SOCRATES: Now is it not also the same with the gods, if as your account has it, they quarrel about what is just and unjust, and some claim that others do wrong and some deny it? Presumably no one, god or man, would dare to claim that he who does a wrong should not answer for it. e

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, on the whole what you say is true, Socrates.

SOCRATES: But I imagine that those who disagree—both men and gods, if indeed the gods do disagree—disagree about particular things which have been done. They differ over given actions, some claiming they were done justly and others unjustly. True?

EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: Come now, my friend, teach me and make me wiser. Where is your proof that all gods believe that a man has been unjustly killed who was hired as a laborer, became a murderer, was bound by the master of the dead slave, and died of his bonds before the man who bound him could learn from the religious advisers what to do? Where is your proof that it is right for a son to indict and prosecute his father for murder on behalf of a man like that? Come, try to show me clearly that all the gods genuinely believe this action right. If you succeed, I shall praise you for your wisdom and never stop. b

EUTHYPHRO: Well, I can certainly do it, Socrates, but it is perhaps not a small task.

SOCRATES: I see. You think I am harder to teach than the judges, for you will certainly make it clear to them that actions such as your father's are wrong, and that all the gods hate them.

EUTHYPHRO: Very clear indeed, Socrates, if they listen to what I say.

SOCRATES: They will listen, if you seem to speak well. But here is something that occurred to me while you were talking. I asked myself, "If Euthyphro were to teach me beyond any question that all the gods believe a death of this sort wrong, what more have I learned from Euthyphro about what the holy and the unholy are? The death, it seems, would be hateful to the gods, but what is holy and what is unholy proved just now not to be marked off by this, for what was hateful to the gods proved dear to the gods as well." So I let you off on that point, Euthyphro: if you wish, let all the gods believe your father's action wrong and let all of them hate it. But is this the correction we are now to make in your account, that what all the gods hate is unholy, and what all the gods love is holy, but what some love and some hate is neither or both? Do you mean for us now to mark off the holy and the unholy in that way? d

EUTHYPHRO: What is to prevent it, Socrates?

SOCRATES: Nothing, at least as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro. But, examine your account to see whether if you assume this, you will most easily teach me what you promised.

EUTHYPHRO: But I would certainly say that the holy is what all the gods love, and that the opposite, what all the gods hate, is unholy. e

SOCRATES: Well, Euthyphro, should we examine this in turn to see if it is true? Or should we let it go, accept it from ourselves or anyone else without more ado, and agree that a thing is so if only someone says it is? Or should we examine what a person means when he says something?

EUTHYPHRO: Of course. I believe, though, that this time what I say is true.

SOCRATES: Perhaps we shall learn better, my friend. For consider: is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy? Or is it holy because it is loved by the gods? 10

EUTHYPHRO: I do not know what you mean, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then I will try to put it more clearly. We speak of earning and being carried, of leading and being led, of seeing and being seen. And you understand in such cases, do you not, that the, differ from each other, and how they differ?

EUTHYPHRO: I think I do.

SOCRATES: Now, is there such a thing as being loved, and is it different from loving?

EUTHYPHRO: Of course.

b SOCRATES: Then tell me: if a thing is being carried, is it being carried because of the carrying, or for some other reason?

EUTHYPHRO: No, for that reason.

SOCRATES: And if a thing is being led, it is being led because of the leading? And if being seen, being seen because of the seeing?

EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.

c SOCRATES: Then it is not because a thing is being seen that the seeing exists; on the contrary, it is because of the seeing that it is being seen. Nor is it because a thing is being led that the leading exists; it is because of the leading that it is being led. Nor is it because a thing is being carried that the carrying exists; it is because of the carrying that it is being carried. Is what I mean quite clear, Euthyphro? I mean this: if something comes to be or something is affected, it is not because it is a thing which is coming to be that the process of coming to be exists, but, because of the process of coming to be, it is a thing which is coming to be; and it is not because it is affected that the affecting exist, but because of the affecting, the thing is affected. Do you agree?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Now, what is being loved is either a thing coming to be something or a something affected by something.

EUTHYPHRO: Of course,

SOCRATES: And so it is as true here as it was before: it is not because a thing is being loved that there is loving by those who love it; it is because of the loving that it is being loved.

EUTHYPHRO: Necessarily.

d SOCRATES: Then what are we to say about the holy, Euthyphro? Is it loved by all the gods, as your account has it?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Because it is holy? Or for some other reason?

EUTHYPHRO: No, for that reason.

SOCRATES: Then it is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?

EUTHYPHRO: It seems so.

SOCRATES: Moreover, what is loved and dear to the gods is loved because of their loving.

EUTHYPHRO: Of course.

SOCRATES: Then what is dear to the gods is not [the same as] holy, Euthyphro, nor is the holy [the same as] dear to the gods, as you claim: the two are different.

e EUTHYPHRO: But why, Socrates?

SOCRATES: Because we agreed that the holy is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved.

EUTHYPHRO: Yes.

SOCRATES: But what is dear to the gods is, because it is loved by the gods, dear to the gods by reason of this same loving; it is not loved because it is dear to the gods.

EUTHYPHRO: True.

11 SOCRATES: But if in fact what is dear to the gods and the holy were the same, my friend, then, if the holy were loved because it is holy, what is dear to the gods would be loved because it is dear to the gods; but if what is dear to the gods were dear to the gods because the gods love it, the holy would be holy because it is loved. But as it is, you see, the opposite is true, and the two are completely different. For the one (what is dear to the gods) is of the sort to be loved *because* it is loved; the other (the holy), because it is of the sort to be loved, *therefore* is loved. It would seem, Euthyphro, that when you asked what the holy is, you did not mean to make its nature and reality clear to me; you mentioned a mere affection of it—the holy has been so affected as to be loved by all the gods. But what it really is, you have not yet said. So if b you please, Euthyphro, do not conceal things from me: start again from the beginning and tell me what sort of thing the holy is. We will not quarrel over whether it is loved by the gods, or whether it is affected in other ways. Tell me in earnest: what is the holy and unholy?

EUTHYPHRO: But, Socrates, I do not know how to tell you what I mean. Somehow everything I propose goes round in circles on us and will not stand still.

SOCRATES: Your words are like the words of my ancestor, Daedalus^{*}. If I had offered them, if I had put them forward, you would perhaps have laughed at me because my kinship to him makes my words run away and refuse to stay put. But as things are, it is you who put them forward and we must find another joke. It is for you that they refuse to stand still, as you yourself agree. c

EUTHYPHRO: But, Socrates, the joke, I think, still tells. It is not me who makes them move around and not stay put. I think you are the Daedalus. If it had been up to me, they would have stayed where they were. d

SOCRATES: Then apparently, my friend, I am even more skillful than my venerated ancestor, inasmuch as he made only his own works move, whereas I, it seems, not only make my own move but other people's too. And certainly the most subtle feature of my art is that I am skilled against my will. For I really want arguments to stand still, to stand fixed and immovable. I want that more than the wealth of Tantalus and the skill of Daedalus combined. But enough of this. Since you seem to be lazy and soft, I will come to your aid and help you teach me about the holy. Don't give up; consider whether you do not think that all the holy is necessarily just. e

EUTHYPHRO: I do.

SOCRATES: Then is all the just holy? Or is all the holy just, but not all the just holy—part of it holy, part something else? 12

EUTHYPHRO: I don't follow you, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And yet you are as much wiser than I am as you are younger. As I said, you are lazy and soft because of your wealth of wisdom. My friend, extend yourself: what I mean is not hard to understand. I mean exactly the opposite of what the poet meant when he said that he was "unwilling to insult Zeus, the Creator, who made all things; for where there is fear there is also reverence." I disagree with him. Shall I tell you why? b

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, certainly.

SOCRATES: I do not think that "where there is fear there is also reverence." I think people fear disease and poverty and other such things fear them, but have no reverence for what they fear. Do you agree?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, certainly.

SOCRATES: Where there is reverence, however, there is also fear. For if anyone stands in reverence and awe of something, does he not at the same time fear and dread the imputation of wickedness? c

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, he does.

SOCRATES: Then it is not true that "where there is fear there is also reverence," but rather where there is reverence there is also fear, even though reverence is not everywhere that fear is: fear is broader than reverence. Reverence is part of fear just as odd is part of number, so that it is not true that where there is number there is odd, but where there is odd there is number. Surely you follow me now?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do.

SOCRATES: Well then, that is the sort of thing I had in mind when I asked if, where there is just, there is also holy. Or is it rather that where there is holy there is also just, but holy is not everywhere just is, since the holy is part of the just. Shall we say that, or do you think differently? d

EUTHYPHRO: No, I think you are right.

SOCRATES: Then consider the next point. If the holy is part of the just, it would seem that we must find out what part of the just the holy is. Now, to take an example we used a moment ago, if you were to ask what part of number the even is, and what kind of number it is, I would say that it is number with equal rather than unequal sides. Do you agree?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do.

SOCRATES: Then try in the same way to teach me what part of the just is holy, so that I may tell Meletus to wrong me no longer and not to indict me for impiety, since I have already learned from you what things are pious and holy and what are not. e

EUTHYPHRO: Well, Socrates, I think that part of the just which is pious and holy is about ministering to the gods, and the remaining part of the just is about ministering to men.

SOCRATES: That appears excellently put, Euthyphro. But there is still one small point left; I do not yet understand what you mean by "ministering." You surely do not mean that ministering to the gods is like 13

* Daedalus' statues were claimed to be so realistic that they came alive.

ministering to other things, though I suppose we do talk that way, as when we say that it is not everyone who knows how to minister to horses, but only the horse-trainer. That is true, is it not?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, certainly.

SOCRATES: Because horse-training takes care of horses.

EUTHYPHRO: Yes.

SOCRATES: And it is not everyone who knows how to minister to dogs, but only the huntsman.

EUTHYPHRO: True.

b SOCRATES: Because huntsmanship takes care of dogs.

EUTHYPHRO: Yes.

SOCRATES: And the same is true of herdsmanship and cattle?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, certainly.

SOCRATES: And holiness and piety minister to the gods, Euthyphro? Is that what you are saying?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, it is.

SOCRATES: Now, is not all ministering meant to accomplish the same thing? I mean this: to take care of a thing is to aim at some good, some benefit, for the thing cared for, as you see horses benefitted and improved when ministered to by horse-training. Do you not agree?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do.

c SOCRATES: And dogs are benefitted by huntsmanship, and cattle by herdsmanship, and similarly with other things as well—or do you think ministering can work harm to what is cared for?

EUTHYPHRO: No, by Zeus, not I.

SOCRATES: But rather is beneficial?

EUTHYPHRO: Of course.

SOCRATES: Now, does holiness, which is to be a kind of ministering, benefit the gods? Does it improve them? Would you really agree that when you do something holy you are making some god better?

EUTHYPHRO: No, by Zeus, not I.

d SOCRATES: I did not think you meant that, Euthyphro. Far from it. That is why I asked you what you meant by ministering to the gods: I did not believe you meant such a thing as that.

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, and you were right, Socrates. I did not mean that.

SOCRATES: Very well. But what kind of ministering to the gods is holiness?

EUTHYPHRO: The kind, Socrates, which slaves minister to their masters.

SOCRATES: I see. Holiness would, it seems, be a kind of service to gods.

EUTHYPHRO: Quite so.

SOCRATES: Now, can you tell me what sort of product service to physicians would be likely to produce? Would it not be health?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes.

e SOCRATES: What about service to ship-builders? Is there not some product it produces?

EUTHYPHRO: Clearly it produces a ship, Socrates.

SOCRATES: And service to house-builders produces a house?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then tell me, my friend: What sort of product would service to the gods produce? Clearly you know, for you say you know better than anyone else about religious matters.

EUTHYPHRO: Yes; and I am telling the truth, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then in the name of Zeus, tell me: What is that fine product which the gods produce, using us as servants?

EUTHYPHRO: They produce many things, Socrates, excellent things.

14 SOCRATES: So do generals, my friend, but still their work can be summed up quite easily. Generals produce victory in war. Not so?

EUTHYPHRO: Of course.

SOCRATES: And farmers too produce many excellent things, but still their work can be summed up as producing food from the earth.

EUTHYPHRO: Of course.

SOCRATES: But what about the many excellent things the gods produce? How does one sum up their production?

b EUTHYPHRO: I told you a moment ago, Socrates, that it is difficult to learn accurately how things stand in the matters. Speaking freely, however, I can tell you that if a man knows how to say and do things

acceptable to the gods in prayer and sacrifice, those things are holy; and they preserve both families and cities and keep them safe. The opposite of what is acceptable to the gods is impious, and this overturns and destroys all things.

SOCRATES: You could have summed up the answer to my question much more briefly, Euthyphro, if you had wished. But you are not eager to instruct me; I see that now. In fact, you just came right up to the point and turned away, and if you had given me an answer, I would by now have learned holiness from you. But as it is, the questioner must follow the answerer wherever he leads: So that do you say the holy and holiness is this time? Knowledge of how to pray and sacrifice? c

EUTHYPHRO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Now, to sacrifice is to give to the gods and to pray is to ask something from them?

EUTHYPHRO: Exactly, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then by this account, holiness is knowledge of how to ask from and give to the gods. d

EUTHYPHRO: Excellent, Socrates. You have followed what I said.

SOCRATES: Yes, my friend, for I am enamored of your wisdom and attend to it closely, so naturally what you say does not fall to the ground wasted. But tell me, what is the nature of this service we render the gods? You say it is to ask from them and give to them?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do.

SOCRATES: Now, to ask rightly is to ask for things we need from them?

EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.

SOCRATES: And again, to give rightly is to give in return what they happen to need from us? For e surely there would be no skill involved in giving things to someone that he did not need.

EUTHYPHRO: You are right, Socrates.

SOCRATES: So the art of holiness would be a kind of business transaction between gods and men.

EUTHYPHRO: Yes; if it pleases you to call it that.

SOCRATES: Why, nothing pleases me unless it happens to be true. But tell me, what benefit do the gods gain from the gifts they receive from us? It is clear to everyone what they give, for we have nothing good they have not given. But how are they benefited by what they get from us? Or do we claim the larger share in the transaction to such an extent that we get all good from them, and they nothing from us? 15

EUTHYPHRO: But, Socrates, do you think the gods benefit from the things they receive from us?

SOCRATES: Why, Euthyphro, whatever could these gifts of ours to the gods then be?

EUTHYPHRO: What do you suppose, other than praise and honor and as I just said, things which are acceptable?

SOCRATES: Then the holy is what is acceptable, Euthyphro, and not what is beneficial or loved by the gods? b

EUTHYPHRO: I certainly think it is loved by the gods, beyond all other things.

SOCRATES: Then, on the contrary, the holy is what is loved by the gods.

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, that beyond anything.

SOCRATES: Will it surprise you if in saying this your words get up and walk? You call me a Daedalus. You say I make them walk. But I say that you are a good deal more skillful than Daedalus, for you make them walk in circles. Or are you not aware that our account has gone round and come back again to the same place? Surely you remember in what went before that the holy appeared to us not to be the same as what is loved by the gods: the two were different. Do you recall? c

EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I recall.

SOCRATES: Then do you not now realize that you are saying what is loved by the gods is holy? But the holy in fact is something other than dear to the gods, is it not?

EUTHYPHRO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Then either we were wrong a moment ago in agreeing to that, or, if we were right in assuming it then, we are wrong in what we are saying now.

EUTHYPHRO: It seems so.

SOCRATES: Let us begin again from the beginning, and ask what the holy is, for I shall not willingly give up until I learn. Please do not scorn me: bend every effort of your mind and now tell me the truth. d You know it if any man does, and, like Proteus, you must not be let go before you speak. For if you did not know the holy and unholy with certainty, you could not possibly undertake to prosecute your aged father for murder in behalf of a hired man. You would fear to risk the gods, lest your action be wrongful, and you

would be ashamed before men. But as it is, I am confident that you think you know with certainty what is holy and what is not. So say it, friend Euthyphro. Do not conceal what it is you believe.

EUTHYPHRO: Some other time, Socrates. Right now I must hurry somewhere and I am already late.

SOCRATES: What are you doing, my friend! You leave me and cast me down from my high hope that I should learn from you what things are holy and what are not. And escape the indictment of Meletus by showing him that, due to Euthyphro, I am now wise in religious matters, that I no longer ignorantly indulge in loose speech and innovation, and most especially, that I shall live better the rest of my life.

APOLOGY*

Characters

Socrates

Meletus

Scene—The Court of Justice

SOOCRATES: In what way you, Athenian men, have been moved by my accusers, I do not know. As for myself, even I almost forgot myself on account of them, so persuasively did they speak. And yet, in a way, they said nothing true. I wondered, most of all, at one of the many falsehoods which they told—the one in which they said that you need to be on guard lest you should be deceived by me, as I am a clever speaker. That they are not ashamed that they will be immediately refuted by me in deed, when I appear in no way to be a clever speaker, seemed to me to be most shameful of them, unless of course they call the one who speaks the truth a clever speaker. For if this is what they are saying, then I would agree that I am an orator, though not of their sort. As I say, therefore, they have said little or nothing true, but from me you will hear the whole truth. By Zeus, Athenian men, neither speeches beautified like theirs with phrases and words, nor contrived, but rather you will hear what is spoken in words as they happen at random, since I trust the things I say to be just. And let none of you expect otherwise. For surely, it is not fitting, men, for someone of my age to come before you like a youth making up speeches. And above everything, Athenian men, I beg and implore this of you. If you hear me defend myself with the very speeches I am accustomed to speak both in the marketplace at the counters, where many of you have heard me, and elsewhere, neither be amazed nor clamor because of this. For it holds thus: for the first time, before a court of justice I come, at the age of seventy. Therefore, I am simply foreign to the ways of speaking here. If I happened to be a foreigner, you would surely sympathize with me if I spoke in the dialect and way in which I was raised, likewise I also beg it of you now, and it is just as it appears to me. Disregard my way of speaking, for perhaps it is worse, perhaps better, but rather consider this alone and apply your mind to it: whether or not the things I say are just. For this is the virtue of a judge, that of an orator, to speak the truth.

First, then, I am right to defend myself, Athenian men, against the first false accusations and my first accusers, and then next against the later accusations and the later accusers. To you, many have accused me from long ago and already for many years, yet they say nothing true. Of them, I am more afraid than of Anytus** and those among him, though they too are dangerous. But those are more dangerous, men, the one's laying hold of many of you since childhood, who persuaded you and accused me of nothing true: that there is a Socrates, a wise man, a ponderer on the things above, and one who has investigated all the things under the earth and makes the weaker speech stronger.

Plato, *Apology*, translated by Mark Kremer (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Focus/Hackett, 2006). Reprinted with permission of Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., All rights reserved.

* The word for apology is *apologia* and can be used to mean legal defense, but is used by Plato to mean something deeper, as in the accounting or justification for one's very existence, which can be justified by nature as opposed to law or *nomos*.

** Anytus was a tanner, who became wealthy and eventually held a leading political position in the democracy.

Those ones, Athenian men, who have spread this report are my dangerous accusers, since the ones c
 who listen think that those who investigate these things do not believe in the gods. Furthermore, these
 accusers are many and have accused me for a long time and, moreover, said these things to you in those
 years in which you are most trusting, some of you being children and some youths, and they accused me
 in a case that was entirely by default, there being no one to defend. And, the thing most unaccountable
 of all is that it is impossible to know and to say their names, unless one should be a comic poet.* They
 persuaded you using envy and slander and the ones having been persuaded themselves, persuaded others. d
 All of these are most difficult to deal with, for to bring any of them forward here is not possible, nor to
 refute any of them, but it is simply necessary, as if fighting shadows, to speak in my defense and to refute
 with no one to respond. You too consider it to be exactly as I say—that there are two groups of accusers,
 the ones accusing me now and the ones long ago of whom I speak. And, consider it necessary as well to
 first defend myself against these first, because both earlier and much more than the later ones did you hear e
 them accusing me.

Well then, a defense speech is necessary, O Athenian men, as well as an attempt to remove from
 you, in the little time here, the slander that you acquired over much time. I would wish things might be 19
 like that, were it in any way better for both you and me, and that I, in making a defense speech, might
 accomplish something. I consider this to be hard and I am not entirely forgetful of it. Nonetheless, let it be
 in whatever way is dear to the god, though it is necessary to obey the law and to make a defense speech.

Let us take up, therefore, from the beginning what the accusation is from which the slander against b
 me has arisen—and in which Meletus trusted when he wrote the indictment against me. Well then, what-
 ever did the slanderers say in their slanders? Just like accusers, their charge must be read: “Socrates does
 injustice and is a busybody, investigating the things beneath the earth and in the heavens and making the
 weaker speech the stronger, and teaching these things to others.” It is like this. You yourselves have also seen c
 such things in the comedy of Aristophanes, a Socrates paraded about claiming to walk on air and spouting
 much other nonsense about which I have no knowledge, neither much nor little. I do not say this in order
 to dishonor this kind of knowledge, if anyone is wise in such subjects, only let me not be prosecuted by
 Meletus on such charges, for, in fact, Athenian men, I have no share in these matters. As witnesses, I offer d
 once more yourselves, and I deem it well that you teach and also tell one another—the ones of you who
 at any time heard me conversing, and many are such ones among you, if ever, either little or great, anyone
 of you heard me conversing about such things, and from this you will see that it is likewise for the other
 things that the many say concerning me.

But, in fact, neither are these things so, and if you have heard from anyone that I attempt to educate
 human beings and take money, neither is that true either. Though this too seems to me to be noble, if one e
 should be able to educate human beings just as Gorgias the Leontine, and Prodicus the Ceon, and Hippias
 the Elean. For of these, each, men, is able, going into each of the cities, to persuade the young, who can
 be with, for free, any of their own citizens whom they wish, to abandon being with these ones and to be 20
 with themselves and to give them money and to show thanks besides.

And there is another wise man from Paros here, who I thought was residing in town, for I chanced
 to encounter a Callias, son of Hipponicus, who has paid out more money to sophists than all others taken
 together. Therefore, I questioned him, for he had two sons—“Callias,” I said, “if your sons were born colts
 or calves, then we could get and hire for them an overseer, who would make both of them noble and good b
 in the virtue belonging to them, he being someone from either horsemen or farmers. But now, since they
 are human beings, who do you have in mind to get to oversee them? Who is a knower of such virtue—that
 of a human being and also of a citizen? For I suppose you have carefully considered it, on account of your
 having two sons. Is there someone,” I said, “or not?”

“Very much so” he said.

“Who” I said, “and where and for how much does he teach?”

“Evenus” he said, “Socrates, from Paros, five minae.”

And I deemed blessed Evenus, if truly he possessed this art and teaches at so modest a price. I, at any c
 rate, would be preening myself on it, if I knew these things. But I do not know, Athenian men.

Now, one of you might object: “But, Socrates, what is your affair? From where did these slanders
 against you come? For surely if you were not engaging in anything any more than others, then such a

* Aristophanes, who parodied Socrates’ wisdom in the *Clouds*.

rumor and account would not have been born, unless you were practicing something other than the many.

d Therefore, tell us what it is, lest we treat you rashly.”

These things, it seems to me, are just—those the speaker says. And I shall attempt to show from whence this came, which brought to me this name and slander. Listen. Perhaps I will seem to some of you to be joking, but be assured, I will tell you the whole truth. For I, Athenian men, have received this name on account of nothing but a certain wisdom. What kind of wisdom is this? Perhaps that wisdom belonging
e to a human being. With respect to that, I probably really have this wisdom. Whereas, those of whom I just spoke, are by chance wise in either some wisdom greater than human wisdom, or some I don’t know what. For I do not know it, and whoever says I do lies, and speaks in order to slander me. And, Athenian men, do not clamor against me, not even if I appear to you to speak somewhat boastfully. For “not mine is the story” which I will tell but I will attribute it to a speaker, an authority for you. For with respect to me, if I have
21 any wisdom and of what sort, I will provide as witness to you the god in Delphi. You know Chaerephon, surely. He was my companion from youth and a fellow to many of you, and he shared your late exile and returned with you. And you know what type Chaerephon was, so fervent in what he would undertake. And once, indeed, having gone into Delphi, he ventured to ask this of the oracle, and again I say—do not clamor, men, for he asked if anyone was wiser than me. Then the Pythia[★] answered that no one was wiser. And about these things his brother here will give testimony to you, since the other has himself reached his end.

b Now consider the reasons for what I say, for I intend to teach you from where the slander against me has come. For I, learning these things, pondered thus: “Whatever is the god saying, and what riddle is he speaking? As I, in fact, am conscious that I am not wise, either much or little. Whatever, then, does he say when asserting that I am wisest? For certainly, at the least, he is not speaking falsely, for that is not decreed for him.” And for a long time, I was at a loss about what he even meant, then, very reluctantly, I turned to an investigation of it something like this: I went to those opined to be wise, as there, if anywhere,
c I would refute the divination and show to the oracle “that this man is wiser than me, but you said I was wisest.” Considering this man, therefore, for it is not necessary to speak his name, he was, however, one



The *Thólos* at Delphi with the *Sanctuary of Apollo* in the background. Socrates’ friend, Chaerophon, went to the famous oracle at Delphi to ask if there was anyone wiser than Socrates. The oracle, who usually gave very cryptic answers, responded with a simple “no.” This led Socrates on a quest to find someone wiser than himself—a quest which resulted in Socrates making a number of influential enemies. (Forrest E. Baird)

★ The Pythia delivered Apollo’s oracles at Delphi.

of the politicians, and considering him and speaking with him, men of Athens, I received an impression something like the following: it seemed to me that this man seemed to be wise to many human beings and most of all to himself, yet he was not. Then I attempted to show him that he thought he was wise but was not. From this I became hated by him and by many of those present. When I went away, I reasoned with respect to myself: "I am wiser than this human being for it is likely that neither of us know anything noble and good, but this one thinks he knows something while not knowing, whereas I, as I do not know, do not think to know. At any rate, I am likely to be a bit wiser than this one with respect to this peculiar thing—that which I do not know, I do not think to know."

From there, I went to another, one opined to be wiser than him, and these things seemed to me the same. And from that point, I incurred the hatred of both him and many others.

After this, I went from one to another, perceiving, distressed, and fearing that I was incurring hatred. Nonetheless, it seemed to be necessary to hold the matter of the god as most important. Therefore, to consider what the oracle meant, I had to go to all those reputed to know something. And by the dog, Athenian men, as it is necessary to speak the truth to you, I really underwent something like the following: the ones with the best reputations appeared to me to be nearly most deficient in my investigation in accord with the god, whereas others with paltrier reputations appeared to be men more suited to having prudence.

In fact, it is necessary to present to you my wandering as the doing of certain labors, for the sake of the oracle becoming irrefutable. After the politicians, I went to the poets, the ones of tragedies and the ones of dithyrambs, and the others, so that there I would lay hold of myself in the act of being more ignorant than them. Therefore, I took up their poems that seemed to me they had worked on most, and questioned them about what they said, in order that at the same time I might also learn something from them. I am ashamed to tell you, men, the truth, nonetheless, it must be spoken. For so to speak, nearly all of those present could have spoken better about the poems than the ones who made them. Thus again with respect to the poets as well, I soon realized that they do not make what they make by wisdom but by some kind of nature and inspiration like the diviners and deliverers of oracles. For these also say many noble things, but they understand nothing of what they say. It was clear to me that the poets too are affected in the same manner. And at the same time, I perceived that they thought, because of their poetry, that they were the wisest of men in other things as well, in which they were not. Thus I left there too, thinking that in the end I was superior to them in like manner as I was to the politicians.

Finally, I went to the manual artisans, for I was conscious that I had knowledge, so to say, of nothing but surely I would discover that they knew many noble things. And I was not deceived in this, for they knew of things of which I did not know, and in this respect were wiser than me. Yet, Athenian men, it seemed to me that the good craftsmen had failed in the very same manner as the poets. Since each one executed his own art nobly, he thought himself wisest and worthy of other things—the greatest things, and this erroneous note of theirs hid their wisdom. Thus I asked myself for the sake of the oracle whether I would prefer to be just as I am, neither being wise at all in their wisdom, nor ignorant in their ignorance, or to possess both things they have. I answered to myself, and to the oracle, that it pays me to be just as I am.

From this investigation, Athenian men, much hatred has come, the most grievous and serious kind, so that many slanders have arisen from them, and I received this appellation of being "wise", for those present at each occasion think that I am wise in those things about which I refute others, whereas it is likely, men, that the god is wise, and that the oracle meant that human wisdom is worth little or nothing. And he appears to say this of Socrates and to have made use of my name for the sake of making of me a pattern, as if to say, "the one of you, human beings, is wisest, who, just like Socrates, realizes that in truth, he is worth nothing in regard to wisdom."

Thus, up until now, I continue seeking and investigating, in accord with the god, any townsmen or foreigner I think to be wise. And whenever he appears to me not to be, I show that he is not and come to the assistance of the god. And as the result of this occupation, I have no leisure either to attend in a way worthy of speaking about the affairs of the city or the affairs of my family. Rather, I am in ten-thousand-fold poverty on account of my devotion to the god.

In addition to this, the young who voluntarily follow me, the ones who have the most leisure—the sons of the wealthiest—delight in hearing human beings questioned and often imitate me, and themselves attempt to question others. And, then, I think they find a great many human beings who think they know something, yet know little or nothing. Thence, the ones questioned by them are angry at me, not themselves, and say that Socrates is someone most vile and corrupts the young. And whenever someone asks them, "By doing what and teaching what?" they have nothing to say but are ignorant, and not to appear at

a loss, they assert the things ready at hand against all philosophers: “the things above and the things below the earth” and “not believing in the gods” and “making the weaker speech the stronger.” For I don’t think, e they would wish to speak the truth, that in the end it is clear that they pretend to know while knowing nothing. Therefore, as they are, I think, ambitious and vehement and numerous, and as they have spoken of me in an orderly and persuasive manner for a long time, they have filled your ears.

From among these men, Meletus, Anytus, and Lycon attacked me. Meletus being angry on behalf of the poets, Anytus on behalf of the craftsmen and the politicians, and Lycon on behalf of the orators. Thus, 24 as I said in the beginning, it would be a wonder to me, should I be able in so short a time to remove from you this slander which has grown to be so great. Athenian men, this is the truth for you. I am concealing from you nothing in my speech, either great or small, nor am I holding anything back, though I know well that I exact hatred from these very things, which is also proof that I speak the truth and that this is b the slander against me and that these are its causes. And if you should investigate these things now or later, you will find it thus.

So with respect to the things of which my first accusers accused me, let this be a sufficient apology to you. Against Meletus, however, the good and patriotic, as he says, and the later accusers, I will attempt next to give a defense. Here again, as if they were any other accuser, let us take up their sworn statement. It is like this: Socrates, it says, does injustice by corrupting the young, and not believing in the gods in which c the city believes, but rather in other, strange *daimonia*.^{*} Such are the charges. Let us examine the charge in each of its particulars.

He says I do injustice by corrupting the youth, but, Athenian men, I say Meletus does, because he jokes with respect to a serious matter, readily bringing human beings to trial, pretending to be serious and earnest about matters for which he cared nothing at all. That it is thus, I will attempt to show you.

d Now, come then, Meletus, and tell me: do you not consider how the youth will be the best possible as most important?

MELETUS: I do

SOCRATES: Come then, tell those men, who is it that makes them better. For it is clear that you know, since you care. For having discovered the one who corrupts them, as you say, namely myself, you bring me before these men and accuse me. Come then, tell them and inform them who it is. Do you see, Meletus, that you are silent and have nothing to say? And does it not seem to you to be disgraceful and a sufficient proof of the very thing I say—that you never cared? Tell me, my good man, who makes them better?

MELETUS: The laws.

e SOCRATES: But that is not what I am asking, best of men, but rather what human being is it who first of all knows this very thing—the laws.

MELETUS: These ones, Socrates, the judges.

SOCRATES: How do you mean, Meletus? Are these ones here able to educate the young and make them better?

MELETUS: Most definitely.

SOCRATES: All of them, or some of them and some not?

MELETUS: All.

SOCRATES: You speak well, by Hera, and of a great abundance of benefactors. What then? The ones listening, do they make them better or not?

25 MELETUS: Them also.

SOCRATES: What about the councilmen?

MELETUS: The councilmen too.

SOCRATES: Then, Meletus, the ones in the Assembly, the Assemblymen, they do not corrupt the young? Or do they also make them better?

MELETUS: Those as well.

SOCRATES: Then it seems that all the Athenians make them noble and good except me; I alone corrupt them. Is this what you are asserting?

^{*} *Daimonia* are certain bastard children of the gods, and, therefore, are appropriate go-betweens joining Socrates and the divine.

MELETUS: I do assert this most emphatically.

SOCRATES: You charge me with a great misfortune. Now, answer me. Does it also seem to be the same to you with respect to horses? Do all human beings make them better, but one particular one is the corrupter? Or is it wholly contrary to this, that one particular one is able to make them better—or the very few who are skilled with horses, whereas the many, if they ever have to do with horses and use them, make them worse? Is it not thus, Meletus, with respect to both horses and all other animals?

It certainly is, whether you or Anytus deny it or affirm it. For it would be a great happiness for the young if one alone corrupts, and many other confer benefits. However, Meletus, you have sufficiently shown that you have never given any thought to the young, and you make clear your own lack of concern, as you care nothing for the things for which you have brought me to court.

But continue to tell us, Meletus, by Zeus, whether it is better to live with decent citizens or knaves. Answer sir, for I am asking of you nothing difficult. Do not knaves do something bad to those who are always near them, whereas the good something good?

MELETUS: Very much so.

SOCRATES: Is there anyone, then, who wishes to be harmed by those he is with rather than to be benefited? Answer, good man, for the law commands you to answer. Is there anyone who wishes to be harmed?

MELETUS: Surely not.

SOCRATES: Come then, do you bring me here asserting that I corrupt the young voluntarily and make them more knavish, or involuntarily?

MELETUS: Voluntarily, I say.

SOCRATES: What, then, Meletus, are you so much wiser at your time of life than me at mine, so that you know that the bad always do something bad to those nearest them, and the good something good, while I have come into so much ignorance as not to know that if ever I do something vile to one of my companions, I will risk receiving in return something bad from him? And, yet, I do so much bad voluntarily, as you say? Of this I am not persuaded by you, Meletus, nor do I think is any other human being. But either I do not corrupt, or if I do corrupt, I do it involuntarily, so that in both cases what you say is false.

And if I corrupt involuntarily, it is not the law to bring me here for such involuntary offenses but rather for you, in private, to take me aside and teach me and admonish me. For it is evident that if I learn, I will at least cease what I do involuntarily. But you fled being with me and teaching me, and were not willing, but you brought me here, where the law is to bring those who need punishment, but not learning.

Thus, then, Athenian men, what I was saying is already evident—that Meletus never cared either much or little about these matters. Nonetheless, tell us, Meletus, how do you mean that I corrupt the youth? Is it not clear from the indictment which you brought, that it is by teaching them not to believe in the gods in whom the city believes, but in other *daimonia* that are novel? Do you not say that by teaching these things, I corrupt them?

MELETUS: Certainly, I most emphatically do say so.

SOCRATES: By these very gods, then, Meletus, of whom our discussion now is, speak to me and these men more clearly. For I cannot understand if you mean that I teach them to believe that there are some kind of gods—and thus that I myself believe that there are gods and am not myself completely without god, nor do injustice in this respect, but that I do not believe in those in which the city believes, but in others, and this is your charge against me, that I believe in others. Or do you mean that I do not believe in any gods and that I teach this to others?

MELETUS: I say that you do not believe in gods at all.

SOCRATES: O wondrous Meletus, on account of what do you say this? Do I not, then, as other human beings, even believe that the sun and moon are gods?

MELETUS: No by Zeus, judges, as he asserts that the sun is stone and the moon is earth.

SOCRATES: Do you think you are accusing Anaxagoras, dear Meletus? And do you thus despise these men and suppose them to be so inexperienced in letters as not to know that the book of Anaxagoras of Clazomene is full of these accounts. And, moreover, that the young learn these things from me, which they can purchase at times in the orchestra for a drachma at most; and, then, to mock Socrates if he were

to pretend they were his own, especially since they are so atypical. But, before Zeus, is it thus I appear to you? That I believe there is no god?

MELETUS: Absolutely not, by Zeus, in no way at all do you believe.

27 SOCRATES: You are unbelievable, Meletus, even to yourself, as it seems to me. For this man, Athenian men, appears to me to be very hubristic and unrestrained and simply to have brought this indictment with some sort of hubris, intemperance, and youthful rashness. He seems like someone testing me by composing a riddle: "Will Socrates the wise know that I am jesting and that I contradict myself, or will I deceive him and the rest of the audience?" For he seems to me to contradict himself in the indictment, as if he should say, Socrates does injustice in not believing that there are gods and believing that there are gods. And surely this is the conduct of one who jests.

b Consider with me now, men, how he appears to me to assert this. And you answer us, Meletus. And you others, as I begged you at the outset, do not clamor if I speak in my accustomed way.

Is there any human being, Meletus, who believes that there are human affairs but does not believe that there are human beings?

c Let him answer, men, and do not clamor incessantly. Is there anyone who does not believe that there are horses, but believes that there are affairs related to horses? Or anyone who does not believe in flute-players, but believes in matters related to flutes? There is not, O best of men. Lest you do not wish to answer, I speak to you and these others. But at least answer to this: "Is there anyone who believes in affairs related to *daimonia* but does not believe in *daimons*?"

MELETUS: There is not.

d SOCRATES: How helpful of you to answer reluctantly when compelled by these men. Now then, you assert that I believe in and teach things related to *daimons*. Therefore, whether old or new, according to your account, I do believe in things related to *daimons* and this you swore to in the indictment. But if I believe in things related to *daimons*, surely there is also much necessity for me to believe in *daimons*. Is it not thus? It sure is. I put you down as agreeing since you do not answer. But with respect to *daimons*, do we not believe they are gods or children of gods? Do you assert or not?

MELETUS: Much indeed.

SOCRATES: Thus, then, I do believe in *daimons*, as you say, and if *daimons* are some kind of god, then it is this about which I say you riddle and jest: asserting that I do not believe in gods, though I believe in *daimons*.

e But if *daimons* are certain bastard children of gods, either from nymphs or from some other of whom it is said, what human being believes in children of gods, but not in gods? For it would be strange, just as if someone believed in mules, children of horses or asses, but did not believe that there are horses or asses.

28 But Meletus, it cannot be other than that you brought this indictment either to try us in these things or because you were at a loss at what true injustice to allege against me. That you could persuade any human being, even one of little intelligence, that the same man believes there are things related to *daimons* and gods, and again that this same man believes in neither *daimons*, gods, nor heroes, there is no device.

b But in fact, Athenian men, that I do not do injustice according to the indictment of Meletus does not seem to me to need much of an apology, but sufficient even is this. And with respect to what I said earlier, that I have incurred much hatred and from many men, be assured this is true. This is what will convict me, if I am convicted, not Meletus, nor Anytus, but the slander and envy of the multitude. It has convicted many other good men already, and I think it will convict me as well. And there is no danger that it will stop with me.

c Perhaps, then, someone might say, "Are you not ashamed, Socrates, for having engaged in the sort of pursuit from which you are now in danger of dying?" To that someone, with just words I would answer: "What you say is ignoble, fellow, if you think that a man, who is of even little use, ought to take into account the risk of living or dying, but ought to consider this alone when he acts: whether he is acting justly or unjustly and whether his deeds are of a good man or a bad. For according to your account, those who met their end at Troy would be contemptible, especially the son of Thetis. Instead of enduring anything shameful, he held danger in so much contempt that his mother, a goddess, spoke to him, something like this, I think, when he was ardent upon killing Hector; she says: 'Son, if you revenge the death of your

comrade Patroclus by killing Hector, thereupon, you yourself will die after Hector, destiny is upon you.' He, on hearing this, made light of death and danger, dreading much more to live as a bad man and not d
 avenge his friends. 'Thereupon may I die,' he says, 'after I inflict punishment on the doer of injustice, so that I may not remain here ridiculous beside the curved ships, a burden to the ground.'" Certainly you do not think he gave any thought to death and danger?

Thus, in truth, it is, men of Athens. Wherever anyone stations himself, holding that it is best, or has been stationed by a ruler, there he must remain and face the danger, as it appears to me, and not take into consideration death or anything else in comparison to what is disgraceful. Thus I should have performed dreadful acts, men of Athens, if, when the rulers whom you elected to govern me stationed me in Potidaea e
 and Amphipolis and at Delium, I remained where they stationed me and faced the danger of dying like everyone else, yet when the god stationed me, as I thought and assumed, ordering me to live the life of philosophy and to examine myself and others, I should then leave my station because I feared death and 29
 anything else whatsoever.

Dire indeed that would be, and then in truth someone might justly bring me to trial, asserting that I do not believe in the gods, as I would be disobeying the oracle, fearing death and thinking that I am wise when I am not. For to fear death, men, is in fact nothing other than to appear to be wise, while not being so. For it is to appear to know what one does not know; no one knows if death happens to be the greatest of all goods for a human being, but the multitude fear it as if they know well that it is the greatest evil. How is this not that reprehensible ignorance, that of thinking that one knows what one does not know? b
 But I, men, in this perhaps am also different from most human beings, and if I should assert that I am wiser than everyone in anything, it would be this: that as I do not know sufficiently about the things of Hades, I, therefore, also think that I do not know. But to do injustice and to disobey someone better than oneself, whether god or human being, I know is bad and shameful. Therefore, compared to the bad things which I know are bad, I will never fear to flee things that I do not know, which may even happen to be good, compared to the things I know are bad.

Thus, not even if you dismiss me now and disobey Anytus, who claimed that either I should not c
 have been brought here at all, or, since I was brought here, that it is impossible not to kill me, asserting to you that if I am acquitted, soon your sons will be completely corrupted from pursuing the things Socrates teaches, and if you should say to me with respect to this: "Socrates, now we will not obey Anytus; we will allow you to leave, but on this condition—that you no longer pursue this investigation or philosophize, and if you are found still doing this, you shall die." If you should allow me to leave, as I said, on d
 these conditions, then I would say to you, "men of Athens, I welcome you and love you, but I will obey the god rather than you, and for so long as I breathe and am capable of it, I will surely not stop philosophizing, and I will exhort you and point out to any of you I happen to meet, saying the sorts of things I am accustomed to: 'best of men, you are an Athenian from a city that is greatest and most renowned for wisdom and strength, are you not ashamed for being concerned with having as much as possible, as well as renown and honor, yet you have no concern for and give no thought to prudence and truth, and e
 how your soul will be the best possible?'" And if any of you debate it and say that he is concerned, I shall then not let him go and I will not depart, but will speak to him and question him and test him. And if he should appear to me not to possess virtue, but only says he does, I shall reproach him, saying that he holds the things worth the most as least important, and the pettier things as more important. I will act 30
 thus to anyone I meet, younger or older and both foreigner and townsman, but especially the townsmen as you are closer to me in kin.

Let it be known that god commands this. And I think that until now no greater good has befallen the city than my service to the god. For I go about doing nothing other than persuading you, both young and old, not to care for bodies and money as earnestly as how your soul will be the best possible. I say, b
 "Virtue does not come from money, but from virtue comes money and all the other good things for human beings both private and public." If by saying these things I corrupt the youth, then it might be harmful. But if anyone says that what I speak is other than this, he speaks without sense. With respect to these things, Athenian men, I would say, either obey Anytus or not, and either let me go or not, since I will not do otherwise, even if I were to die many times.

Do not clamor, Athenian men, but stick to what I asked you and do not clamor at the things I say, but listen. For, as I think, you will benefit from listening, as I am going to tell you other things at which, perhaps, you will clamor, but do not do so on any account. Rest assured that if you kill me, being the man c

d that I say I am, you will not harm me more than yourselves. For neither will Meletus nor Anytus harm me, he would not even be able to, for I do not think it is possible for a better man to be harmed by a worse. Perhaps he may kill, or banish, or dishonor me, and this man no doubt, and others as well, think that these are great evils, whereas I do not think so, but much rather to do what this man is now doing—trying to kill a man unjustly.

e Thus, I, Athenian men, am far from making an apology on my behalf, as one might think, but I do it on your behalf, lest by condemning me, you do something wrong with respect to the gift the god has given to you. For if you kill me, you will not easily find another of my kind, who, though it may sound absurd to say, has simply been set upon the city by the god, as upon a great and well-born horse that is somewhat slow, because of its great size, and needs to be awakened by a gadfly, so the god seems to have set me upon the city as such a one. I awaken and persuade and reprove every one of you, and I do not cease besetting
31 you the whole day. Men, another of this kind will surely not arise easily for you. Thus, if you obey me, you will spare me. But perhaps being irritated like the drowsy when they are awakened, you might obey Anytus and slap me, easily killing me. Then you would live the rest of your life in sleep, unless the god, in his care for you, sends you someone else.

b That I happen to be someone of this kind, given by the god to the city, you may discern hence: it does not appear to be human to have neglected all my own things and to have endured that the affairs of my family be neglected for so many years now, whereas I always attend to your business, going to each of you in private, like a father or older brother might, persuading you to the concern for virtue. If I was benefiting from this, and receiving pay for my exhortations to these things, there would be some explanation, but it is the case, you yourselves see, that even the accusers, who shamelessly accused me in
c all other things, have not been able to become so completely shameless as to bring in a witness to testify that I ever took money or asked for it. For that I speak the truth, I think I offer a sufficient witness: my poverty.

Perhaps, however, it might seem to be strange that, going around being a busybody in private, I give this counsel, but do not dare go before your multitudes to counsel in public. The reason for this is the one you have heard me tell many times and in many places, that something divine and daemonic comes
d to me, a voice that Meletus, making a comedy of it, mentioned in the indictment. This began with me in childhood, a sort of voice comes, and whenever it does, it keeps me from whatever I am about to do, but never urges me on.

This is what opposes my participation in politics, and this opposition appears to me to be entirely noble. For be assured, men of Athens, that if long ago, I had attempted to be politically active I would long ago have perished, and would have benefited neither you nor myself. Do not be angry with me for speak-
e ing the truth. For there is no human being who will be spared from either you or any other multitude, should he be single-mindedly opposed to and prevent many unjust and illegal things from taking place in the city, but it is necessary for one who really fights for the just to lead a private, rather than a public life,
32 in order to preserve himself even for a brief time.

I will offer to you great proofs of this, not speeches but what you honor, deeds. Listen, then, to what has happened to me, that you may see that I would not yield to one man against the just on account of fear of death, though I would perish for not yielding. I will tell you vulgar things, common to the law courts,
b yet true. For I, Athenian men, never held any office in the city but that of Councilman. And it happened that my tribe Antiochus constituted the prytany* when you wanted to judge as a group the ten generals, the ones who did not rescue the men from the naval battle, against the law as it appeared afterward to all of you.** Then, I alone of all the prytanes opposed you doing anything against the laws and I voted against you. And though the orators were ready to indict me and arrest me, and you were ordering and urging
c them on, I thought that I should face danger with the law and the just on my side rather than like you, who on account of fear of prison or death, were counseling unjust things.

* A prytany is an administrative period. There were ten a year corresponding to each of the tribes, whose councilmen, selected by lot, served as prytanes.

** The generals abandoned the dead and left some of the living for dead. According to Homeric poetry, these men were lost souls because they were never put to rest. The demagogue Theramenes aroused religious fear and indignation, as well as democratic jealousy against the generals, who were put on trial together, convicted, and executed.

And this was when the city was still ruled democratically. But when it became an oligarchy, the Thirty^{*} sent for five of us to the Tholos,^{**} and ordered us to arrest Leon the Salaminian and bring him from Salamis for execution.^{***} And they ordered many others to do many things of this kind, wishing that as many as possible would be implicated in the criminal charge. Then, however, I showed once more, not in speech but in deed, that I do not care about death, if it is not too rude to say, in the slightest way, but that all my care was to do no unjust or impious deed. For that government, as strong as it was, did not terrify me into doing anything unjust, but upon coming out of the Tholos, the four went to Salamis and arrested Leon, but I went home. And I might have died because of this, if that government had not soon been destroyed. And of these things you will have many witnesses.

Do you think, then, that I would have survived so many years, if I had been in public affairs and had acted in a way befitting a good man, aiding the just things, and as one ought, considering this as most important? Far from it, Athenian men, nor would any other human being.

But I, throughout my entire life, if I was ever publicly active, it is apparent that I was the kind of man, and I was the same in private, who never conceded anything to anyone contrary to justice—neither to those my slanderers say are my students, nor to anybody else. I have never been the teacher of anyone, but if anyone desired to hear me speaking and going about my business, whether young or old, I never refused it to him. Nor do I converse only when I receive money, and not when I do not receive any, but to rich and poor alike I give myself to questioning, and if anyone wishes to hear what I say, he can respond to me. And with respect to these, if any one of them becomes an upright man or not, I cannot be justly held responsible, because I have neither promised them any instruction nor taught them any. If anyone ever says that he learned from me or heard in private anything that anyone else had not, be sure that he does not speak the truth.

But why do some delight in spending so much time with me? You have heard it, Athenian men! I have told you the whole truth—that they delight to hear those examined who think they are wise but are not, as it is not unpleasant. I have been commanded to practice this by the god, as I say, by divinations, and by dreams, and by every means that any divine decree ever commanded a human being to do anything at all. These things, Athenian men, are both true and easily tested. For if I am corrupting the youth now, and have already corrupted others, and if any of them, having become older, recognized that I even advised them badly in anything when they were young, then now, surely, they should have stood up to accuse me and take revenge for themselves. If they themselves were unwilling to do it, some of their families (fathers and brothers, and other relatives) should now have recalled it and taken revenge, if their families had suffered anything bad from me.

However, there are present here many of them whom I see: first Crito here, my contemporary and my deme, the father of Critobulus here; then Lysanius the Sphettian, the father of Aeschines here; then there is Antiphon the Cephisean, the father of Eigenes. In addition, here are others, whose brothers have kept time in this manner: Theozotides' son Nicostratus, the brother of Theodotus—Theodotus has died so he could not beg him to stop, and the son of Demodocus Paralus, whose brother was Theages. And here Adeimantus son of Ariston, whose brother is Plato here, and Aeantodorus whose brother is Apollodorus here.

I could mention many others to you, some of whom Meletus particularly ought to have offered as a witness in the course of his own speech. If he forgot, let him now offer one, I will give way to him and let him speak if he has anyone of the kind. But totally to the contrary of this, you will find, men, that everyone is ready to assist me, the corrupter, who does evil to their families as Meletus and Anytus say. Those who have themselves been corrupted might have a reason to come to my assistance, but those who have not been corrupted, the relatives, men of older years, what other reason can they have to assist me except the correct and just one, that they know Meletus speaks falsely whereas I am being truthful?

Well then, men, these and perhaps other things are pretty much the things I have to say in my defense. Perhaps some among you may be indignant upon recollecting himself, if he should have, in

* "The Thirty" refers to the oligarchs instituted by the Spartans at the end of the Peloponnesian War. Among these were Critias and Charmides, with whom Socrates had some relation. His association with them, as well as with Alcibiades, might have encouraged the charges and indictment.

** The meeting place of the prytanes under the democracy.

*** Leon of Salamis was reputed for his justice, which no doubt stood as a reproach to the Thirty. They hoped to implicate as many as possible in his murder in order to spread the blame and soften the outrage.

contesting a trial even smaller than this trial, begged and supplicated the judges with many tears, bringing forward his children and many other of his relatives and friends, in order to be pitied as much as possible, whereas I will do none of this, despite that in this as well, I might appear to be risking the greatest danger.

- d Perhaps someone thinking about this may become rather set against me, and being angered by this very thing, he might set his vote down in anger, should there be anyone of you like this. I, however, do not think that there is, but if there is, it seems to me decent to say to him, “I, best of men, do indeed have some relatives”, for it is just as Homer says: “not even have I sprung from an oak or a rock but from human beings,” so that I have a family and sons too, three of them, Athenian men, one now a youth and two still children. I will, nonetheless, not bring them forward to beg you to vote to acquit me.

- e Why, then, will I not do this? Not because I am stubborn, Athenian men, nor because I disrespect you. Whether or not I am undaunted by death is another matter, but with respect to reputation, mine and yours, and the whole city’s, it does not appear to me noble for me to do any of these things as I am old and have this name, whether true or false, it is repeated at least that Socrates is different from the generality of human beings in some manner.

- 35 If those among you who are reputed to excel, whether in wisdom or courage or any other virtue whatsoever, should act in such a manner, then it would be shameful. I have often seen some who, when brought to judgment, though reputed to be something, do wondrous deeds, as thinking they will suffer something dreadful if they die, and as if they would be immortal if you did not kill them. They seem to me to disgrace the city, so that a foreigner might suppose that those Athenians who excel in virtue, whom b they choose from among themselves for their own public offices and other honors, are no better than women. For those of you, Athenian men, who are reputed to be something in like manner, you should neither do these things, nor, whenever we do them, should you allow it. But you should make manifest that you would much rather vote to convict him who introduces these piteous dramas and makes the city look ridiculous, than him who stays silent.

- c Reputation aside, men, it does not seem to me to be just to beg the judge, or to be acquitted through begging, but rather to teach and to persuade, for a judge does not sit to hand out justice as a favor, but to judge, as he has not sworn to favor whoever seems likeable to him, but to judge according to the laws. Therefore, we should not accustom you, and you should not be accustomed, to making false oaths, as neither of us would be pious.

- d So do not think that I, Athenian men, ought to practice such things toward you which I consider to be neither noble, nor just, nor pious, as well, by Zeus, certainly not when I am being accused of impiety by Meletus here. For clearly, if I should persuade you and force you through begging, having sworn an oath, I would be teaching you that there are no gods, and while making my defense speech, would accuse myself of not believing in gods. But that is far from being so, for I believe, men of Athens, as none of my accusers do, and I give it to you and the god to judge me in the manner that is best both for me and for you.

(He is found guilty by 281 votes to 220.)

- e There are many concurrences, men of Athens, that keep me from being indignant at this outcome, 36 that you voted to condemn me, and one of them is that the outcome was not unexpected by me. I, however, wonder at the number of votes on either side, as I did not think that [the vote] would be by a few but by many. But now it appears that if only thirty votes had fallen otherwise, I would have been acquitted. So far as Meletus is concerned, it seems to me that I have already been acquitted; and not only have I been acquitted but it is clear to all that, had not Anytus and Lycon come forward to accuse me, he would have to pay a fine of a thousand drachmas, as he would not have obtained a fifth of the votes.

- b As is the case, the man proposes for me the penalty of death. Well now. What shall I in return propose to you, men of Athens? * Is it not clear that it should be that for which I am worthy? What is it, then? What do I deserve to suffer or pay because during my life I remained quiet and did not care about the things for which the many care—money and the household, and military command and popular oration, as well as c the other offices, and the conspiracies and factions that grow in the city—as I considered myself too decent to survive if I took part in these things? I did not enter into affairs where, if I entered, I would be of no

* For certain crimes no penalty was fixed by Athenian law. Having reached a verdict of guilty, the court had to decide between the alternative penalties proposed by the prosecution and the defense.

benefit to either you or to myself, but to each of you I went in private to do the greatest benefaction, I affirm, and I endeavored to persuade each of you not to care for anything of his own before having cared for himself—how he will be the best and most prudent possible, and not to care for the things of the city before having cared for the city itself, and to care for other things in the same manner. What penalty, then, do I deserve, being as I am? Something good, men of Athens, at least if you give me what I deserve according to my true worth—and, moreover, a good of a kind that would be fitting for me. What then is fitting for a man of poverty, a benefactor, and one who needs leisure to exhort you? There is nothing more fitting, Athenian men, than that such a man be given his meals in the Prytaneum,* and much more fitting than if any one of you won a victory at Olympia with a horse or a chariot, either two or four horse. For such a one makes you seem to be happy, whereas I make you so; and he does not need sustenance, but I am in need. Therefore, it is necessary for me to propose what I deserve consistent with justice. I propose then to be awarded my meals in the Prytaneum. d 37

Perhaps, however, in proposing this, I seem to you to speak in almost the same proud manner as I spoke about lament and supplication. But it is not the case, Athenian men, but rather that I am convinced that I do not voluntarily do injustice to any human being, though I have not persuaded you, as we have conversed with each other for but a short time. You would be persuaded, as I suppose, if you had a law like other human beings, not to try someone in a matter of death in one day alone, but over many. But as things stand, it is not easy to erase great slanders in a short time. b

Being convinced, then, that I do not do injustice to anyone, I am far from doing injustice to myself by declaiming against myself, that I myself deserve something bad, and by proposing this sort of thing as my desert. What should I fear? That I might suffer what Meletus proposes for me, to which I say that I do not know whether it is good or bad. Instead of this, should I choose something of the things I know well to be bad, and propose that? Should I propose prison? And why should I live imprisoned, a slave to the authority that is regularly established there, the Eleven?** Or should I propose money and imprisonment until I pay? But for me this is the same penalty of which I just spoke, as I have no money to pay. c

Should I then propose exile? For perhaps you would allow me this as my desert. I should indeed have much love of soul, men of Athens, if I were so unreasonable as not to be able to see that you, who are my fellow-citizens, have been unable to endure my way of life and speeches, but rather that they have become burdensome and hateful to you, so that you now seek to be free of them—will others then easily bear them? Far from it, Athenian men. Fine indeed would life be for me, a human being of my age to be exiled going from city to city, always being driven out. For I know well that wherever I might go, the youth will listen to me when I speak, as they do here. And if I repel them, they will themselves drive me out, persuading their elders. But if I do not repel them, then their fathers and families will drive me out on account of these same youths. d e

Yet, perhaps someone will say: “Socrates, can you not live in exile from us, by being silent and keeping quiet?” This is the hardest thing of all of which to persuade some of you. For if I say that it would be to disobey the god, and on this account it is impossible to keep quiet, you will not be persuaded by me, supposing that I am being ironic. If, on the other hand, I say that this is a very great good for a human being—to make speeches every day about virtue and other things of which you have heard me speak when examining myself and others, and that for a human being the unexamined life is not worth living, still less, when I say these things, will you be persuaded by me. Yet, such is the case, as I affirm, men, however to persuade you is not easy. 38

And at the same time I am not accustomed to think of myself as deserving something bad. If I had money, I would have proposed as much as I could afford to pay, since that would do me no harm. But it is the case that I do not have any money—unless of course you want me to pay what I am able. Perhaps, then, I could pay you a minae of silver. So I propose that amount. b

But, Plato here, Athenian men, and Crito, Critobulus, and Apollodorus urge me to propose thirty minae and they will guarantee it. So I propose that amount and they will be sufficient guarantors of the money for you. c

(He is condemned to death.)

* Meals at the Prytaneum were reserved for the greatest benefactors of the city.

** Socrates is speaking of the eleven prison authorities, chosen by lot from the citizenry.



The Pnyx is where the Athenian Assembly met and where Socrates was put on trial as recorded in Plato's *Apology*. (Wikimedia/Tomisti)

You, in order to save a little time, men of Athens, will get a reputation and be charged with the guilt of having killed Socrates, a wise man, by those wishing to defame the city. For those who wish to defame will assert that I am wise even if I am not. In any case, if you would have waited a short time, this would have taken place on its own. You surely see my age, that it is far advanced in life and close to death. I do not say this to all of you, but to those who voted to condemn me to death.

And I say this as well to these same persons. Perhaps you think, men of Athens, that I have been convicted for want of the kinds of speeches that would have persuaded you, as if I had thought that I should do or say anything to escape the penalty. Far from it. I have been convicted for a want, not of speeches, but of boldness and shamelessness, and willingness to say the kinds of things to you that would have pleased you most to hear—to have me wail and lament and do and say many other things unworthy of me, as I affirm, but such as you have been accustomed to hear from others. But neither then did I think that I ought to do anything, in order to avoid danger, unworthy of a free man, nor do I regret having defended myself as I did. I would much prefer to die defending myself like this than to live like that.

For neither in a trial nor in a war should I or anybody else plan to escape death by doing anything possible. In battle it is frequently evident that one might escape death by laying down one's arms and turning to supplicate one's pursuers. And, there are many other devices in every danger to avoid death, if one dares to do and to say anything. But I suspect this is not difficult, men, to avoid death, but that it is much more difficult to avoid wickedness, for it runs faster than death. And now I, being slow and old, am taken by the slower of the two, but my accusers being clever and agile, are taken by the faster—wickedness. And now I leave, condemned by you to death, but they are by the truth convicted of wretchedness and injustice. And I abide by my sentence, as do they. These things, perhaps, must be as they are, and I suppose there is just measure in them.

Next, I desire to prophesize to you, O you who voted to condemn me. For now I am where human beings are apt to prophesize, when they are about to die. I say to you who have condemned me to death, that vengeance will come to you straight away after my death, and far more severe by Zeus, than the kind you have given me by killing me. For you have done this thinking you will be freed from giving an account of your life, but rather quite the contrary will happen to you, as I affirm. There will be more who will confound you, whom I have been restraining though you did not notice them. And they will be more severe in so far as they are younger, and you will be angrier. For if you think that by killing human beings you will keep someone from reproaching you for not living correctly, then you do not think finely. For that kind of escape is neither at all possible nor noble. But rather the noblest and easiest kind is not

to restrain others, and to prepare oneself to be the best possible. Having foretold these things to you who voted to condemn me, I am set free.

But with you who voted for me, I would gladly converse about what has taken place, while the officials are busy and I do not yet go to the place where, when I do go, I must die. Stay with me, men, for this time. Nothing keeps us from telling stories to one another for as long as possible. For I am willing to show you, as to friends, the meaning of whatever it is that has just occurred to me. To me, at least, judges, and by calling you judges I address you correctly, something wondrous has happened. For my customary prophesy from the *daimonion* was always very frequent on all other former occasions, opposing me even in trifling matters if I was about to do something wrong. But now you yourselves behold what has happened to me, which anyone might think to be, and which is believed to be, the ultimate evil. Yet, when I departed from my home this morning, the sign of the god did not oppose me, nor when I came up here to the trial, nor anywhere in my speech when I was about to say anything, despite that in other speeches it has frequently restrained me while I was talking. But now, with respect to this proceeding, it has not opposed me, in either deed or speech. What, then, do I think is the cause of this? I will tell you. It is likely that what has befallen to me is good and that it is not possible that those think correctly who think being dead is bad. To me, a great proof of this has occurred, for it is not possible that the accustomed sign should not have opposed me, unless I were about to do some good.

But let us keep in mind the following possibility in which there is a great hope that it is good. For being dead is either of two things. It is either like being annihilated and the dead man has no perception of anything, or as it is said, it is a kind of change and passage of the soul from here to another place.

And if there is no perception, but it is like a sleep in which the sleeper has no dream whatsoever, death would be a wondrous gain. For I think that if someone had to pick the night in which he slept so soundly that he did not even dream, and had to compare the other nights and days of his life to that one, and then upon reflection had to compare how many days and nights in his own life he had lived better and more pleasantly than that one, then I think that, not just a private man, but the Great King himself would find them easy to count compared to the other days and nights. Now, if death is something like that, I at least say it is a gain, as in this manner, all time seems to be nothing more than a single night.

On the other hand, if death is like a journey from here to another place, and if what is said is true, that all the dead are indeed there, what greater good could there be than that, judges? For if arriving in Hades, released from those here who claim to be judges, discovering judges in truth—the very ones who are said to judge there—Minos and Rhadamanthys, and Aeacus and Triptolemus, and those other of the demi-gods, who were just during their own lives, would this be a paltry journey? Or again, how much would any of you give to be with Orpheus and Musaeus and Hesiod and Homer? I, indeed, am willing to die often, if these things are true, as for me in particular, passing time there would be wondrous. I would compare my own experiences with theirs when chancing upon Palamedes, or Telemonian Ajax, or anyone else of the ancients who died on account of an unjust verdict. And I think it would not be unpleasant.

And in particular the greatest thing, to spend time examining and discovering those there, as I do to the ones here, whoever of them is wise and whoever thinks he is but is not. What would one give, men of the jury, to examine the one who led the great army against Troy, or Odysseus, or Sisyphus, or the thousand others whom one could mention, both men and women, with whom to converse and to be with and to examine would be inconceivable happiness? Certainly those there do not kill for that. For they are happier than those here, in other things as well as being deathless for the rest of time, provided the things said are true.

But you, men of the jury, should also be of good hope toward death and to hold in mind this certain thing as true—that for a good man there is nothing bad, whether alive or dead, neither are the gods without care for that one's troubles, nor have my current troubles come from themselves, but it is clear to me that it is now better for me to be dead and to have been freed from my troubles. On account of this, the sign did not turn me aside, and I am neither in any way angry at those who voted to condemn me, nor my accusers. Though it was not with this in mind that they voted to condemn me and accused me, rather they thought to harm me. For this, they deserve to be blamed.

This much, however, I beg of them. Punish my sons when they grow up, men, paining them as I have pained you, should they appear to you to care for money or anything else more than virtue. And if they are reputed to be something, though being nothing, reproach them as I have you—that they do not care for the things they should and that they think they are something when they are worth nothing. And if you do these things, we will have been treated justly by you, I myself and also my sons.

But now it is time to depart—I to die and you to live. Which of us takes a better path is unclear to everyone except the god.

CRITO

Characters

Socrates

Crito

Scene—The Prison of Socrates

- 43 SOCRATES: Why have you come at this hour, Crito? Isn't it still early?
 CRITO: Very early.
 SOCRATES: What time, exactly?
 CRITO: Depth of dawn, before first light.
 SOCRATES: I'm surprised the guard was willing to admit you.
 CRITO: He's used to me by now, Socrates, because I come here so often. Besides, I've done him a kindness.
 SOCRATES: Did you come just now, or a while ago?
 CRITO: Quite a while ago.
- b SOCRATES: Then why didn't you wake me right away, instead of sitting there in silence?
 CRITO: No, Socrates. I might wish I weren't in such wakeful pain myself, and I've been marveling for some time at how sweetly you sleep. I didn't wake you on purpose, so that you could spend the time as pleasantly as possible. Often before, through the whole of our lives, I've thought you happy in your ways, but never more than now in the present misfortune—so cheerfully and lightly do you bear it.
- c SOCRATES: But surely, Crito, it would scarcely be appropriate in a man of my age to be distressed that he now has to die.
 CRITO: Other men as old have been taken in similar misfortune, Socrates, and age did not relieve their distress at what faced them.
 SOCRATES: True. But why are you here so early?
 CRITO: I bring grievous news, Socrates. Not grievous to you, it appears, but grievous to me and to all your companions, and heaviest to bear, I think, for me.
- d SOCRATES: What is it? Has the ship come from Delos, on whose arrival I'm to die?*
- CRITO: Not yet. But I think it will come today, to judge from the report of some people who've arrived from Sunium and left it there. From what they say, it will clearly come today, and then tomorrow, Socrates, your life must end.
- SOCRATES: Well, Crito, let it be for the best. If so it pleases the Gods, let it be so. Still, I do not think
- 44 it will come today.
 CRITO: From what do you infer that?
 SOCRATES: I'll tell you. I am to die, I think, the day after the ship arrives.
 CRITO: Yes—so the authorities say, at any rate.
 SOCRATES: Then I think it will come tomorrow, not today. I infer that from a dream I saw a little while ago tonight. Perhaps you chose a good time not to wake me.
 CRITO: What was the dream?
 SOCRATES: A woman appeared to me. She came, fair and beautiful of form, clothed in white, and she
- b called to me and said, "Socrates, on the third day shalt thou go to fertile Phthia."
 CRITO: A strange dream, Socrates.
 SOCRATES: But Crito. I think a clear one.
 CRITO: Yes, too clear, it seems.
 CRITO: But, please, Socrates, my beloved friend, please let me persuade you even at this point. Save yourself. As for me, if you should die it will be a multiple misfortune. Quite apart from the loss of such friendship as I shall not find again, people who don't really know us will think I didn't care, because I could
- c have saved you if only I'd been willing to spend the money. Yet what could seem more shameful than the

appearance of putting money before friends? People won't believe that you refused to escape even though we were eager to help.

SOCRATES: But Crito, why should we be so concerned about what people will think? Reasonable men, who are the ones worth considering, will believe that things happened as they did.

CRITO: Surely at this point, Socrates, you see how necessary it really is to care about what people think. The very things now happening show that they can accomplish, not the least of evils, but very nearly the greatest, if a man has been slandered among them. d

SOCRATES: If only they could work the greatest of evils, Crito, so that they might also work the greatest goods, it would truly be well. But as it is, they can do neither; they cannot make a man wise or foolish. They only act at random.

CRITO: Very well, let that be so. But tell me this, Socrates. Are you worried about me and the rest of your friends? Are you afraid that, if you escape, the sycophants will make trouble for us for helping you, so that we may be compelled to forfeit our estates or a great deal of money, or suffer more besides? If you're afraid of something of that sort, dismiss it. It is right for us to run that risk to save you, and still greater risk if need be. Please, let me persuade you to do as I say. 45

SOCRATES: Of course I'm worried about those things, Crito, and many other things too.

CRITO: Then don't be afraid. In fact, it's not a large sum which certain people are willing to take to manage your escape, and as for the sycophants, you see how cheaply they can be bought; it wouldn't take much money for them. You have mine at your disposal, and it is, I think, enough, but if you're at all worried about me and think you shouldn't spend mine, your friends from abroad are ready. One of them, Simmias of Thebes, has brought enough money, just for this purpose, and Cebes and quite a few others are ready, too. So as I say, you mustn't hesitate because of that. Nor should you be troubled about what you said in court, how if you went into exile you wouldn't know what to do with yourself. There are many places for you to go where they'd welcome you warmly, but if you want to go to Thessaly, I have friends there who will honor and protect you, so that no one will cause you distress. Furthermore, Socrates, I think the thing you're doing is wrong. You betray yourself when you could be saved. You hasten a thing for yourself of a kind your very enemies might hasten for you—and have hastened, wishing you destroyed. In addition, I think you're betraying your sons. You desert them when you could raise and educate them; so far as you're concerned, they're to take what comes, and what is likely to come is just what usually comes to orphans in the poverty of their orphanhood. No. Either a man shouldn't have children, or he should accept the burden of raising and educating them; the choice you're making is one of the most heedless indifference. Your choice should be that of a goof and courageous man—especially since you say you've had a lifelong concern of virtue. I'm ashamed, Socrates, ashamed both for you and for your friends, because it's going to seem that the whole business was done through a kind of cowardice in us. The case was brought to court when it needn't have been. Then there was the conduct of the trial. And now, as the final absurdity of the whole affair, it will look as if we let slip this final opportunity because of our own badness and cowardice, whereas we could have saved you or you could have saved yourself if we were worth anything at all. These things are bad, and shameful both to you and to us. Decide. Or rather, at this hour, it isn't time to decide but to have decided. This is the last chance, because even thing must be done this coming night, and if we wait it will not be possible any longer. Please, Socrates, be persuaded by me and do as I ask. 46

SOCRATES: My dear Crito, your eagerness is worth much, if rightly directed. But if not, then the greater it is, the worse. We must consider carefully whether this thing is to be done, for I am now and always have been the sort of man who is persuaded only by the argument which on reflection proves best to me, and I cannot throw over arguments I formerly accepted merely because of what has come; they still seem much the same to me, and I honor them as I did before. If we can't find better ones, be assured that I will not give way to you, not even if the power of the multitude were far greater than it now is to frighten us like children with its threats of confiscation, bonds, and death. Now, how might we most fairly consider the matter? Perhaps we should first take up this argument of yours about beliefs. We often used to say that some beliefs are worth paying attention to and others not. Was that wrong? Or was it right before I had to die, whereas it is now obviously idle nonsense put for the sake of arguing? I'd like to join with you in common inquiry, Crito. Does that appear in any way changed now that I'm here?—Let us dismiss it or be persuaded by it. We often used to say, I think—and we used to think it made sense—that among the beliefs men entertain, some are to be regarded as important and others are not. Before the Gods, Crito, were we wrong? At least insofar as it lies in human agency, you aren't about to die tomorrow, and the present situation won't distort your judgment. So consider the matter. Don't you think it's satisfactory to say that one 47

shouldn't value the beliefs of every man, but rather of some men and not others, and that one shouldn't value every belief of men, but some beliefs and not others? Isn't that right?

CRITO: It is.

SOCRATES: Now, it's useful beliefs which should be valued, not harmful or bad ones?

CRITO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Useful ones being those of the wise, bad ones those of the foolish?

CRITO: Of course.

- b SOCRATES: To continue, what did we use to say about things like this? Suppose a man goes in for athletics. Does he pay attention to the opinions, the praise and blame, of everybody, or only the one man who is his physician or trainer?

CRITO: Only the one.

SOCRATES: Then he ought to welcome the praise and fear the blame of that one man, not of the multitude.

CRITO: Clearly.

SOCRATES: So he is to train and exercise, eat and drink, in a way that seems good to a supervisor who knows and understands, rather than anyone else.

CRITO: True.

- c SOCRATES: Very well. But if he disobeys that supervisor, scorns his judgment and praises, values those of the multitude who are without understanding, won't he suffer an evil?

CRITO: Of course.

SOCRATES: What is that evil? Whither does it tend, and into what possession of the man who disobeys?

CRITO: Into the body, clearly, for it ruins that.

SOCRATES: Right. And isn't this also true in other matters, Crito? We don't need to run through them all, but isn't it especially true of what is just and unjust, honorable and shameful, good and evil—just the things our decision is now concerned with? Are we to fear and follow the multitude in such matters?

- d Or is it rather the opinion of one man, if he but have knowledge, which we must reverence and fear beyond all the rest? Since, if we do not follow it, we will permanently damage and corrupt something that we used to say becomes better by justice and is harmed by injustice. Or is there no such thing?

CRITO: I certainly think there is, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Very well then, suppose that, by disobeying the opinion of those who understand, we were to ruin what becomes better by health and is damaged by disease. Would life be worth living for us once it has been damaged? That is the body, of course?

- e CRITO: Yes.

SOCRATES: Well, would life be worth living with a wretched, damaged body?

CRITO: Surely not.

SOCRATES: Then is it worth living when there is damage to what the just benefits and the unjust corrupts? Or do we think that this—whatever it is of ours to which justice and injustice pertain—is of less worth than the body?

CRITO: Surely not.

SOCRATES: Of more worth?

CRITO: Far more.

SOCRATES: Then perhaps we shouldn't give much thought to what the multitude tells us, my friend. Perhaps we should rather think of what he will say who understands things just and unjust—he being but one man, and the very Truth itself. So your first claim, that we ought to pay attention to what the multitude thinks about what is just and honorable and good, is mistaken. “But then,” someone might say, “the multitude can kill us.”

- b CRITO: Yes, Socrates, it is very clear someone might say that.

SOCRATES: And yet, my friend, the conclusion we've reached still seems much as it did before. Then too, consider whether this agreement also still abides: that it is not living which is of most importance, but living well.

CRITO: It does.

SOCRATES: But “well” is the same as honorably and justly—does that abide too?

CRITO: Yes.

- c SOCRATES: Then in light of these arguments, we must consider whether or not it would be right for me to try to escape without permission of the Athenians. If it proves right, let us try; if not, let us dismiss

the matter. But as for these other considerations you raise about loss of money and raising children and what people think—Crito, those are really fit topics for people who lightly kill and would raise to life again without a thought if they could—the multitude. As for us, the argument has been chosen; there is nothing to be considered but the things we’ve already mentioned—whether it is right to give money with our thanks to those who are going to manage my escape, whether in actual fact we shall do injustice by doing any of these things. If it proves to be unjust, then perhaps we should give thought neither to death nor to anything else except the doing of injustice. d

CRITO: You are right, Socrates. Look to what we should do.

SOCRATES: Let’s examine the matter together, my friend, and if you can somehow refute what I’m going to say, do so, and I’ll be persuaded. But if not, then please, my dear friend, please stop returning over and over again to the same argument about how I ought to escape from here without permission from the Athenians. For I count it important that I act with your agreement, not against your will. So look to the starting point of the inquiry. See whether it is satisfactorily stated, and try to answer what I ask as you think proper. 49 e

CRITO: I’ll certainly try.

SOCRATES: Do we say that there are any circumstances in which injustice ought willingly or wittingly be done? Or is injustice to be done in some circumstances but not others? Is the doing of injustice in no way honorable or good, as we often in the past agreed, or have those former agreements been cast aside these last few days? Has it long escaped our notice, Crito, that as old men in serious discussion with each other we were really no better than children, or is it rather precisely as we used to claim: that whether the multitude agrees or not, whether we must suffer things still worse than this or things more easy to bear, still, the doing of injustice is in every circumstance shameful and evil for him who does it. Do we affirm that, or not? b

CRITO: We do.

SOCRATES: Then one must never do injustice.

CRITO: Of course not.

SOCRATES: Nor, as most people think, return injustice for injustice, since one must never do injustice. c

CRITO: That follows.

SOCRATES: Then does this? Ought one work injury, Crito?

CRITO: No, surely not, Socrates.

SOCRATES: Then it is just to work injury in return for having suffered it, as the multitude affirms?

CRITO: Not at all.

SOCRATES: No, for surely there is no difference between doing ill to men and doing injustice.

CRITO: True.

SOCRATES: Then one ought not return injustice for injustice or do ill to any man, no matter what one may suffer at their hands. Look to this, Crito. Do not agree against your real opinion, for I know that few men think or will ever think it true. Between those who accept it and those who do not, there is no common basis for decision; when they view each others’ counsels, they must necessarily hold each other in contempt. So consider very carefully whether you unite with me in agreeing that it can never be right to do injustice or return it, or to ward off the suffering of evil by doing it in return, or whether you recoil from this starting point. I have long thought it true and do still. If you think otherwise, speak and instruct me. But if you abide by our former agreements, hear what follows. e

CRITO: I do abide. Please go on.

SOCRATES: I say next, or rather, I ask, whether one is to do things he agreed with someone to do, given that they are just, or is one to deceive?

CRITO: One is to do them.

SOCRATES: Then observe what follows. If I escape from here without persuading the City, am I not injuring someone, and someone I least ought? And am I not failing to abide by agreements that are just? 50

CRITO: Socrates, I can’t answer what you ask, for I don’t understand.

SOCRATES: Look at it this way. Suppose I was about to run off from here, or whatever the thing should be called. And suppose the Laws, the common constitution of the City, came and stood before me and said, “Tell us, Socrates, what you intend to do. Do you mean by this to destroy us? To destroy, as far as in you lies, the Laws and the City as a whole? Or do you think that a city can continue to exist and not be overturned, in which legal judgements once rendered are without force, it may be rendered unauthoritative by private citizens and so corrupted?” How are we to answer that, Crito, and questions like it? A b

c good deal might be said, especially by an orator, in behalf of that law, now to be broken, which requires that judgements judicially rendered be authoritative. Or are we to reply that the City did us an injustice and didn't decide the case correctly. Is that what we're to say?

CRITO: Most emphatically, Socrates.

d SOCRATES: Then what if the Laws were to reply, "Socrates, was that really our agreement? Or was it rather to abide by such judgements as the City might render?" And if I were surprised at the question, they might go on, "There's no reason for surprise, Socrates. Answer the question, especially since you're
d so used to questions and answers, Come then, what charge do you lay against us and the City, that you should undertake to destroy us? We gave you birth. It was through us that your father took your mother to wife and begot you. Tell us, then, those of us who are the Laws of Marriage, do you find some fault in us being incorrect?"

"No fault." I would say.

"Then what about the Laws governing the rearing of children once born, and their education—the Laws under which you yourself were educated. Did we who are the Laws established for that purpose prescribe incorrectly when we directed your father to educate you in music and gymnastic?"

e "Correctly," I'd say.

"Very well, then. We bore you, reared you, educated you. Can you then say, first of all, that you are not our offspring and our slave—you, and your fathers before you? And if that's true, for you think that justice is on a level between you and us—that it is right for you to do in return what we may undertake to do to you? Was there such an equality relative to your father, or your master is you had one, so that you might
51 return whatever was done to you—strike back when struck, speak ill when spoken ill to, things like that? Does such a possibility then exist toward your Country and its Laws, so that if we should undertake to destroy you, believing it just, you in return will undertake so far as you are able to destroy us, your Country and its Laws? Will you claim that this is right—you, who are so profoundly concerned about virtue? Or are you so wise that you have let it escape your notice that Country is to be honored beyond mother and
b father or any forebears; that it is more holy, more to be revered, of greater apportionment among both gods and men of understanding; that an angered Country must be revered and obeyed and given way to even more than an angered father; that you must either persuade it to the contrary or do what it bids and suffer quietly what it prescribes, whether blows or bonds, whether you are led to war for wounds or death, still, these things are to be done. The just lies here: never to give way, never to desert, never to leave your
c post, but in war or court of law or any other place to do what City and Country command—that, or to persuade it of what is by nature just. It is not holy to use force against a mother or father; and it is far more unholy to use force against your Country." What are we to say to that, Crito? Do the Laws speak the truth?

CRITO: Yes, I think they do.

SOCRATES: "Then consider this, Socrates," the Laws might say. "If we speak the truth, aren't you attempting to wrong us in what you now undertake? We gave you birth. We nurtured you. We educated
d you. We have to you and to every other citizen a share of every good thing we could. Nonetheless, we continue to proclaim, by giving leave to any Athenian who wishes, that when he had been admitted to the rights of manhood and sees things in the City and its Laws which do not please him, he may take what is his and go either to one of our colonies or a foreign land. No law among us stands in the way or forbids it. You may take what is yours and go where you like, if we and the City do not please you. But whoever
e among you stays, recognizing the way we render judgement and govern the other affairs of the City, to him at that point we say that by his action he has entered agreement with us to do as we bid. And if he does not obey, we say that he commits injustice in three ways: because he disobeys us, and we gave him birth; because he disobeys us, and we nurtured him; because he agreed to obey us and neither obeys nor
52 persuades us that we are doing something incorrect—even though we did not rudely command him to do as we bid, but rather set before him the alternatives of doing it or persuading us to the contrary. Those are the charges, Socrates, which we say will be imputable to you if you do what you're planning. To you, and to you not least, but more than any other Athenian."

b And if I were to ask, "Why is that?" they might justly assail me with the claim that, as it happened, I more than most Athenians had ratified this agreement. They might say, "Socrates, we have ample indication that we and the City pleased you. You would not have stayed home in it to a degree surpassing all other Athenians, unless it pleased you in a surpassing degree. You never left to go on a festival, except once to the Isthmian Games. You never went anywhere else except on military service. You never journeyed abroad as

other men do, nor had you any desire to gain knowledge of other cities and their laws—we and this our City sufficed for you. So eagerly did you choose us, so eagerly did you agree to live as a citizen under us, that you even founded a family here. So much did the City please you. Even at your very trial, you could have proposed exile as a penalty, and done with the City's knowledge and permission what you're now attempting to do against her will. But at the time, you made a fine pretense of not being distressed at having to die. You'd choose death before exile—so you said. But now you feel no shame at those words, nor any concern for us, who are the Laws. You attempt to destroy us by trying to run off like the meanest of slaves, contrary to the compacts and agreements you entered with us to live as a citizen. First of all, then, tell us this: do we or do we not speak the truth when we say that by your actions, if not by your words, you have agreed to live as a citizen under us?" What am I to say to that, Crito? Must I not agree?


CRITO: Necessarily, Socrates.

SOCRATES: "Very well then," they might say. "Aren't you trespassing against your compacts and agreements with us? You didn't agree under constraint, you weren't misled or deceived, nor were you forced to decide in too little time. You had seventy years, during which time you could have gone abroad if we did not please you, or if your agreement came to seem to you unjust, but you preferred neither Sparta nor Crete, which you often used to say were well governed, or any other city, Greek or barbarian. Quite the contrary; you traveled abroad less often than the halt, the lame, and the blind. So the City pleased you, to a degree surpassing all other Athenians. Therefore, we pleased you, too, for to whom would a city be pleasing without laws? Are you, then, now not to abide by your agreements? If you are persuaded by us, Socrates, you will. You will not make yourself a butt of mockery by escaping.

"Consider too what good you will accomplish for yourself or your friends if you transgress or offend in this way. That your friends risk prosecution themselves, with deprivation of city and confiscation of estate, could hardly be more clear. But you first. If you were to go to any of the cities nearest Athens—Thebes, say, or Megara, for both are well governed—you would go as an enemy to their polity. Those concerned for their own cities would eye you in suspicion, believing you to be a corrupter of laws. Again, you would confirm the opinion of your judges and lead them to think they rendered judgement justly, for a corrupter of laws may surely also be thought, and emphatically, a corrupter of young and ignorant men. Will you then shun well-governed cities, and men of the more estimable sort? Or will you associate with them and without sense of shame and discuss—What will you discuss, Socrates? What arguments? The ones you used to offer here, about how virtue and justice are of highest worth for men, along with prescriptive custom and the Laws? "The affair of Socrates"—don't you think it will look indecent? Surely you must. Then will you keep clear of such places and go to Thessaly among Crito's friends? There is plenty of license and unchastened disorder in Thessaly, and no doubt they'd delight in hearing you tell your absurd story about how you ran off from prison dressed up in a disguise—a peasant's leather coat, perhaps? Disguised like a runaway slave, just to change your looks! That you are an old man with probably only a little time to live, and yet you cling boldly to life with such greedy desire that you will transgress the highest laws—will there be no one to say it? Perhaps not, if you give no offense. But otherwise, Socrates, you will hear many a contemptuous thing said of you. Will you then live like a slave, fawning on every man you meet? And what will you do in Thessaly when you get there, bedsides eat, as if you'd exiled yourself for a banquet. But as for those arguments of yours about justice and the other virtues—what will they mean to us then?

"Still, you want to live for your children's sake, so you can raise and educate them. Really? Will you take them to Thessaly and raise and educate them there, and make foreigners out of them so they can enjoy that advantage too? If you don't, will they be better reared for your being alive but not with them? Your friends will look after them. Will they look after them if you go to Thessaly, but not if you go to the Place of the Dead? If those who call themselves your friends are really worth anything, you cannot believe that.

"Socrates, be persuaded by us, for we nurtured you. Put not life nor children not anything else ahead of what is just, so that when you come to the Place of the Dead you may have all this to say in your defense to those who rule there. It will not appear better here, more virtuous, more just, or more holy, for you or any of those around you to do this kind of thing here. And it will not be better for you on your arrival there. You now depart, if you depart, the victim of injustice at the hands of men, not at the hands of us who are the Laws. But if you escape, if you thus shamefully return injustice for injustice and injury for injury, if you trespass against your compacts and agreements with us, and work evil on those you least



Socrates' Prison, near the Acropolis, Athens. The traditional site of the prison where Socrates was held while awaiting execution. (Forrest E. Baird)

d ought—yourself, your friends, your Country and its Laws—we shall be angered at you while you live, and those our brothers who are the Laws in the Place of the Dead will not receive you kindly, knowing that you undertook so far as in you lay to destroy us. Do not be persuaded to do what Crito bids. Be persuaded by us.”

Crito, my dear and faithful friend, I think I hear these things as the Corybants* think they hear the pipes, and the droning murmur of the words sounds within me and makes me incapable of hearing aught else. Be assured that if you speak against the things I now think true, you will speak in vain. Still, if you suppose you can accomplish anything, please speak.

CRITO: Socrates, I cannot speak.

e SOCRATES: Very well, Crito. Let us so act, since so the God leads.

PHAEDO

Characters

Echecrates

Phaedo

Socrates

* Attendants or priests of Cybele noted for wild music and dancing.

Plato, *Phaedo* (72c–83e, 114e–118b), translated by Eva Brann, Peter Kalkavage, and Eric Salem (Newburyport, MA: Focus Philosophical Library, 1998). Reprinted with permission of Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., All rights reserved.

Apollodorus
 Cebes
 Crito
 Simmias
 The Servant of the Eleven
 Scene—The Prison of Socrates

[*Socrates is speaking*]...My dear Cebes, if all things that partake of living were to die, and, when they died, the dead were to stay in that shape and not return to life, then wouldn't there be a great necessity for all things to end up dead and for nothing at all to be alive? For if the living were to come to be from anything other than the dead and the living were to die, what trick would there be to prevent all things from being utterly spent in death?" 72c

"Seems to me not a single one, Socrates," said Cebes, "but in my opinion what you say is altogether true." d

"Most definitely so, Cebes, as it seems to me," he said, "and we're not deceived in agreeing to these very things: There genuinely is a returning to life, the living come to be from the dead, and the souls of the dead *are*."

"And besides, Socrates," Cebes rejoined, "this also goes along with that other argument you're in the habit of making often, which—if it's true—says that our learning happens to be nothing other than recollection; and according to this argument, I suppose it's necessary that we've learned at some previous time what we now recollect. But this is impossible if our soul was not somewhere before being born in this human form here. So in this way too the soul seems to be something deathless." e 73

"But Cebes," Simmias rejoined, "what were the demonstrations for this? Remind me—I can't remember very well at present."

"There's one argument," said Cebes, "a most beautiful one: When human beings are questioned, if somebody questions them well, they themselves tell everything as it is, although if knowledge and a right account didn't happen to be within them, they wouldn't have been able to do this. Further, you get the surest indication that this is so when you direct them to mathematical diagrams or something else of that sort."* b

"And if you're not persuaded by that, Simmias," said Socrates, "see if you don't come to the same opinion when you look at it in this way. You distrust—don't you—the claim that what's called learning is recollection?"

"It's not that I'm distrustful," said he, Simmias. "But I need," he said, "to undergo the very thing the account's about—recollecting. Though from what Cebes tried to say, I've already pretty nearly remembered and am persuaded. Still, I'd now like to hear how you were trying to put it."

"I was going to put it in this way," said he. "We agree, I suppose, that if anybody is to recollect anything, he must have knowledge of it at some time before." c

"Of course," he said.

"Then do we also agree on this, that whenever knowledge comes to be present in this way, there's recollection? What way do I mean? This: Whenever somebody who's either seen or heard something—or has grasped it by some other sense—not only recognizes that thing but also takes note of another, the knowledge of which isn't the same but different, don't we justly say that he recollects that of which he grasped the notion?" d

"What do you mean?"

"Something like this: Knowledge of a human being and of a lyre are different, I suppose."

"Why, of course."

"Don't you know, then, that lovers, when they see a lyre or cloak or anything else that their boy-friend was in the habit of using, are affected in this way: They recognize the lyre and they grasp in thought the form of the boy whose lyre it was? And that's recollection. Just so, somebody who's seen Simmias often recollects Cebes. And there'd be a thousand such cases."

"A thousand, indeed, by Zeus!" said Simmias.

* In the *Meno* (82B ff.) Socrates questions a slave boy with the help of such a diagram and gets him to discover mathematical truths within himself.

- e "Now isn't that sort of thing," said he, "a kind of recollection? Especially when somebody undergoes this concerning things which, from time and inattention, he'd already forgotten?"
- "Certainly," he said.
- "What about this?" said he. "Is it possible for somebody who's seen a sketched horse or a sketched lyre to recollect a human being, and who's seen Simmias sketched to recollect Cebes?"
- "Of course."
- "Then isn't it possible for somebody who's seen Simmias sketched to recollect Simmias himself?"
- 74 "It's certainly possible," he said.
- "Then doesn't it follow from all this that recollection stems from similar things and also stems from dissimilar?"
- "It follows."
- "But at least whenever somebody's recollecting something from similar things, isn't it necessary for him to undergo this as well: to note whether or not, with respect to similarity, this thing somehow falls short of what he's recollected?"
- "It's necessary," he said.
- "Consider, then," said he, "if it's like this: We claim, I suppose, that there's some 'equal.' I don't mean stick equal to stick or stone to stone or anything else like that, but something other, beyond all these things—the Equal Itself. Shall we claim that this is something, or nothing at all?"
- b "By Zeus," said Simmias, "we certainly shall claim it, wondrously so!"
- "And do we have knowledge of it, the Equal that *is*?"
- "Of course," he said.
- "And we grasped the knowledge of it from—where? Isn't it from the things we were talking about just now: We've seen sticks or stones or some other things that are equal, and from these we've noticed the Equal Itself, although it's other than these? Or doesn't it appear to you to be other? Look at the matter in this way: Isn't it the case that equal stones and sticks, while being the same, sometimes appear equal from one point of view and from another not?"
- "Certainly."
- c "What about this: Is it possible that the Equals Themselves at times appeared to you to be unequals or Equality to be Inequality?"
- "Never ever, Socrates."
- "Therefore," said he, "these equals and the Equal Itself aren't the same."
- "No way, as it appears to me, Socrates."
- "And yet," he said, "it's nevertheless from these equals, although they're other than *that* Equal, that you've noted and grasped the knowledge of it?"
- "What you say," he said, "is most true."
- "And isn't it either similar or dissimilar to them?"
- "Of course."
- d "But that makes no difference," said he. "So long as, after you see one thing and from this sight you note something else, whether similar or dissimilar—that," he said, "must necessarily have been recollection."
- "Certainly."
- "What about this?" said he. "Do we undergo some such thing as this concerning equals among sticks and the other equals we were talking about just now: Do they appear to us to be equals in just the same way as the Equal Itself, the equal that *is*? Or do they fall somewhat short of being the sort of thing the Equal is—or not at all?"
- "They fall short by a lot," he said.
- "Then do we agree to this: Whenever somebody who's seen something notes, 'What I'm now seeing
- e wants to be of the same sort as something else among the things that are; yet it falls short and isn't able to be that sort of thing but is inferior,' then mustn't the man who notes this necessarily have had occasion to see beforehand that thing he says it's like but falls short of?"
- "Necessarily."
- "Well then, have we too undergone some such thing with respect to equals and the Equal Itself, or not?"
- "Altogether so."
- 75 "Then it's necessary that we saw the Equal before that time when we first saw equals and noted: 'All these things are striving to be like the Equal but fall short of it.'"
- "That's so."

"But surely we also agree on this: We haven't gotten the notion of it from somewhere else, nor is it even possible to get the notion of it except from seeing or touching or some other of the senses. And I say all these senses are the same thing."

"The same, Socrates, at least with respect to what the argument wants to make clear."

"So then, it's from the senses that we must get the notion that all the objects in these sensations both strive after the Equal that is and fall short of it. Is that what we're saying?" b

"Just that."

"Therefore, before we began to see and hear and use the other senses, I suppose we must have had occasion to grasp the knowledge of the Equal Itself, the equal that *is*, if we were ever to refer There the equals that came from our senses and to think that all such things are putting their heart into being the sort of thing the Equal is but are inferior to it."

"That's necessary, from what we said before, Socrates."

"Weren't we both seeing and hearing and having the other senses right from the moment we were born?"

"Of course."

"But, we declare, we must have grasped the knowledge of the Equal before all this?" c

"Yes."

"Therefore, as it seems, it's necessary that we grasped it before we were born."

"So it seems."

"Then isn't this the case: If we grasped it and were born having it, we had knowledge both before we were born and right at the moment we were born, not only of the Equal and the Greater and the Less but also of all such things? For our present argument isn't about the Equal any more than it's about the Beautiful Itself and the Good Itself and the Just and the Holy and, as I say, about all those things upon which we set the seal 'that which is,' in the questions we ask as well as in the answers we give; so we must necessarily have grasped the various knowledges of all these things before we were born." d

"That's so."

"And if in fact, after grasping these things, we didn't on each occasion forget them, then we're necessarily always born knowing them and know them throughout our life, since knowing is just this: when somebody who's grasped knowledge of something holds onto it and hasn't utterly lost it. Or don't we say that forgetting is just this, Simmias: the shedding of knowledge?"

"That's entirely so, Socrates," he said. e

"But I suppose if, having grasped knowledge before we were born, we lost it utterly when we were born, but later by use of our senses we grasp again the various knowledges we once had before—then wouldn't what we call 'learning' be the grasping again of our old familiar knowledge? And I suppose we'd speak rightly if we called this 'recollecting?'"

"Of course."

"For surely this appeared possible: A person senses something either by seeing or by hearing it or by grasping it with some other sense and—starting from this thing—notes some other he'd forgotten and which the sensed thing approaches, whether it's dissimilar or similar. So that, as I said, one or the other of two things holds. Either we were all born having knowledge of these things and have knowledge of them throughout our life; or we know later, and those of whom we say 'they learn' do nothing but recollect, and learning would be recollection." 76

"That's exactly how it is, Socrates."

"Then which do you choose, Simmias: Are we born already having knowledge, or do we recollect later things the knowledge of which we'd grasped before?" b

"I can't choose at present, Socrates."

"Well now, surely you can choose between these, and have some sort of opinion about it: Can a man who has knowledge give an account of what he has knowledge of, or not?"

"There's a great necessity for this, Socrates," he said.

"And do all people seem to you to be able to give an account of those things we were talking about just now?"

"I sure wish they could," said Simmias. "But what I'm terrified of more than anything is that tomorrow at this time there'll no longer be anybody among human beings worthy of the task."

"Then, Simmias, I take it all people don't seem to you to have knowledge of these things?" he said. c

"Not in the least."

"Then they recollect what they once learned?"

"That's a necessity."

"And our souls grasped the knowledge of these things—when? Surely not from the time we were born as human beings."

"Surely not."

"Therefore, it was before."

"Yes."

"Therefore, Simmias, our souls were earlier too, before they were in human form, and they were separate from bodies and had thoughtfulness."

"Unless, Socrates, we grasp these various knowledges as we are born—that time's still left."

d "Well, my comrade—but at what other time do we lose them? For we aren't born having them, as we agreed just now. Or do we lose them at the very time we also grasp them? Or can you suggest some other time?"

"Not at all, Socrates—I was unaware that I wasn't making sense."

e "Then is this our situation, Simmias?, " he said. "If what we're forever babbling about is—some Beautiful as well as some Good and all such Being—and if we refer to this Being everything that comes from the senses, since we've discovered that it was present before and was ours, and if we liken the things of sense to that Being, then just as surely as these beings *are*, so also our soul *is*, even before we were born. And if they *are not*, then wouldn't this account we've given be beside the point? Is this our situation, and is there an equal necessity that these things *be* and that our souls *were* even before we were born, and if the former *are not*, then the latter *were not*?"

77 "Extraordinary, Socrates!" said Simmias, "There seems to me to be the same necessity, and the account is taking refuge in a beautiful conclusion: Our soul is before we were born, just as surely as the Being you spoke of just now. For my part, I've got nothing as lucid to me as this: All such things, Beautiful and Good and all the rest you were talking about just now, are as much as anything can be. And to me at any rate this point seems to have been sufficiently demonstrated."

"And to Cebes as well?" said Socrates. "For Cebes must be persuaded, too."

b "He's sufficiently persuaded—I think," said Simmias, "although he's the mightiest of men when it comes to distrusting arguments. But I imagine he hasn't failed to be persuaded that our soul was before we were born. And yet, Socrates," he said, "it doesn't seem, even to me myself, to have been demonstrated that when we die, the soul will still *be*. Instead, what Cebes was just talking about, the fear of the many, still threatens: When the human being dies, his soul is scattered, and this is the end of her being. For what keeps her from being born and being put together from somewhere or other and *being* before she arrives in a human body, and then, once she's arrived and is freed from the body, from reaching her end and being destroyed?"

c "Well put, Simmias," said Cebes. "For it appears that half, as it were, of what's needed has been demonstrated, namely, that our soul was before we were born. But it needs to be further demonstrated that when we die, our soul *will* be no less than she was before we were born—if the demonstration is to have an end."

d "It's been demonstrated even now, Simmias and Cebes," said Socrates, "if you're willing to put this argument together with the one we agreed on before this: Every living thing comes to be from what's dead. For if the soul *is* beforehand as well, and if it's necessary for her, when she enters into life and is born, to come to be from nowhere else than death and being dead, how is it not necessary for her to be, even when she's died, since she must be born again? Hence the very thing you were talking about just now has been demonstrated. All the same, it seems to me it would please you and Simmias to busy yourselves with the argument some more, and besides, you have the fear of children—that in truth the wind will blow e the soul away and scatter her in all directions as she departs from the body, especially whenever somebody happens to die, not in a calm, but in some great gust of wind."

And Cebes, with a laugh, said, "Try to persuade us as if we were afraid. Or rather, not as if we were afraid—perhaps even in us there's some child present who's terrified by such things. So let's try to persuade him not to fear death as if it were a hobgoblin."

"What you should do," said Socrates, "is to sing him incantations each day until you sing away his fears."

78 "Then where, Socrates," he said, "are we to get hold of a good singer of such incantations, since you," he said, "are abandoning us?"

"There's a lot of Greece, Cebes," he said. "I suppose there are good men in it—and there are many races of foreigners too. You must ransack them all in search of such a singer, sparing neither money nor toil, since there isn't anything more necessary on which you might spend your money. And you must search for him in company with one another, too, for perhaps you wouldn't easily find anyone more able to do this than yourselves."

"Then that's what we'll do," said Cebes. "But let's go back to where we abandoned the argument, if that gives you pleasure."

"It definitely gives me pleasure, how could it not?"

b

"Beautifully put," he said.

"Then mustn't we ask ourselves something like the following?" said Socrates. "What sort of thing is apt to suffer this affection—being scattered—and what sort of thing do we fear might suffer this? And what sort of thing is not apt to suffer it? And after this, must we not in turn investigate whether soul is of the one sort or the other, and from this whether we must be confident or fear for our soul?"

"What you say is true," he said.

"Now is what has been composed and is composite by nature apt to suffer this: to be divided up in just the way it was composed? And if anything turns out to be non-composite, isn't it alone, if anything, apt not to suffer this?"

c

"Seems to me to be that way," said Cebes.

"Then aren't those very things that are always self-same and keep to the same condition most likely to be non-composites; and aren't those that vary from one moment to another and are never in the self-same condition likely to be composites?"

"So it seems to me."

"Then let's go," he said, "to the very things we were talking about in the earlier argument. Does Being Itself—whose being we give an account of in our questioning and answering—always keep to the self-same condition, or does it vary from one moment to another? The Equal Itself, the Beautiful Itself, each thing itself that *is*—in short, that which *is*—do these ever admit of any sort of change whatsoever? Or does each thing that *is*, being of single form when taken itself all by itself, always keep to the self-same condition and never ever in any way whatsoever admit of any alteration at all?"

d

"It's necessarily in the self-same condition, Socrates," said Cebes.

"But what about the many beautiful things, such as human beings or horses or cloaks or any other such things of that sort, or equal things or anything else having the same names as those other things we mentioned? Do they keep to the self-same condition? Or, in complete contrast to those other things, are they, so to speak, never in any way self-same, either in relation to themselves or to each other?"

e

"That's how it is," said Cebes. "These in turn never keep to the same condition."

"Now isn't it the case that you could touch and see and sense these by other senses, while it's not possible to grasp those things that always keep to the same condition other than by the reckoning of thought, since such things are unseen and not visible?"

79

"What you say is altogether true," he said.

"Let us then posit, if you want to," he said, "two forms of the things that are—the Visible and the Unseen."

"Let us posit them," he said.

"And posit that the Unseen always keeps to the self-same condition, while the Visible is never in the self-same condition?"

"Let us posit that as well," he said.

"Come then," said he, "is something of ourselves body and something else soul?"

b

"Nothing but," said he.

"Then to which form do we say the body would be more similar and akin?"

"This much is clear to everybody," he said, "that it's to the Visible."

"And what about the soul? Is she a visible or an unseen thing?"

"Unseen, at least by human beings, Socrates," he said.

"But surely we meant 'visible' and 'not visible' in relation to the nature of human beings, or do you think otherwise?"

"In relation to the nature of humans."

"Then what do we say about soul: Is she a visible or an invisible thing?"

"Not visible."

"Then she's unseen?"

"Yes."

"Therefore soul is a thing more similar to the Unseen than is body, and body more similar to the Visible."

c "That's entirely necessary, Socrates."

"Now haven't we also been saying from way back that the soul, whenever she makes use of the body for investigating something, whether through seeing or through hearing or through any other sense (for that's what investigating through the body is—investigating something through sensing), then she's dragged by the body into things that never keep to the self-same condition, and she herself wanders and is shaken up and gets dizzy, just as if she were drunk, because she's had contact with such things?"

"Of course."

d "But whenever, herself by herself, she investigates, she goes off There, to what's pure and is always and is deathless and keeps to the same condition, and since she's akin to this, continually comes to be with it—whenever, that is, she's come to be herself all by herself and this is possible for her—and then she's stopped her wandering and, around those things, always keeps to the selfsame condition, because she's had contact with such things; and this state of hers has been called thoughtfulness—isn't all this so?"

"What you say is altogether beautiful and true, Socrates."

e "So again, to which form does the soul seem to you to be more similar and akin, given what was said both before and now?"

"Everyone, it seems to me, even the slowest learner," said he, "must concede from this way of arguing that the soul is wholly and altogether more similar to what keeps to the same condition rather than to what doesn't."

"And what of the body?"

"It's similar to the other form."

80 "Now see it in this way too: Whenever soul and body are in the same place, nature ordains the body to be a slave and to be ruled and the soul to rule and be master. Again, given this, which of the two seems to you to be similar to the divine and which to the deathbound? Or doesn't the divine seem to you to be of a nature to rule and govern and the deathbound to be ruled and be a slave?"

"Seems that way to me."

"Then which of the two is the soul like?"

"It's clear, Socrates, that the soul is like the divine and the body like the deathbound."

b "Now consider, Cebes," he said, "whether these things follow for us from all that's been said: Soul is most similar to what's divine and deathless and intelligible and single-formed and indissoluble and always keeps to the self-same condition with itself. Body, in its turn, is most similar to what's human and deathbound and many-formed and unintelligible and dissoluble and never keeps to the self-same condition with itself. Can we say anything against this, my dear Cebes, to show that this conclusion doesn't hold?"

"We can't."

"Well then, since this is how things stand, isn't body apt to be dissolved quickly and soul in turn apt to be altogether indissoluble, or something close to this?"

c "Why, of course."

"You note, then," he said, "that whenever the human being dies, his visible part, lying in the visible realm, the body—which we call a corpse and which is apt to dissolve and fall apart and be dispersed—doesn't undergo any of these things right off but lasts for a rather long time, indeed for a very long time whenever somebody meets his end with his body in fine shape and at a fine time of year. For the body, when it's dried out and embalmed the way people are embalmed in Egypt, remains nearly whole for a remarkably long time. And when it rots, some parts of the body—the bones and sinews and all such things—are still, so to speak, deathless. Isn't all this so?"

"Yes."

e "And therefore the soul, that unseen thing that goes off to another region like herself, a region noble and pure and unseen—to the true Hades, the good and thoughtful god, where (god willing!) my soul too must soon go—will this soul of ours, being this sort of thing and having such a nature, be blown every which way and perish straightaway after she's freed from the body, as the many say? Far from it, my dear Cebes, and Simmias too! Much rather is this the case: If she's set free pure, dragging along with her nothing of the body, because she was in no way willing to commune with it in life but fled it and gathered herself

into herself, because she was always making this her care, which is nothing else but rightly philosophizing and exercising a ready care to be genuinely dead... or wouldn't this be the care of death?" 81

"Altogether so."

"Then being in this condition, doesn't she go off to what's similar to her, to the Unseen—the divine and deathless and thoughtful—and once she arrives There, isn't it her lot to be happy, since she's been freed from wandering and mindlessness and terrors and savage loves and other human evils and, as is said of the initiates, truly spends the rest of time in the company of gods? Shall we say that, Cebes, or something else?"

"That, by Zeus!" said Cebes.

"But I imagine that if she's freed from the body defiled and impure, because she was always having intercourse with the body and servicing it and loving it and being bewitched by it and its desires and pleasures to the point that nothing else seemed true to her but what's body-like (which one can touch and see and drink and eat and use for the pleasures of love-making), and because she was in the habit of hating and trembling at and fleeing what's shadowy to the eyes and unseen but is intelligible and seized on by philosophy—do you think a soul in this condition will be released herself all by herself and unadulterated?" c

"In no way whatsoever," he said.

"But I take it she'll be set free pervaded by the body-like, which the company and intercourse with the body have made grow together with her because the soul was always with the body and gave it lots of care?"

"Of course."

"And, my friend, we should imagine that the body-like is oppressive and heavy and earthy and visible; and a soul in the sort of condition we described is made heavy and dragged back into the visible region through terror of the Unseen and of Hades and, as they say, circulates among the memorials and tombs, around which certain shadowy apparitions of souls have been seen, ghostly images produced by the sort of souls that weren't released in purity but participate in the Visible—which is why they too are visible." d

"That's likely, Socrates."

"Of course it's likely, Cebes. And it's not at all likely that these are the souls of the good—they're the souls of the inferior, souls compelled to wander around such places paying the penalty for their former way of life, which was bad. And they wander about until, through the desire for the body-like that stalks them, they're again entangled in a body. And as is likely, they're entangled in whatever sort of characters they happen to have made their care in life." e

"What sort of characters do you mean, Socrates?"

"I mean something like this: Those who've made gorgings and abusings and boozings their care and weren't wary of these things are likely to slip into the classes of donkeys and other such beasts. Don't you think so?" 82

"What you say is certainly likely."

"And those who held injustices and tyrannies and robberies in highest honor will slip into the classes of wolves and falcons and hawks—or where else do we say such souls would go?"

"Not to worry," said Cebes, "into such classes."

"Isn't it clear then," said he, "where all the rest would go as well, each one into a class that's similar to its care?"

"Why, certainly it's clear," he said.

"Then aren't the happiest of these, and the ones who go to the best region," he said, "those who've devoted themselves to the popular and political virtue people call moderation and justice, which is born of habit and of care, without philosophy and without mind?" b

"In what way are these the happiest?"

"Because it's likely that they'll arrive again into some such political and tame class as perhaps that of bees or wasps or ants, or even back again into the same human class, and from them will be born temperate men."

"It's likely."

"And indeed it's not lawful for anybody who hasn't philosophized and gone off from here entirely pure, to enter the class of gods—but the lover of learning may. It is for these reasons, my comrades Simmias and Cebes, that those who philosophize rightly keep away from all the bodily desires and bear up and don't give themselves over to them—not because they're somehow terrified of ruin and poverty, as are the many and money-loving; nor again are they terrified of the dishonor and disrepute of corruption, as are the power-lovers and honor-lovers—not for that do they keep away from desires." c

"That, Socrates, wouldn't be fitting," said Cebes.

d "No, it wouldn't be, by Zeus!" said he. "That, Cebes, is surely why those who care for their own souls but don't live to serve the body, bid farewell to all these people and don't make the same journey as they do, since these others don't know where they're going. But since they themselves consider that they must do nothing contrary to philosophy and to the release and cleansing it effects, they turn to it and follow wherever it leads."

"How do they do that, Socrates?"

e "I'll tell you," he said. "For the lovers of learning recognize," said he, "that when philosophy takes over their soul, she's utterly bound within the body and glued to it, and she's compelled to investigate the things that *are* through it as through a cage rather than herself through herself, and she wallows in every
83 sort of ignorance. And philosophy sees that the dreadful cleverness of the cage comes from desire—so that the bound man would be himself the chief accomplice of his bondage. And so that's just what I'm saying: Lovers of learning recognize that philosophy, when it takes over their soul in this condition, gently persuades her and attempts to release her. It shows her that investigation through the eyes is full of deception, and that investigation through the ears and other senses is full of deception as well; and it persuades her to retreat from them, insofar as there's no necessity to use them. And philosophy exhorts her to gather and
b collect herself into herself and to trust in nothing but herself and what she perceives herself all by herself of what's itself all by itself among the things that *are*, and to regard nothing else as true that she investigates through anything that's different from herself and differs under differing conditions. And it tells her that such a thing is sensible and visible, while what she herself sees is intelligible and invisible. Now the soul of the true philosopher thinks she must not run contrary to this release. And so she keeps herself away from pleasures and desires and pains and terrors as much as she can, reasoning that whenever somebody is violently pleased or terrified or pained or desirous, he doesn't just suffer the evil one might think comes
c from them, such as falling ill or spending a lot because of desires. No, the greatest and most extreme evil of all—this he suffers, and it doesn't enter into his reasoning."

"What evil's that, Socrates?" Cebes said.

"That every human being's soul is compelled, at the very moment she's violently pleased or pained at something, to regard what above all brought about her suffering as both most manifest and most true—although this isn't the case. And these are above all visible things, aren't they?"

"Of course."

d "Then in this experience above all, isn't soul tied down by body?"

"How's that?"

"Because each pleasure and pain—as if it had a nail—nails the soul to the body, pins her and makes her body-like, so she opines to be true exactly whatever things the body says are true. For as a result of her having similar opinions with the body and delighting in the same things, I imagine that the soul is compelled to become similar in ways and similar in nurture so as never to arrive in Hades pure; instead,
e she always leaves full of the body, so that she tends to fall quickly again into another body and takes root there as if she had been sown. And as a result of this, she has no share of intercourse with the divine and pure and single-formed."

★ ★ ★

114e ...A man should be confident on behalf of his own soul—the man, that is, who in his life bade farewell to the other, body-related pleasures and ornaments as something alien to him, considering them more likely to do him harm than good, and who seriously pursued the learning-related pleasures, and who, having adorned his soul not with something alien but with the soul's own adornment—moderation and
115 justice and courage and freedom and truth—awaits the journey to Hades like one who means to journey whenever fate should call. Now you, Simmias and Cebes and you others," he said, "will each make the journey hereafter at a certain time. 'But me Destiny calls anon,' as a man in a tragedy might declaim, and the hour for me to turn to the bath is nearly come. For surely it seems better to drink the potion after bathing and not to give the women the trouble of bathing a corpse."

b Now when he said that, Crito said, "Alright, Socrates, but what last instructions do you have for these others or me either about your children or about anything else? Is there anything at all we could do for you by way of a special favor?"

"Just what I'm always telling you, Crito," he said, "nothing very novel: By caring for yourselves, you'll be doing whatever you do as a favor to me and to mine and to yourselves, even if you don't agree to anything now. But if you're careless of yourselves and aren't willing to live, as it were, in the footsteps of the things said now and in the time before, no matter how many agreements you may make at present, and how emphatically, you won't be doing much."

"Then we'll put our hearts into doing as you say," he said. "But in what way shall we bury you?"

"However you want to," he said, "if, that is, you catch me and I don't get away from you!" And with a serene laugh and a glance in our direction, he said: "I'm not persuading Crito, gentlemen, that I am this Socrates—the one who is now conversing and marshalling each of our arguments. Instead, he thinks I'm that one he'll see a little later as a corpse and so asks how he should bury me. And as for the long argument I've been making from way back, that when I drink the potion I shall no longer remain here with you but shall be off and gone to all sorts of happiness among the blessed—to him I seem to be merely talking and telling encouraging tales at once to you and to me. So give a pledge for me before Crito," he said, "the pledge contrary to the one *he* made before the judges. For he swore that I would remain here. But as for you: Give a pledge that I shall by no means remain here when I die, but shall be off and gone, so that Crito may bear it more easily and, as he sees my body being either burnt or buried, won't make a fuss over me because he thinks I'm suffering dreadfully, nor say at the funeral that he's laying out Socrates, or carrying him to his grave or burying him. For know this well, my excellent Crito," said he, "that not to speak in a fine way not only strikes a false note in itself, but also makes for something bad in our souls. Instead, you should be confident and declare that you're burying my body, and you should bury it just as seems agreeable to you and as you think is most in accordance with custom."

When he had said this, he got up to go into a sort of chamber to bathe, and Crito followed him and kept telling us to wait behind. So we waited, conversing among ourselves and examining closely what had been said, and then again going through our misfortune—how great it would be—since we simply believed that we'd spend the rest of our life just like orphans robbed of their father. But when he'd bathed and his children had been brought to him—two of his sons were small, and one big—and when those women who belong to his household had arrived, then once he'd conversed with them in front of Crito and had given the instructions he wished to, he told the women and children to go away, and he himself came to us. And it was already close to the setting of the sun (he'd spent much time within). Once he had come, he sat down, freshly bathed, and after this not many things were discussed. And the servant of the Eleven came and stood by him and said, "Socrates, I certainly won't pass the same judgment on you that I pass on others: They get angry with me and curse me when I order them to drink the potion under the compulsion of the officials. But as for you, during this time I've come to recognize you as the noblest and gentlest and best man among those who've ever arrived here; what's more, I know well that you're angry not with me but with those others—for you recognize who's responsible. So now—for you know what I came to report—farewell and try to bear these necessities as easily as possible." And bursting into tears as he turned around, he began to walk away.

And Socrates, as he glanced up at him, said, "Farewell to you, too, and we'll do as you say." And with that he said to us, "How civilized that human being is; indeed, throughout my whole time here he used to visit me and sometimes used to converse with me and was the choicest of men—and now see how nobly he weeps for me. But come now, Crito, let us be persuaded by him, and let somebody bring in the potion, if it's been concocted, and if it hasn't been, let the man concoct it."

And Crito said, "But Socrates, I think there's still sun on the mountains and it hasn't set yet. Also, I know that others drink very late, long after the order comes to them, and after they've dined and drunk very well, and even after some have had intercourse with anyone they happen to desire. So don't hurry—there's still a ways to go."

And Socrates said, "It's reasonable for those you mention, Crito, to do these things—they suppose they profit by doing them—and it's reasonable that I won't. For I don't think I'll profit at all by drinking a little later—except, of course, to make myself a laughingstock in my own eyes by clinging to life and being stingy with it when there's nothing more left. So come on," he said, "be persuaded and don't act otherwise!"

And Crito, when he heard this, nodded to the boy who was standing nearby. And the boy, after he'd gone out and spent a long time away, came back bringing the one who was to give the potion, which he



Jacques-Louis David, "The Death of Socrates." (*The Metropolitan Museum of Art, public domain*)

carried, already concocted, in a cup. When Socrates saw the man, he said, "Alright, best of men, since you're one who has knowledge of these things, what should I do?"

b "Nothing," he said, "other than drink and walk around until you get heavy in the legs and then lie down; and the potion will act of itself." And with that, he extended the cup to Socrates.

And having taken it—and very graciously too, Echecrates—without the least tremor and without any falling off in his color or expression, but instead, looking up from under his brows at the man with that bull's look that was so usual with him, he said, "What do you say to pouring somebody a libation from this drink? Is it allowed, or not?"

"Socrates," he said, "we concoct only so much as we think is the right dose to drink."

c "I understand," said he, "but I suppose I am allowed to, and indeed should, pray to the gods that my emigration from here to There may turn out to be a fortunate one. That's just what I'm praying for—and may it be so!" And with these words he put the cup to his lips and downed it with great readiness and relish. Now up to that point, most of us had been fairly able to keep ourselves from weeping. But when we saw that he was drinking—indeed, that he had drunk—we could do so no longer. In spite of myself, my own tears poured forth in torrents, so that I hid my face and bewailed my loss—for it was not him I d bewailed, oh no, but my own misfortune... to be robbed of such a man for a comrade! Crito got up and left even before I did, since he couldn't keep back his tears. But Apollodorus, who hadn't stopped weeping even during the whole time before, at that moment really let loose with such a storm of wailing and fussing that there wasn't a single one of those present whom he didn't break up—except, of course, Socrates himself.

e And that man said, "What are you doing, you wonders! Surely this wasn't the least of my reasons for sending the women away—so they wouldn't strike such false notes! For I've heard too that one should meet one's end in propitious silence. So be still and control yourselves!"

And when we heard this, we grew ashamed of ourselves and held back our weeping. He walked around, and when he said his legs had gotten heavy, he lay down on his back—that's what the man told him to do—and with that, the one who'd given him the potion laid hold of him and, after letting some time elapse, began examining his feet and legs, and then gave his foot a hard pinch and asked him if he 118 sensed it—he said "no"—and again, after that, his thighs. And going upward in this way, he showed us that he was growing cold and stiff. And he himself touched him and said that when it came to his heart, at that point he'd be gone.

And the parts about his lower belly had already nearly grown cold when he uncovered himself (for he had covered himself) and said what was to be the final thing he uttered: “Crito,” he said, “we owe a cock to Asclepius. So pay the debt and don’t be careless.”*

“Very well, it shall be done,” said Crito, “but see if you have anything else to say.”

When he asked him this, he no longer answered. But after he let a little time elapse, he moved, and the man uncovered him, and he’d composed his countenance; and when Crito saw this, he closed his mouth and his eyes.

This was the end, Echecrates, of our comrade, as it came to pass—a man, as we may say, who was, among those of that time we’d come up against, the best and, yes, the most thoughtful and the most just.

REPUBLIC** (in part)

Characters

Socrates

Glaucon

Adeimantus

Cephalus

Polemarchus

Thrasymachus

Cleitophon

Scene—Cephalus’ home at Piraeus

BOOK I

★ ★ ★

[SOCRATES:] And when Thrasymachus many times, even while we were in the middle of our conversation, was making motions to take over the argument, he was prevented by those sitting by him, who wanted to hear the argument out. But when we paused as I said this, he could no longer keep still, but having gathered himself to spring like a wild animal, he launched himself at us as if to tear us to pieces. Both I and Polemarchus were quaking in fear, and he, snarling into our midst, said: “What drivel are you people full of now, Socrates? And why do you act like idiots kowtowing to each other? But if you truly want to know what’s just, don’t merely ask and then, as befits someone with a passion for honor, cross-examine whenever anybody answers, knowing that it’s easier to ask than to answer, but also answer yourself and tell what you claim the just thing is. And don’t give me any of that about how it’s the needful or the beneficial or the profitable or the gainful or the advantageous, but tell me clearly and precisely what you mean, since I won’t stand for it if you talk in such empty words.” 336b c d

* Asclepius was the Greek god of healing. When one recovered from an illness it was customary to offer a cock as a sacrifice, so Socrates’ last words imply that death is a kind of healing.

** The only speaker in the dialogue is Socrates. He begins recounting a conversation he had on the occasion of a foreign religious festival that took place just outside Athens. Between the day and night portions of the festivities, a group of young men latches on to Socrates, who could be expected to provide entertaining talk. Polemarchus takes the group to his house, where they meet his father Cephalus, a very old man preoccupied with making amends before his death for any injustices in his life. Socrates asks him what he understands justice to be and begins to examine the implications of his answer. [We pick up the conversation as Thrasymachus, a well-known sophist, breaks in to the conversation.]

Plato, *Republic* (Book I, 336b–342e, 347b–e; Book II, 357a–362c, 368a–376e; Book III, 412b–417b; Book IV, 427c–445e; Book V, 449–462e, 473b–e; Book VI–VII, 502c–521b), translated by Joe Sachs (Newburyport, MA: Focus Philosophical Library, 2007). Reprinted by permission of Focus Publishing/R. Pullins Company.

And I was flabbergasted when I heard this, and was afraid as I looked at him, and it seemed to me that if I had not seen him before he saw me I would have been struck dumb.* But as it was, just as he was beginning to be driven wild by the argument I looked at him first, and so I was able to answer him, and said, trembling a little, "Don't be rough on us, Thrasymachus. If we're mistaken in any point in the examination of the argument, I and this fellow here, you can be assured that we're going astray unwillingly. For don't even imagine, when, if we were looking for gold, we wouldn't be willing to kowtow to each other in the search and ruin our chances of finding it, that when we're looking for justice, a thing more valuable than much gold, we'd be so senseless as to defer to each other and not be as serious as possible about bringing it to light. Don't so much as imagine that, friend. But I imagine we don't have the power to find it. So it's much more fitting anyway for us to be pitied by you clever people instead of being roughed up."

And hearing this, he burst out laughing with great scorn and said "Oh Heracles, this is that routine irony of Socrates. I knew about this, and I kept telling these people before that you wouldn't be willing to answer, but you'd be ironic and do everything else but answer if anyone asked you anything."

"That's because you're wise, Thrasymachus," I said, "so you know very well that if you asked anyone how much twelve is, and in asking demanded of him in advance, 'don't give me any of that, fellow, about how twelve is two times six or three times four or six times two or four times three, since I won't stand for such drivel from you,' it was clear to you, I imagine, that no one could answer someone who interrogated him that way. But if he said to you, 'Thrasymachus, how do you mean it? That I must give none of the answers you prohibited in advance? Not even, you strange fellow, if it happens to be one of these, but instead I have to say something other than the truth? Or how do you mean it?' What would you say to him about that?"

"Oh sure," he said, "as if this was like that."

"Nothing prevents it," I said. "But then even if it isn't like it, but appears to be to someone who is asked such a question, do you imagine he'll any the less answer the question the way it appears to him, whether we forbid it or not?"

"So what else," he said; "are you going to do the same thing? Are you going to give any of those answers I banned?" "I wouldn't be surprised," I said, "if it seemed that way to me when I had examined it."

"Then what if I show you a different answer about justice," he said, "beyond all these, better than they are? What penalty would you think you deserve to suffer?"

"What other penalty," I said, "than the one it's fitting for someone who doesn't have knowledge to suffer? And it's fitting, no doubt, for him to learn from someone who has knowledge. So I think I too deserve to suffer this penalty."

"You're amusing," he said, "but in addition to learning, pay a penalty in money too."

"Okay, whenever I get any," I said.

"He's got it," said Glaucon. "So as far as money's concerned, Thrasymachus, speak up, since all of us will chip in for Socrates."

"I imagine you will," he said, "so Socrates can go on with his usual routine: he won't answer but when somebody else answers he'll grab hold of his statement and cross-examine him."

"Most skillful one," I said, "how could anyone give an answer who in the first place doesn't know and doesn't claim to know, and then too, even if he supposes something about these things, would be banned from saying what he believes by no inconsiderable man? So it's more like it for you to speak, since you do claim to know and to have something to say. So don't do anything else but gratify me by answering, and don't be grudging about teaching Glaucon here as well as the others."

And when I'd said these things, Glaucon and the others kept begging him not to do otherwise. And Thrasymachus was obviously longing to speak in order to be well thought of, believing that he had an answer of overwhelming beauty. But he made a pretense of battling eagerly for me to be the one that answered. But making an end of this, he gave way, and then said, "This is the wisdom of Socrates; he himself is not willing to teach, but he goes around learning from others and doesn't even pay them any gratitude."

"In saying that I learn from others," I said, "you tell the truth, Thrasymachus, but when you claim that I don't pay for it in full with gratitude, you lie, for I pay all that is in my power. I have the power only to show appreciation, since I don't have money. And how eagerly I do this, if anyone seems to me to speak well, you'll know very well right away when you answer, for I imagine you'll speak well."

* [A popular superstition, that if a wolf sees you first, you become dumb.]

"Then listen," he said. "I assert that what's just is nothing other than what's advantageous to the stronger. So why don't you show appreciation? But you won't be willing to."

"First I need to understand what you mean," I said, "since now I don't yet know. You claim that what's advantageous to the stronger is just. Now whatever do you mean by this, Thrasymachus? For I'm sure you're not saying this sort of thing; that if Polydamas the no-holds-barred wrestler is stronger than we are, and bull's meat is advantageous to him for his body, this food would also be advantageous, and at the same time just, for us who are weaker than he is." d

"You're nauseating, Socrates," he said, "and you grab hold of the statement in the way that you can do it the most damage."

"Not at all, most excellent man," I said, "just say more clearly what you mean."

"So you don't know," he said, "that some cities are run tyrannically, some democratically, and some aristocratically?"

"How could I not?"

"And so this prevails in strength in each city, the ruling part?"

"Certainly."

"And each ruling power sets up laws for the advantage of itself, a democracy setting up democratic ones, a tyranny tyrannical ones, and the others likewise. And having set them up, they declare that this, what's advantageous for them, is just for those who are ruled, and they chastise someone who transgresses it as a lawbreaker and a person doing injustice. So this, you most skillful one, is what I'm saying, that the same thing is just in all cities, what's advantageous to the established ruling power. And this surely prevails in strength, so the conclusion, for someone who reasons correctly, is that the same thing is just everywhere, what's advantageous to the stronger." 339

"Now," I said, "I understand what you mean. But whether it's true or not, I'll try to learn. So you too answer that the advantageous is just, Thrasymachus, even though you made a prohibition for me that I could not give this answer, though there is added to it 'for the stronger.' " b

"A small addendum, no doubt," he said.

"It's not clear yet whether it's a big one. But it is clear that whether you're speaking the truth needs to be examined. For since you're saying and I'm agreeing that what's just is something advantageous, but you're making an addition and claiming it to be that of the stronger, while I don't know that, it needs to be examined."

"So examine it," he said.

"That will be done," I said. "Now tell me, do you not claim, though, that it's also just to obey the rulers?"

"I do."

"And are the rulers in each city infallible, or the sort of people who also make mistakes?" c

"By all means," he said, "they're surely the sort of people who also make mistakes."

"So when they try to set up laws, they set up some correctly and certain others incorrectly?"

"I certainly imagine so."

"Then to set them up correctly is to set up laws that are advantageous to themselves, and incorrectly, disadvantageous ones? Or how do you mean it?"

"That's the way."

"But whatever they set up needs to be done by those who are ruled, and this is what is just?"

"How could it be otherwise?"

"Then according to your statement, not only is it just to do what's advantageous to the stronger, but also to do the opposite, what's disadvantageous." d

"What do you mean?" he said.

"What you mean, it seems to me; but let's examine it better. Wasn't it agreed that when the rulers command those who are ruled to do certain things they're sometimes completely mistaken about what's best for themselves, but what the rulers command is just for those who are ruled to do? Wasn't this agreed?"

"I certainly imagine so," he said.

"Well then," I said, "imagine also that it was agreed by you that doing what's disadvantageous for those who rule and are stronger is just, whenever the rulers unwillingly command things that are bad for themselves, while you claim that for the others to do those things which they commanded is just. So then, most wise Thrasymachus, doesn't it turn out necessarily in exactly this way, that it's just to do the opposite of what you say? For what's disadvantageous to the stronger is without doubt commanded to the weaker to do." e

- 340 “By Zeus, yes, Socrates,” said Polemarchus, “most clearly so.”
 “If you’re going to be a witness for him,” Cleitophon interjected.
 “And what need is there for a witness? Thrasymachus himself agrees that the rulers sometimes command things that are bad for themselves, and that for the others to do these things is just.”
 “That’s because Thrasymachus set it down, Polemarchus, that doing what’s ordered by the rulers is just.”
 “Because he also set it down, Cleitophon, that what’s advantageous to the stronger is just. And
 b having set down both these things, he agreed next that sometimes the stronger order things that are disadvantageous to themselves for those who are weaker and ruled to do. And from these agreements what’s advantageous to the stronger would be no more just than what’s disadvantageous.”
 “But,” said Cleitophon, “he meant that the advantage of the stronger is what the stronger believes is advantageous to himself; this is what needs to be done by the weaker, and he set this down as what’s just.”
 “But he didn’t say it that way,” said Polemarchus.
 c “It makes no difference, Polemarchus,” I said, “but if Thrasymachus says it this way now, let’s accept it this way from him. And tell me, Thrasymachus, was this what you wanted to say the just is, what seems to the stronger to be the advantage of the stronger, whether it might be advantageous or not? Shall we say you mean it that way?”
 “That least of all,” he said. “Do you imagine that I call someone who makes a mistake stronger when he’s making a mistake?”
 “I did imagine that you were saying that,” I said, “when you agreed that the rulers are not infallible
 d but are even completely mistaken about some things.”
 “That’s because you’re a liar who misrepresents things in arguments, Socrates. To start with, do you call someone who’s completely mistaken about sick people a doctor on account of that very thing he’s mistaken about? Or call someone skilled at arithmetic who makes a mistake in doing arithmetic, at the time when he’s making it, on account of this mistake? I imagine instead that we talk that way in a manner of speaking, saying that the doctor made a mistake, or the one skilled at arithmetic made a mistake, or
 e the grammarian. But I assume that each of these, to the extent that this is what we address him as, never makes a mistake, so that in precise speech, since you too are precise in speech, no skilled worker makes a mistake. For it’s by being deficient in knowledge that the one who makes a mistake makes it, in respect to which he is not a skilled worker. So no one who’s a skilled worker or wise or a ruler makes a mistake at the time when he is a ruler, though everyone would say that the doctor made a mistake or the ruler made a mistake. Take it then that I too was answering you just now in that sort of way. But the most precise way
 341 of speaking is exactly this, that the one who rules, to the extent that he is a ruler, does not make mistakes, and in not making a mistake he sets up what is best for himself, and this needs to be done by the one who is ruled. And so I say the very thing I’ve been saying from the beginning is just, to do what’s advantageous to the stronger.”
 “Okay, Thrasymachus,” I said. “I seem to you to misrepresent things by lying?”
 “Very much so,” he said.
 “Because you imagine that I asked the question the way I did out of a plot to do you harm in the argument?”
 “I know that very well,” he said. “And it’s not going to do you any good, because you couldn’t do
 b me any harm without it being noticed, and without being unnoticed you wouldn’t have the power to do violence with the argument.”
 “I wouldn’t even try, blessed one,” I said. “But in order that this sort of thing doesn’t happen to us again, distinguish the way you mean someone who rules and is stronger, whether it’s the one who is so called or the one in precise speech whom you just now mentioned, for whose advantage, since he’s stronger, it will be just for the weaker to act.”
 “The one who’s a ruler in the most precise speech,” he said. “Do harm to that and misrepresent it by
 c lies if you have any power to—I ask for no mercy from you—but you won’t be able to.”
 “Do you imagine,” I said, “that I’m crazy enough to try to shave a lion or misrepresent Thrasymachus by lies?”
 “You certainly tried just now,” he said, “but you were a zero even at that.”
 “That’s enough of this sort of thing,” I said. “But tell me, the doctor in precise speech that you were just now talking about, is he a moneymaker or a healer of the sick? And speak about the one who is a doctor.”
 “A healer of the sick,” he said.

"And what about a helmsman? Is the one who's a helmsman in the correct way a ruler of sailors or a sailor?"

"A ruler of sailors."

"I assume there's no need to take into account that he does sail in the ship, and no need for him to be called a sailor, since it's not on account of sailing that he's called a helmsman, but on account of his art and his ruling position among the sailors."

"That's true," he said.

"Then for each of the latter there's something advantageous?"

"Certainly."

"And isn't art by its nature for this," I said, "for seeking and providing what's advantageous in each case?"

"For that," he said.

"Then is there any advantage for each of the arts other than to be as complete as possible?"

"In what sense are you asking this?"

"In the same sense," I said, "as, if you were to ask me whether it's sufficient for a body to be a body or whether it needs something extra, I'd say 'Absolutely it needs something extra, and it's for that reason that the medical art has now been discovered, because a body is inadequate and isn't sufficient to itself to be the sort of thing it is. So it's for this reason, in order that it might provide the things that are advantageous for the body, that the art was devised.' Would I seem to you to be speaking correctly in saying this," I said, "or not?"

"It's correct," he said.

"What then? Is the medical art itself—or any other art—inadequate, and is it the case that it has need of some extra virtue? Just as eyes need sight and ears need hearing and for these reasons there is need of some art applied to them that will consider and provide what's advantageous for these things, is there then in the art itself some inadequacy in it too, and a need for each art to have another art that will consider what's advantageous for it, and for the one that will consider that to have another art in turn of that kind, and this is unending? Or will it consider what's advantageous for itself? Or is there no additional need either for it or for any other art to consider what's advantageous for its inadequacy, because there is no inadequacy or mistake present in any art, nor is it appropriate for an art to look out for the advantage of anything other than that with which the art is concerned, but it itself is without defect and without impurity since it is correct as long as each is the whole precise art that it is. Consider it in that precise speech now: is that the way it is, or is it some other way?"

"That way," he said, "as it appears."

"So then," I said, "the medical art considers what's advantageous not for the medical art but for a body."

"Yes," he said.

"And horsemanship considers what's advantageous not for horsemanship but for horses, and neither does any other art consider what's advantageous for itself, since there's no extra need for that, but for that with which the art is concerned."

"So it appears," he said.

"But surely, Thrasymachus, the arts rule over and have power over that with which they're concerned."

He went along with that too, very grudgingly.

"Then no sort of knowledge considers or commands what's advantageous for the stronger, but what's advantageous for what's weaker and ruled by it."

He finally agreed with this too, though he tried to make a fight about it, and when he agreed I said, "So does anything else follow except that no doctor, to the extent he is a doctor, considers or commands what's advantageous for a doctor, but instead for someone who's sick? For it was agreed that the doctor is precisely a ruler of bodies but not a moneymaker. Or was that not agreed?"

He said so.

"Then the helmsman too was agreed to be precisely a ruler of sailors but not a sailor?"

"It was agreed."

"Then this sort of helmsman and ruler at any rate will not consider and command what's advantageous for a helmsman, but what's advantageous for the sailor who's ruled."

He said so, grudgingly.

"Therefore, Thrasymachus," I said, "neither will anyone else in any ruling position, to the extent he is a ruler, consider or command what's advantageous for himself, but what's advantageous for whatever is

ruled, for which he himself is a skilled workman, and looking toward that, and to what's advantageous and appropriate for that, he both says and does everything that he says and does."

★ ★ ★

- 347b "You know that people are said to be passionate for honor and money as a reproach, and it is one?"
 "I do," he said.
 "So," I said, "that's why good people aren't willing to rule for the sake of either money or honor. They don't want to be called mercenary if they openly get wages for the ruling office, or thieves if they secretly take money from the office themselves. And they don't rule for the sake of honor either, since
 c they aren't passionate for honor. So there needs to be a necessity attached to it for them, and a penalty, if they're going to be willing to rule; that's liable to be where it comes from that it's considered shameful to go willingly to rule rather than to await necessity. And the greatest sort of penalty is to be ruled by someone less worthy, if one is not oneself willing to rule. It's on account of fearing this that decent people appear to me to rule, when they do rule, and then they go to rule not as though they were heading for something good or as though they were going to have any enjoyment in it, but as though to something
 d necessary, since they have no one better than or similar to themselves to entrust it to. Because, if a city of good men were to come into being, they'd be liable to have a fight over not ruling just as people do now over ruling, and it would become obvious there that the person who is a true ruler in his being is not of such a nature as to consider what's advantageous for himself rather than for the one ruled. So everyone with any discernment would choose to be benefited by someone else rather than to have the trouble of
 e benefiting someone else. On this point, then, I by no means go along with Thrasymachus that what's just is what's advantageous for the stronger.

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BOOK II

- 357 Now when I said these things, I imagined I'd be released from discussion, but as it seems, it was just a prologue. For Glaucon is always most courageous in confronting everything, and in particular he wouldn't stand for Thrasymachus's giving up, but said "Socrates, do you want to seem to have persuaded us or truly
 b persuade us that in every way it's better to be just than unjust?"
 "If it would be up to me," I said, "I'd choose truly."
 "Then you're not doing what you want. For tell me, does it seem to you there's a certain kind of good that we'd take hold of not because we desire its consequences, but to embrace it itself for its own sake, such as enjoyment and any of the pleasures that are harmless and from which nothing comes into the succeeding time other than to enjoy having them?"
 c "It seems to me," I said, "that there is such a thing."
 "Then what about the kind that we love both itself for its own sake and for the things that come from it, such as thinking and seeing and being healthy? For presumably we embrace such things for both reasons."
 "Yes," I said.
 "And do you see a third form of good," he said, "in which there's gymnastic exercise, and being given medical treatment when sick, and giving medical treatment, as well as the rest of moneymaking
 d activity? Because we'd say these are burdensome, but for our benefit, and we wouldn't take hold of them for their own sake, but we do for the sake of wages and of all the other things that come from them."
 "There is also this third kind," I said, "but what about it?"
 "In which of these kinds," he said, "do you put justice?"
 358 "I imagine in the most beautiful kind," I said, "which must be loved both for itself and for the things that come from it by someone who's going to be blessedly happy."
 "Well it doesn't seem that way to most people," he said, "but to belong to the burdensome kind that ought to be pursued for the sake of the wages and reputation that come from opinion, but ought to be avoided itself on its own account as being something difficult."

"I know it seems that way," I said, "and a while ago it was condemned by Thrasymachus as being that sort of thing, while injustice was praised, but, as it seems, I'm a slow learner."

"Come then," he said, "and listen to me, if the same things still seem true to you, because Thrasy- b machus appears to me to have been charmed by you like a snake, sooner than he needed to be. But to my way of thinking, no demonstration has taken place yet about either one, since I desire to hear what each of them is and what power it has itself by itself when it's present in the soul, and to say goodbye to the wages and the things that come from them.

"So I'm going to do it this way, if that seems good to you too: I'll revive Thrasymachus's argument, c and I'll say first what sort of thing people claim justice is and where they say it comes from, and second that everyone who pursues it pursues it unwillingly as something necessary but not good, and third that they do it fittingly since the life of someone who's unjust is much better than that of someone who's just—as *they* say, since it doesn't seem that way to me at all, Socrates, though I'm stumped as my ears are talked deaf when I listen to Thrasymachus and tens of thousands of other people, while I haven't yet heard the d argument on behalf of justice, that it's better than injustice, from anyone in the way I want it. I want to hear it itself by itself praised, and I assume that I'd hear this most of all from you.

"That's why I'll strain myself to speak in praise of the unjust life, and as I speak I'll point out to you in what way I want to hear you in turn condemn injustice and praise justice. But see if what I'm saying is to your liking."

"Most of all," I said, "for what would anyone who has any sense enjoy more to talk about and hear e about repeatedly?"

"You're speaking most beautifully," he said. "Listen then to what I said I'd talk about first, what sort of thing justice is and where it comes from. People claim that doing injustice is by its nature good and suffering injustice is bad, but that suffering injustice crosses over farther into bad than doing injustice does into good, so that when people both do injustice to and suffer it from each other and get a taste of both, it seems profitable to the ones who don't have the power to avoid the latter and choose the former to make 359 a contract with each other neither to do injustice nor suffer it. And from then on they begin to set up laws and agreements among themselves and to name what's commanded by the law both lawful and just, and so this is the origin and being of justice, being in the middle between what is best, if one could do injustice and not pay a penalty, and what is worst, if one were powerless to take revenge when suffering injustice. What's just, being at a mean between these two things, is something to be content with not as something b good, but as something honored out of weakness at doing injustice, since someone with the power to do it and who was truly a man would never make a contract with anyone neither to do nor suffer injustice. He'd be insane.

"So, Socrates, it's the nature of justice to be this and of this sort, and these are the sorts of things it comes from by its nature, as the argument goes. The fact that those who pursue it pursue it unwillingly from a lack of power to do injustice, we might perceive most clearly if we were to do something like this c in our thinking: by giving to each of them, the just and the unjust, freedom to do whatever he wants, we could then follow along and see where his desire will lead each one. Then we could catch the just person in the act of going the same route as the unjust one because of greed for more, which is what every nature, by its nature, seeks as good, though it's forcibly pulled aside by law to respect for equality.

"The sort of freedom I'm talking about would be most possible if the sort of power ever came to d them that people say came to the ancestor of Gyges the Lydian. They say he was a shepherd working as a hired servant to the one who then ruled Lydia, when a big storm came up and an earthquake broke open the earth, and there was a chasm in the place where he was pasturing the sheep. Seeing it and marveling, he went down and saw other marvels people tell legends about as well as a bronze horse, hollowed out, that had windows in it, and when he stooped down to look through them he saw a dead body inside that appeared bigger than a human being. And this body had on it nothing else but a gold ring around its finger, e which he took off and went away.

"And when the customary gathering of the shepherds came along, so that they could report each month to the king about his flocks, he too came and had on the ring. Then while he was sitting with the others, he happened to turn the stone setting of the ring around toward himself into the inside of his hand, 360 and when this happened he became invisible to those sitting beside him, and they talked about him as though he'd gone away. He marveled, and running his hand over the ring again he twisted the stone setting outward, and when he had twisted it he became visible. And reflecting on this, he tried out whether the ring had this power in it, and it turned out that way for him, to become invisible when he twisted the stone

setting in and visible when he twisted it out. Perceiving this, he immediately arranged to become one of the messengers attending the king, and went and seduced the king's wife, and with her attacked and killed the king and took possession of his reign.

"Now if there were a pair of rings of that sort, and a just person put on one while an unjust person put on the other, it would seem that there could be no one so inflexible that he'd stand firm in his justice and have the fortitude to hold back and not lay a hand on things belonging to others, when he was free to take what he wanted from the marketplace, and to go into houses and have sex with anyone he wanted, and to kill and set loose from chains everyone he wanted, and to do everything he could when he was the equal of a god among human beings. And in acting this way, he would do nothing different from the other, but both would go the same route.

"And surely someone could claim this is a great proof that no one is just willingly, but only when forced to be, on the grounds that it is not for his private good, since wherever each one imagines he'll be able to do injustice he does injustice. Because every man assumes that injustice is much more profitable to him privately than justice, and the one saying the things involved in this sort of argument will claim that he's assuming the truth, because if anyone got hold of such freedom and was never willing to do injustice or lay a hand on things belonging to others, he'd seem to be utterly miserable to those who observed it, and utterly senseless as well, though they'd praise him to each other's faces, lying to one another from fear of suffering injustice.

"So that's the way that part goes. But as for the choice itself of the life of the people we're talking about, we'll be able to decide it correctly if we set the most just person opposite the most unjust; if we don't, we won't be able to. What then is the way of opposing them? This: we'll take nothing away either from the injustice of the unjust person or from the justice of the just person, but set out each as complete in his own pursuit. First, then, let the unjust one do as clever workmen do; a top helmsman, for instance, or doctor, distinguishes clearly between what's impossible in his art and what's possible, and attempts the latter while letting the former go, and if he still slips up in any way, he's competent to set himself right again. So too, let the unjust person, attempting his injustices in the correct way, go undetected, if he's going to be surpassingly unjust. Someone who gets caught must be considered a sorry specimen, since the ultimate injustice is to seem just when one is not.

"So one must grant the completely unjust person the most complete injustice, and not take anything away but allow him, while doing the greatest injustices, to secure for himself the greatest reputation for justice; and if thereafter he slips up in anything, one must allow him to have the power to set himself right again, and to be competent both to speak so as to persuade if he's denounced for any of his injustices, and to use force for everything that needs force, by means of courage and strength as well as a provision of friends and wealth. And having set him up as this sort, let's stand the just person beside him in our argument, a man simple and well bred, wishing not to seem but be good, as Aeschylus puts it.

"So one must take away the seeming, for if he's going to seem to be just there'll be honors and presents for him as one seeming that way. Then it would be unclear whether he would be that way for the sake of what's just or for the sake of the presents and honors. So he must be stripped bare of everything except justice and made to be situated in a way opposite to the one before, for while he does nothing unjust, let him have a reputation for the greatest injustice, in order that he might be put to the acid test for justice: its not being softened by bad reputation and the things that come from that. Let him go unchanged until death, seeming to be unjust throughout life while being just, so that when both people have come to the ultimate point, one of justice and the other of injustice, it can be decided which of the pair is happier."

"Ayayay, Glaucon my friend," I said, "how relentlessly you scrub each of them pure, like a statue, for the decision between the two men."

"As much as is in my power," he said, "and now that the two are that way, there's nothing difficult any more, as I imagine, about going on through in telling the sort of life that's in store for each of them. "So it must be said, and if in fact it's said too crudely, don't imagine I'm saying it, Socrates, but the people who praise injustice in preference to justice.

"They'll say this: that situated the way he is, the just person will be beaten with whips, stretched on the rack, bound in chains, have both eyes burned out, and as an end after suffering every evil he'll be hacked in pieces, and know that one ought to wish not to be but seem just. And therefore the lines of Aeschylus would be much more correct to speak about the unjust person, since they'll claim that the one who is unjust in his being, inasmuch as he's pursuing a thing in contact with truth and not living with a view to opinion, wishing not to seem but be unjust

Gathers in the fruit cultivated deep in his heart
From the place where wise counsels breed.

p

In the first place, he rules in his city as one who seems to be just; next, he takes a wife from wherever he wants, and gives a daughter to whomever he wants; he contracts to go in partnership with whomever he wishes; and besides benefiting from all these things, he gains by not being squeamish about doing injustice. So when he goes into competition both in private and in public, he overcomes his enemies and comes out with more, and since he has more he is rich and does good to his friends and damages his enemies. And to the gods he makes sacrifices in an adequate way and dedicates offerings in a magnificent way, and does much better service to the gods, and to the human beings it pleases him to, than the just person does, so that in all likelihood it's more suitable for him, rather than the just person, to be dearer to the gods.

c

"In that way, Socrates, they claim that, on the part of both gods and human beings, a better life is provided for the unjust person than for the just."

★ ★ ★

[Socrates responds to Glaucon and Adeimantus]: "You've experienced something godlike if you haven't been persuaded that injustice is better than justice, though you have the power to speak that way on behalf of it. And you seem to me truly not persuaded, but I gather this from other indications of your disposition, since from your arguments I'd distrust you. But to the degree that I trust you more, I'm that much more stumped as to how I can be of use, and I have no way to help out, since I seem to myself to be powerless. A sign of this for me is that I imagined what I said to Thrasymachus demonstrated that justice is better than injustice, but you didn't let my argument stand. But neither is there any way for me not to help out, since I'm afraid that it would be irreverent to be standing by while justice is being defamed and not help out as long as I'm still breathing and have the power to utter a sound. So what has the most force is for me to come to its defense in whatever way is in my power."

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b

c

Then Glaucon and the others begged me in every way to help out and not give up the argument, but to track down what each of them is and what the truth is about the sort of benefit that goes with the two of them. So I said exactly what seemed to me the case: "The inquiry we're setting ourselves to is no inconsiderable thing, but for someone sharp-sighted, as it appears to me. So since we aren't clever," I said, "the sort of inquiry for us to make about it seems to me exactly like this: if someone had ordered people who were not very sharp-sighted to read small print from a distance, and then it occurred to someone that maybe the same letters are also somewhere else, both bigger and on something bigger, it would plainly be a godsend, I assume, to read those first and examine the smaller ones by that means, if they were exactly the same."

d

"Certainly," Adeimantus said, "but Socrates, what have you spotted in the inquiry about justice that's of that sort?"

e

"I'll tell you," I said. "There's justice, we claim, of one man, and there's presumably also justice of a whole city?"

"Certainly," he said. "Isn't a city a bigger thing than one man?"

"It's bigger," he said.

"Then maybe more justice would be present in the bigger thing, and it would be easier to understand it clearly. So if you people want to, we'll inquire first what sort of thing it is in cities, and then we'll examine it by that means also in each one of the people, examining the likeness of the bigger in the look of the smaller."

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"You seem to me to be saying something beautiful," he said.

"Then if we were to look at a city as it comes into being in speech," I said, "would we see the justice and injustice that belong to it coming into being as well?"

"Probably so," he said.

"And then, once it has come into being, is there a hope of seeing what we're looking for more readily?"

b

"Very much so."

"Does it seem good, then, that we should try to accomplish this? Because I imagine it's not a small task, so you people consider it."

"It's been considered," Adeimantus said. "Don't do anything else."

“Okay,” I said. “A city, as I imagine, comes into being because it happens that each of us is not self-sufficient, but needs many things. Or do you imagine a city is founded from any other origin?”

“None at all,” he said.

c “So then when one person associates with another for one use, and with another for another use, since they need many things, and many people assemble in one dwelling place as partners and helpers, to this community we give the name city, don’t we?”

“Certainly.”

“And they share things one with another, if they give or take shares of anything, because each supposes it to be better for himself?”

“Certainly.”

“Come then,” I said, “and let’s make a city from the beginning in our speech. And it seems like what will make it will be our need.”

“What else could it be?”

d “But surely the first and greatest of needs is the provision of food for the sake of being and living.”

“Absolutely.”

“And second is the need for a dwelling place, and third for clothes and such things.”

“That’s so.”


“Well then,” I said, “how big a city will be sufficient to provide this much? Is it anything else than one person as a farmer, another a housebuilder, and some other a weaver? Or shall we add to it a leather-worker or someone who attends to something else for the body?”

“Certainly.”

e “And the city that’s most necessary anyway would consist of four or five men.”

“So it appears.”

“And then what? Should each one of these put in his own work for them all in common, with the farmer, say, who is one, providing food for four and spending four times the time and effort in the



Ostraka from 428 B.C., found on the north side of the Acropolis. These clay disks were used in ostracism voting. Each eligible male Athenian citizen scratched the name of the man he thought most undesirable. The “candidate” with the most votes was obliged to leave Athens for ten years. Given that “each of us is not self-sufficient” (*Republic* 369b) and all are dependent on the community, this was a severe punishment. (Forrest E. Baird)

provision of food for the others too to share, or paying no attention to that, make a fourth part of this food for himself alone in a fourth part of the time and devote one of the other three to providing for a house, another to a cloak, and the other to shoes, and not have the trouble of sharing things with others but do himself, by himself, the things that are for himself?" 370

And Adeimantus said, "Probably, Socrates, the first way would be easier than that one."

"And by Zeus, there's nothing strange about that," I said. "For I'm thinking to myself, now that you mention it, that in the first place, each of us doesn't grow up to be entirely like each, but differing in nature, with a different person in practice growing toward a different sort of work. Or doesn't it seem that way to you?" b

"It does to me."

"Then what? Would someone do a more beautiful job who, being one, worked at many arts, or when one person works at one art?"

"When one person works at one art," he said.

"And I assume this too is clear, that if anyone lets the critical moment in any work go by, it's ruined."

"That's clear."

"Because I don't imagine the thing that's being done is willing to wait for the leisure of the person who's doing it, but it's necessary for the one doing it to keep on the track of the thing he's doing, not when the turn comes for a sideline." c

"That's necessary."

"So as a result of these things, everything comes about in more quantity, as more beautiful, and with more ease when one person does one thing in accord with his nature and at the right moment, being free from responsibility for everything else."

"Absolutely so."

"So there's need for more than four citizens, Adeimantus, for the provisions we were talking about, since the farmer himself, as seems likely, won't make his own plow, if it's going to be beautifully made, or his pickax, or any of the other tools for farming. And neither will the housebuilder, and there's need of many things for that, and likewise with the weaver and the leatherworker." d

"That's true."

"So with carpenters and metalworkers and many such particular kinds of craftsmen coming in as partners in our little city, they'll make it a big one."

"Very much so."

"But it still wouldn't be a very big one if we add cattlemen and shepherds to them, and other herdsmen, so that the farmers would have oxen for plowing, and the house-builders along with the farmers could use teams of animals for hauling, and the weavers and leatherworkers could use hides and wool." e

"It wouldn't be a small city either," he said, "when it had all these."

"But still," I said, "even to situate the city itself in the sort of place in which it won't need imported goods is just about impossible."

"It's impossible."

"Therefore there's still a further need for other people too who'll bring it what it needs from another city."

"There'll be a need."

"And if the courier goes empty-handed, carrying nothing those people need from whom ours will get the things for their own use, he'll leave empty-handed, won't he?" 371

"It seems that way to me."

"Then they'll need to make not only enough things to be suitable for themselves, but also the kinds and quantity of things suitable for those people they need things from."

"They'll need to."

"So our city will need more of the farmers and other craftsmen."

"More indeed."

"And in particular other couriers no doubt, who'll bring in and carry away each kind of thing, and these are commercial traders aren't they?"

"Yes."

"So we'll also need commercial traders."

"Certainly." b

"And if the commerce is carried on by sea, there'll be an additional need for many other people gathered together who know the work connected with the sea."

"Very many."

"And how about in the city itself? How are they going to share out with each other the things each sort makes by their work? It was for the sake of this that we even went into partnership and founded the city."

"It's obvious," he said: "by selling and buying."

"So a marketplace will arise out of this for us, and a currency as a conventional medium of exchange?"

"Certainly."

c "But if, when the farmer or any other workman has brought any of the things he produces into the marketplace, he doesn't arrive at the same time as those who need to exchange things with him, is he going to stay unemployed at his craft sitting in the marketplace?"

d "Not at all," he said, "but there are people who, seeing this, take this duty on themselves; in rightly managed cities it's pretty much for the people who are weakest in body and useless for any other work to do. Because there's a need for it, so they stay around the marketplace to give money in exchange to those who need to sell something and to exchange in turn for money with all those who need to buy something."

"Therefore," I said, "this useful service makes for the origin of retail tradesmen in the city. Don't we call people retail tradesmen who are set up in the marketplace providing the service of buying and selling, but call those who travel around to cities commercial traders?"

"Certainly."

e "And as I imagine, there are still certain other serviceable people, who don't entirely merit sharing in the partnership for things that involve thinking but have sufficient strength of body for labors, so since they sell the use of their strength and call this payment wages, they are called, as I imagine, wage laborers, aren't they?"

"Yes."

"And the wage laborers, as seems likely, are the component that fills up the city?"

"It seems that way to me."

"Well then Adeimantus, has our city already grown to be complete?"

"Maybe."

"Then where in it would the justice and the injustice be? And together with which of the things we examined did they come to be present?"

372 "I have no idea, Socrates," he said, "unless it's somewhere in some usefulness of these people themselves to each other."

b "And maybe you're putting it beautifully," I said. "We need to examine it though and not be shy about it. So first, let's consider what style of life people will lead who've been provided for in this way. Will they do otherwise than produce grain and wine and cloaks and shoes? And when they've built houses, by summer they'll work at most things lightly clad and barefoot, but in winter adequately clothed and in shoes. And they'll nourish themselves by preparing cereal from barley and flour from wheat, baking the latter and shaping the former by hand, and when they've set out fine cakes of barley meal and loaves of wheat bread on some sort of straw or clean leaves, reclining on leafy beds spread smooth with yew and myrtle, they and their children will feast themselves, drinking wine to top it off, while crowned with wreaths and singing hymns to the gods, joining with each other pleasurably, and not producing children beyond their means, being cautious about poverty or war."

c And Glaucon broke in, saying "It looks like you're making your men have a feast without any delicacies."

d "That's true," I said. "As you say, I forgot that they'll have delicacies too, salt obviously, as well as olives and cheese, and they'll boil up the sorts of roots and greens that are cooked in country places. And as sweets we'll doubtless set out for them some figs and chickpeas and beans, and at the fire they'll roast myrtle berries and acorns, while sipping wine in moderation. And in this way it's likely that, going through life in peace combined with health and dying in old age, they'll pass on another life of this sort to their offspring."

And he said, "And if you were making provisions for a city of pigs, Socrates, what would you fatten them on besides this?"

"But how should they be provided for, Glaucon?" I said.

“With the very things that are customary,” he said. “I assume they’ll lie back on couches so they won’t get uncomfortable, and take their meals from tables, and have exactly those delicacies and sweets that people do now.” e

“Okay, I understand,” I said. “We’re examining, it seems, not just how a city comes into being, but a city that lives in luxury. And maybe that’s not a bad way to do it, since by examining that kind of city we might quickly spot the way that justice and injustice take root in cities. Now it seems to me though that the true city is the one we’ve gone over, just as it’s a healthy one. But if you want us also to look in turn at an infected city, nothing prevents it. For these things, it seems, aren’t sufficient for some people, and neither is this way of life, but couches and tables and the other furnishings will be added, and especially delicacies as well as perfumed ointments and incense and harem girls and pastries, and each of these in every variety. And so it’s no longer the necessities we were speaking of at first—houses, cloaks, and shoes—that have to be put in place, but painting and multicolored embroidery have to be set in motion, and gold and ivory and all that sort of thing have to be acquired, don’t they?” 373

“Yes,” he said.

“Isn’t there a need then to make the city bigger again? Because that healthy one isn’t sufficient any longer, but is already filled with a mass of things and a throng of people, things that are no longer in the cities for the sake of necessity, such as all the hunters as well as the imitators [i.e., artists], many of whom are concerned with shapes and colors, many others with music, and also the poets and their assistants, the reciters, actors, dancers, theatrical producers, and craftsmen for all sorts of gear, including makeup for women and everything else. And we’ll especially need more providers of services, or doesn’t it seem there’ll be a need for tutors, wet nurses, nannies, beauticians, barbers, and also delicacy-makers and chefs? Furthermore, there’ll be an extra need for pig farmers; this job wasn’t present in our earlier city because there was no need for it, but in this one there’s the extra need for this too. And there’ll be a need for a great multitude of other fattened livestock too, if one is going to eat them. Isn’t that so?” b

“How could it be otherwise?”

“Then won’t we be much more in need of doctors when people live this way instead of the earlier way?” d

“Very much so.”

“And doubtless the land that was sufficient then to feed the people will now have gone from sufficient to small. Or how do we put it?”

“That way,” he said.

“Then does something have to be cut off by us from our neighbors’ land if we’re going to have enough to graze on and plow, and by them in turn from ours if they too give themselves over to the unlimited acquisition of money, exceeding the limit of necessities?” e

“That’s a great necessity, Socrates,” he said.

“So what comes after this, Glaucon, is that we go to war? Or how will it be?”

“That way,” he said.

“And let’s say nothing yet, at any rate,” I said, “about whether war accomplishes anything bad or good, but only this much, that we have discovered in its turn the origin of war, in those things out of which most of all cities incur evils both in private and in public, when they do incur them.”

“Very much so.”

“So, my friend, there’s a need for the city to be still bigger, not by a small amount but by a whole army, which will go out in defense of all their wealth and in defense of the things we were just now talking about, and do battle with those who come against them.” 374

“Why’s that?” he said. “Aren’t they themselves sufficient?”

“Not if it was beautifully done,” I said, “for you and all of us to be in agreement when we were shaping the city; surely we agreed, if you recall, that one person has no power to do a beautiful job at many arts.”

“What you say is true,” he said.

“Then what?” I said. “Does the contest involved in war not seem to you to require art?” b

“Much of it,” he said.

“So is there any need to go to more trouble over leatherworking than over warfare?”

“By no means.”

“But that’s the very reason we prevented the leatherworker from attempting at the same time to be a farmer or a weaver or a housebuilder, but just be a leatherworker, so that the work of leathercraft would be done beautifully for us, and in the same way we gave out one job to one person for each of the others, c

the job into which each had grown naturally and for which he was going to stay at leisure from the other jobs, working at it throughout life and not letting the critical moments slip by to accomplish it beautifully. But isn't it of the greatest consequence that the things involved in war be accomplished well? Or are they so easy that even some farmer is going to be skilled at warfare at the same time, or a leatherworker or anyone working at any other art whatever, while no one could become sufficiently skillful at playing checkers or dice who didn't practice that very thing from his youth but treated it as a sideline? And someone who picks up a shield or any other weapon or implement of war, on that very day is going to be an adequate combatant in heavy-armor fighting or any other sort of battle that's needed in war, when no other implement that's picked up is going to make anyone a craftsman or fighter or even be usable to someone who hasn't gotten any knowledge about it or been supplied with adequate training?"

"Those implements would be worth a lot," he said.

"So then," I said, "to the extent that the work of the guardians is the most important, would it also be in need of the most leisure compared to other pursuits, as well as of the greatest art and care?"

"I certainly imagine so," he said.

"So wouldn't it also need a nature adapted to that very pursuit?"

"How could it not?"

"So it would be our task, likely, if we're going to be capable of it, to pick out which and which sort of natures are adapted to the guarding of the city."

"Ours indeed."

"By Zeus," I said, "it's no light matter we've called down as a curse on ourselves.

Still, it's not something to run away from in fear, at least to the extent our power permits."

"Certainly not," he said.

"So do you imagine that for guarding" I said, "there's any difference in nature between a pure bred puppy and a well-bred young man?"

"What sort of nature are you talking about?"

"For instance, each of the pair, I suppose, needs to be sharp at perceiving things, nimble at pursuing what it perceives, and also strong, if it needs to fight when it catches something."

"There is certainly a need for all these things," he said.

"And to be courageous too, if it's going to fight well."

"How could it be otherwise?"

"But will a horse or a dog or any other animal whatever that's not spirited be likely to be courageous? Or haven't you noticed how indomitable and invincible spiritedness is, and how, when it's present, every soul is both fearless and unyielding against everything?"

"I've noticed."

"And surely it's obvious what the guardian needs to be like in the things that belong to his body."

"Yes."

"And particularly in what belongs to the soul, that he has to be spirited."

"That too."

"Then how, Glaucon," I said, "when they're that way in their natures, will they not be fierce toward each other and toward the other citizens?"

"By Zeus," he said, "not easily."

"But surely they need to be gentle toward their own people but rough on their enemies, and if they aren't, they won't wait for others to destroy them but do it first themselves."

"True," he said.

"So what will we do?" I said. "Where are we going to find a character that's gentle and high-spirited at the same time? For presumably a gentle nature is opposite to a spirited one."

"So it appears."

"But surely if someone lacks either one of these things, he won't become a good guardian. But these things seem like impossibilities, and so it follows that a good guardian becomes an impossibility."

"It's liable to be that way," he said.

I too was stumped and was thinking over what had been said before, and I said, "Justly are we stumped, my friend, because we've gotten away from the image we were setting up."

"How do you mean that?"

"We didn't notice that there are natures, after all, of the sort we were imagining there aren't, that have these opposites in them."

"But where?"

"One might see it in other animals too, though not least in the one we set beside the guardian for comparison. Because you know, no doubt, about pure bred dogs, that this is their character by nature, to be as gentle as possible with those they're accustomed to and know, but the opposite with those they don't know." e

"Certainly I know it."

"Therefore," I said, "this is possible, and it's not against nature for the guardian to be of the sort we're looking for."

"It doesn't seem like it."

"Well then, does it seem to you that there's still a further need for this in the one who'll be fit for guarding, that in addition to being spirited he also needs to be a philosopher by nature?"

"How's that?" he said. "I don't get it."

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"You'll notice this too in dogs," I said, "which is also worth wondering at in the beast."

"What sort of thing?"

"That when it sees someone it doesn't know, it gets angry, even when it hasn't been treated badly by that person before, while anyone familiar it welcomes eagerly, even when nothing good has ever been done to it by that one. Or haven't you ever wondered at this?"

"Till this moment," he said, "I haven't paid it any mind at all. That they do this, though, is certainly obvious."

"But surely it shows an appealing attribute of its nature and one that's philosophic in a true sense." b

"In what way?"

"In that it distinguishes a face as friend or enemy," I said, "by nothing other than the fact that it has learned the one and is ignorant of the other. And indeed, how could it not be a lover of learning when it determines what's its own and what's alien to it by means of understanding and ignorance?"

"There's no way it couldn't," he said.

"But surely," I said, "the love of learning and the love of wisdom are the same thing?"

"They're the same," he said.

"Then shall we have the confidence to posit for a human being too, that if he's going to be at all gentle to his own people and those known to him, he needs to be by nature a lover of wisdom and of learning?" c

"Let's posit it."

"So someone who's going to be a beautiful and good guardian of our city will be philosophic, spirited, quick, and strong by nature."

"Absolutely so," he said.

"So he'd start out that way. But now in what manner will they be brought up and educated by us? And if we examine it, is there anything that gets us forward toward catching sight of the thing for the sake of which we're examining all this, the manner in which justice and injustice come into being in a city? The point is that we might not allow enough discussion, or we might go through a long one." d

And Glaucon's brother said, "For my part, I expect this examination to be one that gets us very far along into that."

"By Zeus, Adeimantus my friend," I said, "it's not to be given up then, even if it happens to be overlong."

"Not at all."

"Come then, and just as if they were in a story and we were telling the story and remaining at leisure, let's educate the men in our speech."

"We should do just that."

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BOOK III

★ ★ ★

"Okay," I said, "what would be the next thing after that for us to distinguish? Wouldn't it be which of these same people will rule and which will be ruled?" 412c

"Sure."

"And it's clear that the older ones should be the rulers and the younger should be ruled?"

"That's clear."

"And that it should be the best among them?"

"That too."

"And aren't the best farmers the ones most adept at farming?"

"Yes."

"But since in this case they need to be the best among the guardians, don't they need to be the most adept at safeguarding the city?"

"Yes."

"So don't they need, to start with, to be intelligent at that as well as capable, and also protective of the city?"

d "That's so."

"But someone would be most protective of that which he happened to love."

"Necessarily."

"And surely someone would love that thing most which he regarded as having the same things advantageous to it as to himself, and believed that when it fared well it followed that he himself fared well, and the other way around when it didn't."

"That's the way it is," he said.

e "Therefore the men who need to be selected from among the rest of the guardians are those who appear to us, when we examine the whole course of their lives, as if they most of all would do wholeheartedly whatever they'd regard as advantageous to the city, and who wouldn't be willing in any way to do what was not."

"They'd be suited to it," he said.

"It seems to me, then, that they need to be observed in all stages of life to see if they're adept guardians of this way of thinking, and don't drop it when they're bewitched or subjected to force, forgetting their opinion that they ought to do what's best for the city."

"What do you mean by dropping?" he said.

413 "I'll tell you," I said. "It appears to me that an opinion goes away from one's thinking either willingly or unwillingly. A false one goes away willingly from someone who learns differently, but every true one unwillingly."

"The case of the willing dropping I understand," he said, "but I need to learn about the unwilling case."

"What?" I said. "Don't you too believe human beings are deprived of good things unwillingly but of bad ones willingly? Isn't it a bad thing to think falsely about the truth and a good thing to think truly? Or doesn't believing things that are seem to you to be thinking truly?"

"You're certainly speaking rightly," he said, "and it does seem to me that people are unwilling to be deprived of the truth."

b "And don't they suffer this by being robbed, bewitched, or overpowered?"

"Now I'm not understanding again," he said.

"I guess I'm speaking like a tragedy," I said. "By those who are robbed, I mean people who are persuaded to change their minds and people who forget, because from the latter, time, and from the former, speech takes opinions away without their noticing it. Now presumably you understand?"

"Yes."

"And by those who are overpowered I mean people that some grief or pain causes to change their opinions."

"I understand that too," he said, "and you're speaking rightly."

c "And I imagine that you too would claim that people are bewitched who change their opinions when they're either entranced by pleasure or in dread of something frightening."

"Yes," he said, "it's likely that everything that fools people is bewitching."

d "Then as I was just saying, one needs to find out which of them are the best guardians of the way of thinking they have at their sides, that the thing they always need to do is to do what seems to them to be best for the city. So they need to be observed right from childhood by people who set tasks for them in which someone would be most likely to forget such a thing or be fooled out of it; anyone who remembers it and is hard to fool is to be chosen and anyone who doesn't is to be rejected. Isn't that so?"

"Yes."

“And laborious jobs, painful sufferings, and competitions also need to be set up for them in which these same things are to be observed.”

“That’s right,” he said.

“Thus a contest needs to be made,” I said, “for the third form as well, that of bewitchment, and it needs to be watched. The same way people check out whether colts are frightened when they lead them into noisy commotions, the guardians, when young, need to be taken into some terrifying situations and then quickly shifted into pleasant ones, so as to test them much more than gold is tested in a fire. If someone shows himself hard to bewitch and composed in everything, a good guardian of himself and of the musical style that he learned, keeping himself to a rhythm and harmony well-suited to all these situations, then he’s just the sort of person who’d be most valuable both to himself and to a city. And that one among the children and the youths and the men who is tested and always comes through unscathed is to be appointed as ruler of the city as well as guardian, and honors are to be given to him while he’s living and upon his death, when he’s allotted the most prized of tombs and other memorials. Anyone not of that sort is to be rejected. It seems to me, Glaucon,” I said, “that the selection and appointment of rulers and guardians is something like that, described in outline, not with precision.”

“It looks to me too like it would be done some such way,” he said.

“Isn’t it most correct, then, to call these the guardians in the true sense, complete guardians for outside enemies and also for friends inside, so that the latter won’t want to do any harm and the former won’t have the power to? The young ones that we’ve been calling guardians up to now, isn’t it most correct to call auxiliaries and reinforcements for the decrees of the rulers?”

“It seems that way to me,” he said.

“Then could we come up with some contrivance,” I said, “from among the lies that come along in case of need, the ones we were talking about just now, some one noble lie told to persuade at best even the rulers themselves, but if not, the rest of the city?”

“What sort of thing?” he said.

“Nothing new,” I said, “but something Phoenician* that has come into currency in many places before now, since the poets assert it and have made people believe; but it hasn’t come into currency in our time and I don’t know if it could—it would take a lot of persuading.”

“You seem a lot like someone who’s reluctant to speak,” he said.

“And I’ll seem to you very appropriately reluctant,” I said, “when I do speak.”

“Speak,” he said. “Don’t be shy.”

“I’ll speak, then. And yet I don’t know how I’ll get up the nerve or find the words to tell it. First I’ll try my hand at persuading the rulers themselves and the soldiers, and then also the rest of the city, that, after all, the things we nurtured and educated them on were like dreams; they seemed to be experiencing all those things that seemed to be happening around them, but in truth they themselves were at the time under the soil inside the earth being molded and cultivated, and their weapons and other gear were being crafted, and when they were completely formed, the earth, that was their mother, made them spring up. So now, as if the land they dwell in were a mother and nurse, it’s up to them to deliberate over it, to defend it if anyone were to attack, and to take thought on behalf of the rest of the citizens as their earthborn siblings.”

“It’s not without reason,” he said, “that you were ashamed for so long to tell the lie.”

“It was entirely reasonable,” I said. “But all the same, listen to the rest of the story as well. What we’ll say in telling them the story is: ‘All of you in the city are brothers, but the god, when he molded those of you who are competent to be rulers, mixed gold into them at their formation—that’s why they’re the most honorable—but all the auxiliaries have silver in them, and there’s iron and bronze in the farmers and other skilled workers. So since you’re all kin, for the most part you’ll produce children like yourselves, but it’s possible for a silver offspring sometimes to be born from a gold parent, and a gold from a silver, and all the others likewise from one another. So the god exhorts the rulers first and foremost to be good guardians of their children, of nothing more diligently than that, and to keep watch for nothing so diligently as for what they have intermixed in their souls. And if a child of theirs is born with bronze or iron mixed in it, they’ll

* Cadmus, the legendary founder of the Greek city Thebes, came from Phoenicia (the region roughly the same as modern Lebanon). To found the city he had to kill a dragon. A god told him to plant the dragon’s teeth, and the first inhabitants of the city sprang up from those seeds. When Socrates says the story was current in many places, he means there were other local legends of races sprung from the ground they now live on, all originally brothers and sisters whose first mother is the land that feeds them and that they defend and love.

by no means give way to pity, but paying it the honor appropriate to its nature, they'll drive it out among the craftsmen or farmers, and if in turn any children are born from those parents with gold or silver mixed in them, they'll honor them and take them up, some to the guardian group, the others to the auxiliary, because there's an oracle foretelling that the city will be destroyed when an iron or bronze guardian has guardianship over it. So do you have any contrivance to get them to believe this story?"

d "There's no way," he said, "at least for these people themselves. There might be one, though, for their sons and the next generation and the rest of humanity after that."

e "But even that," I said, "would get things going well toward their being more protective of the city and of one another, because I understand pretty well what you mean. And that's that it will carry on the way an oral tradition leads it. But once we've armed these offspring of the earth, let's bring them forth with their rulers in the lead. And when they've come, let them look for the most beautifully situated spot in the city to set up a military camp, from which they could most effectively restrain the people in the city if any of them were unwilling to obey the laws, and defend against those outside it if any enemy, like a wolf, were to attack the flock. And when they've set up the camp and offered sacrifices to those whom they ought, let them make places to sleep. Or how should it be?"

"That way," he said.

"The sort of places that would be adequate to give shelter in both winter and summer?"

"Of course," he said, "because you seem to be talking about dwellings."

"Yes," I said, "dwellings for soldiers anyway, but not for moneymakers."

416 "How do you mean the one differs from the other?" he said.

"I'll try to tell you," I said. "Because it's surely the most dreadful and shameful of all things for a shepherd to raise dogs as auxiliaries for the flock that are of the sort and brought up in such a way that, from intemperance or hunger or some bad habit of another kind, the dogs themselves try to do harm to the sheep, acting like wolves instead of dogs."

"It is dreadful," he said; "how could it be anything else?"

b "Then isn't there a need to be on guard in every way so that our auxiliaries won't do that sort of thing to the citizens, since they're the stronger, becoming like savage masters instead of benevolent allies?"

"There's a need to be on guard," he said.

"And wouldn't they have been provided with the most effective safeguard if they've been beautifully educated in their very being?"

"But surely they have been," he said.

And I said, "That's not something that deserves to be asserted with certainty, Glaucon my friend.

c What we were saying just now does deserve to be, though, that they need to get the right education, whatever it is, if they're going to what's most important for being tame, both toward themselves and toward those who are guarded by them."

"That's certainly right," he said.

d "Now in addition to this education, any sensible person would claim that they need to be provided with dwellings and other property of that sort, whatever it takes for them not to be stopped from being the best possible guardians and not to be tempted to do harm to the citizens."

"And he'll be claiming something true."

e "Then see whether they need to live and be housed in some such way as this," I said, "if they're going to be that sort of people. First, no private property that's not completely necessary is to be possessed by any of them. Next, there's to be no house or treasure room belonging to any of them except one that everyone who wants to will enter. Provisions, of all things men need who are moderate and courageous fighters in war, they're to receive at fixed times from the other citizens as recompense for guarding them, of such an amount that they have nothing over and nothing lacking each year. Going regularly to public dining halls, they're to live in common like soldiers in a camp. About gold and silver, it's to be said to them that they have the divine sort from gods always in their souls, and have no further need of the human sort, and that it's not pious to defile their possession of the former by mixing with it the possession of mortal gold, because many impious deeds have occurred over the currency most people use, while the sort they have with them is uncorrupted. And for them alone of those in the city, it's not lawful to handle or touch gold and silver, or even to go under the same roof with them, or wear them as ornaments, or drink out of silver or gold cups.

417 "And in this way they'd keep themselves and the city safe. But whenever they possess private land and houses and currency, they'll be heads of households and farm owners instead of guardians, and they'll

become hostile masters instead of allies of the other citizens, and spend their whole lives hating and being hated, and plotting and being plotted against, fearing those inside the city instead of and much more than the enemies outside it, as they and the rest of the city race onward, already very close to destruction.

"For all these reasons, then," I said, "we'll declare that's the way the guardians need to be provided for in the matter of housing and the rest, and we'll set these things down as laws, won't we?"

"Very much so," said Glaucon.

BOOK IV

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"Your city, son of Ariston," I said, "[has] now be founded. So after that, take a look around in it yourself, once you've provided a light from somewhere, and call in your brother and Polemarchus and the others, if in any way we might see wherever its justice might be, and its injustice, and what differentiates the pair from each other, and which of the two someone who's going to be happy ought to get hold of, whether he goes unnoticed or not by all gods and human beings." 427d

"You're talking nonsense," said Glaucon. "You took it on yourself to search for it because it's irrelevant for you not to come to the aid of justice in every way to the limit of your power." e

"It's true," I said, "as you remind me, and so it must be done, but you folks need to do your part too."

"Well that's what we'll do," he said.

"Then I hope to find it this way," I said. "I imagine our city, if in fact it's been correctly founded, is completely good."

"Necessarily," he said.

"So it's clear that it's wise and courageous and moderate and just."

"That's clear."

"Then whatever we find in it from among them, the leftover part will be what hasn't been found?" 428

"Of course."

"Then just as with any other four things, if we were looking for a particular one of them in whatever it was, whenever we recognized that one first that would be good enough for us, but if we recognized the three first, by that very means we would have recognized the thing we're looking for, because it's obvious that it couldn't any longer be anything else than the thing left over."

"You're saying it correctly," he said.

"So for these things too, since they happen to be four, they need to be looked for in the same way?"

"Obviously."

"Well then, the first thing that seems to me to be clearly visible in it is wisdom. b

And there seems to be something strange about it."

"What?" he said.

"The city that we went over seems to me to be wise in its very being. Because it is well-counseled, isn't it?"

"Yes."

"And surely it's clear that this very thing, good counsel, is a certain kind of knowledge, since it's presumably not by ignorance but by knowledge that people counsel well."

"That's clear."

"But many kinds of knowledge of all varieties are surely present in the city."

"How could there not be?"

"Then is it on account of the carpenters' knowledge that the city is called wise and well-counseled?" c

"Not at all," he said, "on account of that it's called skilled in carpentry."

"Then it's not on account of the knowledge that counsels about how wooden equipment would be best that a city is called wise."

"No indeed."

"Well then, is it the knowledge about things made of bronze or anything else of that sort?"

"None whatever of those," he said.

"And it's not the knowledge about growing the fruits of the earth; that makes it skilled in farming."

"It seems that way to me."

d “What about it, then?” I said. “Is there any knowledge in the city just now founded by us, on the part of any of its citizens, by which it counsels not about things in the city pertaining to someone in particular, but about itself as a whole, and in what way it would interact best within itself and with other cities?”

“There certainly is.”

“What is it,” I said, “and in which of them?”

“It’s guardianship,” he said, “and it’s in those rulers whom we were just now naming complete guardians.”

“So on account of this sort of knowledge, what do you call the city?”

“Well-counseled,” he said, “and wise in its very being.”

e “Now do you imagine,” I said, “that there will be more metalworkers present in our city than these true guardians?”

“A lot more metalworkers,” he said.

“And compared also to all the rest who are given names for having any particular kinds of knowledge, wouldn’t these guardians be the fewest of them all?”

“By a lot.”

429 “Therefore it’s by means of the smallest group and part of itself, the part that directs and rules, and by the knowledge in it, that a whole city founded in accord with nature would be wise. And it seems likely that this turns out by nature to be the smallest class, the one that’s appropriately allotted a share of that knowledge which, alone among the other kinds of knowledge, ought to be called wisdom.”

“Very true, just as you say,” he said.

“So we’ve discovered this one of the four—how we did I don’t know—both it and where in the city it’s lodged.”

“It seems to me at any rate,” he said, “to have been discovered well enough.”

“But as for courage, it and the part of the city it lies in, and through which the city is called courageous, are surely not very hard to see.”

“How so?”

b “Who,” I said, “would say a city was cowardly or courageous by looking to anything other than that part of it which defends it and takes the field on its behalf?”

“No one,” he said, “would look to anything else.”

“Because I don’t imagine,” I said, “that whether the other people in it are cowards or courageous would be what determines it to be the one sort or the other.”

“No.”

c “Then a city is also courageous by means of a certain part of itself, by its having in it a power such that it will safeguard through everything its opinion about what’s to be feared, that it’s the same things or the sorts of things that the lawgiver passed on to them in their education. Or isn’t that what you call courage?”

“I haven’t quite understood what you’re saying,” he said; “just say it again.”

“I mean,” I said, “that courage is a certain kind of preservation.”

“What kind of preservation exactly?”

d “Of the opinion instilled by law through education about what things and what sorts of things are to be feared. By preserving it through everything I meant keeping it intact when one is in the midst of pains and pleasures and desires and terrors and not dropping it. I’m willing to make an image of what it seems to me to be like if you want me to.”

“I want you to.”

e “You know, don’t you,” I said, “that dyers, when they want to dye wool so it will be purple, first select, from among the many colors, wool of the single nature belonging to white things, and then prepare it in advance, taking care with no little preparation that it will accept the pigment as much as possible, and only so dip it in the dye? And what is dyed in this way becomes impervious to fading, and washing it, whether without soaps or with them, has no power to remove the color from it, but what is not done that way—well, you know what it comes out like, whether one dyes it with other colors or this one without having taken care in advance.”

“I know,” he said, “that it’s washed out and laughable.”

430 “Then understand,” I said, “that we too were doing something like that to the extent of our power when we were selecting the soldiers and educating them with music and gymnastic training. Don’t imagine that we devised that for any reason other than so they, persuaded by us, would take the laws into themselves like a dye in the most beautiful way possible, so that their opinion about what’s to be feared, and

about everything else, would become impervious to fading, because they'd had the appropriate nature and upbringing, and the dye couldn't be washed out of them by those soaps that are so formidable at scouring, either pleasure, which is more powerful at doing that than every sort of lye and alkaline ash, or pain, terror, and desire, more powerful than any other soaps. This sort of power and preservation through everything of a right and lawful opinion about what is and isn't to be feared, I for my part call courage, and I set it down as such unless you say otherwise." b

"No," he said, "I don't say anything different, because it seems to me that you're considering the right opinion about these same things that comes about without education, as animal-like or slavish, and not entirely reliable, and that you'd call it something other than courage."

"Entirely true," I said, "as you say."

"Then I accept this as being courage," he said. c

"Yes, do accept it," I said, "but as a citizen's courage, and you'll be accepting it the right way. We'll go over something still more beautiful in connection with it later if you want, because what we've been looking for now is not that but justice. For the inquiry about that, I imagine this is sufficient."

"Yes," he said, "beautifully said."

"So two things are still left," I said, "that it's necessary to catch sight of in the city, moderation, and the one for the sake of which we're looking for them all, justice." d

"Quite so."

"How, then, might we discover justice so that we won't have to bother any more about moderation?"

"Well," he said, "I don't know and I wouldn't want it to come to light first anyway if we're no longer going to examine moderation. So if you want to gratify me, consider this before that."

"I certainly do want to," I said; "unless I'd be doing an injustice."

"Consider it, then," he said.

"It's got to be considered," I said, "and as seen from where we are, it looks more like a sort of consonance and harmony than the ones before." e

"How?"

"Presumably," I said, "moderation is a certain well-orderedness, and a mastery over certain pleasures and desires, as people say—being stronger than oneself—though in what way they mean that I don't know. And some other things of that sort are said that are like clues to it, aren't they?"

"They most of all," he said.

"But then isn't being stronger than oneself absurd? Because the one who's stronger than himself would presumably also be weaker than himself, and the weaker stronger, since the same person is referred to in all these terms." 431

"How could it not be the same one?"

"But it appears to me," I said, "that this phrase intends to say that there's something to do with the soul within a human being himself that has something better and something worse in it, and whenever what's better by nature is master over what's worse, calling this 'being stronger than oneself' at least praises it. But whenever, from a bad upbringing or some sort of bad company, the better part that's smaller is mastered by the larger multitude of the worse part, this as a reproach is blamed and called 'being weaker than oneself,' and the person so disposed is called intemperate." b

"That's likely it," he said.

"Then look over toward our new city," I said, "and you'll find one of these things present in it. Because you'll claim that it's justly referred to as stronger than itself, if in fact something in which the better rules over the worse ought to be called moderate and stronger than itself."

"I am looking over at it," he said, "and you're telling the truth."

"And surely one would find a multitude and variety of desires as well as pleasures and pains, in children especially, and in women and menial servants, and also in most of the lower sorts of people among those who are called free." c

"Very much so."

"But you'll meet with simple and measured desires and pleasures, which are guided by reasoning with intelligence and right opinion, in few people, who are both best in nature and best educated."

"True," he said.

"Then don't you see that these too are present in your city, and that the desires in most people and those of the lower sorts are mastered there by the desires and intelligence of the lesser number of more decent people?" d

"I do," he said.

"So if one ought to refer to any city as stronger than pleasures and desires, and than itself, that needs to be applied to this one."

"Absolutely so," he said.

"So then isn't it moderate too in all these respects?"

"Very much so," he said.

"And also, if in any city the same opinion is present in both the rulers and the ruled about who ought to rule, it would be present in this one. Doesn't that seem so?"

"Emphatically so," he said.

"Then as for being moderate, in which group of citizens will you say it's present when they're in this condition, in the rulers or in the ruled?"

"In both, presumably," he said.

"So do you see," I said, "that we had an appropriate premonition just now that moderation is like a certain harmony?"

"Why's that?"

432 "Because it's not like courage and wisdom, each of which by its presence in a certain part showed the city to be either wise or courageous. It doesn't act that way, but is in fact stretched through the whole across the scale, showing the weakest, the strongest, and those in between to be singing the same song together, whether you want to rank them in intelligence, or, if you want, in strength, or even by their number or their money or by anything whatever of that sort. So we'd be most correct in claiming that this like-mindedness is moderation, a concord of the naturally worse and better about which ought to rule, both in the city and in each one."

"The way it seems to me is completely in accord with that," he said.

"Well then," I said, "three of them have been spotted in our city—at least it seems that way. So what would be the remaining form by which the city would further partake in virtue? For it's clear that this is justice."

"That's clear."

c "So now, Glaucon, don't we need to take up positions like hunters in a circle around a patch of woods and concentrate our attention, so that justice doesn't escape anywhere, disappear from our sight, and become obscure? Because it's evident that it's in there somewhere. So look and make a spirited effort to catch sight of it, in case you spot it in any way before I do, and you'll show it to me."

"If only I were able to," he said. "Instead, if you treat me as a follower who's capable of seeing what's pointed out to him, you'll be handling me in an entirely sensible way."

"Follow then," I said, "after offering up prayers along with me."

"I'll do that," he said; "just you lead."

"The place sure does look like an inaccessible and shadowy one," I said; "at any rate it's dark and hard to scout through. But still, one needs to go on."

d "Yes, one does need to go on," he said.

And spotting something, I called, "Got it! Got it, Glaucon! We've probably got its trail, and I don't think it's going to get away from us at all."

"You bring good tidings," he said.

"But oh what a slug-like condition we were in," I said.

"In what sort of way?"

e "All this time, you blessed fellow, and it seems it's been rolling around in front of our feet from the beginning, and we didn't see it for all that, but were utterly ridiculous; the way people holding something in their hands sometimes look for the things they're holding, we too weren't looking at the thing itself but were gazing off into the distance somewhere, which is probably the very reason it escaped our notice."

"How do you mean?" he said.

"Like this," I said: "it seems to me that although we've been saying it and hearing it all along, we haven't learned from our own selves that we were in a certain way saying it."

"That's a long prologue for someone who's eager to hear," he said.

433 "Well then, hear whether I mean anything after all," I said.

"Because from the beginning the thing we've set down as what we needed to do all through everything when we were founding the city, this, it seems to me, or else some form of this, is justice. Surely

we set down, and said often, if you remember, that each one person needed to pursue one of the tasks that are involved in the city, the one to which his nature would be naturally best adapted."

"We did say that."

"And surely we've heard it said by many others that doing what's properly one's own and not meddling in other people's business is justice, and we've said it often ourselves."

"We have said that."

"This, then, my friend," I said, "when it comes about in a certain way, is liable to be justice, this doing what's properly one's own. Do you know where I find an indication of this?"

"No, tell me," he said.

"It seems to me," I said, "that the thing that's left over in the city from the ones we've considered—moderation, courage, and wisdom—is what provided all of them with the power to come into being in it and provides their preservation once they've come into being, for as long as it's in it. And in fact we were claiming that justice would be what was left over from them if we were to find the three."

"And that is necessary," he said.

"And certainly," I said, "if one had to judge which of these would do our city the most good by coming to be present in it, it would be hard to decide whether it's the agreement of opinion of the rulers and ruled, or the preservation of a lawful opinion that arises in the soldiers about what things are and aren't to be feared, or the judgment and guardianship present in the rulers, or whether it's this that does it the most good by being in it, in a child and a woman and a slave and a free person and a craftsman and a ruler and one who's ruled, the fact that each of them, being one person, did what was properly his own and didn't meddle in other people's business."

"It's hard to decide," he said; "how could it not be?"

"Therefore, it seems that, with a view to a city's virtue, the power that comes from each person's doing what's properly his own in it is a match for its wisdom and moderation and courage."

"Very much so," he said.

"And wouldn't you place justice as a match for these as to a city's virtue?"

"Absolutely so."

"Then consider whether it will seem that way in this respect too: will you assign the judging of lawsuits in the city to the rulers?"

"Certainly."

"And will they judge them with their sights on anything else besides this, that each party not have another's property or be deprived of his own?"

"No, only on that."

"Because it's the just thing?"

"Yes."

"Then in this respect too, having and doing what's properly one's own would be agreed to be justice."

"That's so."

"Now see if the same thing seems so to you that does to me. If a carpenter tries to work at the job of a leatherworker, or a leatherworker at that of a carpenter, or if they trade their tools and honors with each other, or even if the same person tries to do both jobs, and everything else gets traded around, would it seem to you to do the city any great harm?"

"Not very great," he said.

"But I imagine when someone who's a craftsman by nature, or some other sort of moneymaker, but proud of his wealth or the multitude of his household or his strength or anything else of the sort, tries to get in among the warrior kind, or one of the warriors into the deliberative and guardian kind when he doesn't merit it, and they trade their tools and honors with each other, or when the same person tries to do all these jobs at the same time, then I imagine it would seem to you too that this change and meddling among them would be the ruin of the city."

"Absolutely so."

"Therefore among the three classes there are, any meddling or changing into one another is of the greatest harm to the city, and would most correctly be referred to as the greatest wrongdoing."

"Precisely so."

"And wouldn't you say the greatest wrongdoing toward one's own city is injustice?"

"How could it not be?"

"So this is injustice. And let's say this the other way around; the minding of their own business by the moneymaking, auxiliary, and guardian classes, when each of them does what properly belongs to it in a city, is the opposite of that and would be justice and would show the city to be just?"

"It doesn't seem to be any other way than that to me," he said.

d "Let's not say it in quite so rigid a way yet, but if this form is agreed by us to be present in each one of the people as well and to be justice there, then we'll join in going along with it. What more would there be to say? And if not, then we'll consider something else. But for now let's complete the examination by which we imagined it would be easier to catch sight of what sort of thing justice is in one human being
e if we tried to see it first in some bigger thing that has justice in it. And it seemed to us that a city is just that, and so we founded the best one in our power, knowing well that it would be present in a good one at least. So let's carry over what came to light for us there to one person, and if they're in accord, it will turn out beautifully; but if something different shows up in the single person, we'll go back to the city again
435 and test it. And maybe, by examining them side by side and rubbing them together like sticks, we could make justice flame forth from them, and once it's become evident we could substantiate it for ourselves."

"Then it's down the road you indicate," he said, "and it behooves us to go there too."

"Well then," I said, "does the bigger or smaller thing that someone refers to by the same name happen to be unlike the other one in the respect in which it's called the same, or like it?"

"Like it," he said.

b "Therefore a just man will not differ at all from a just city with respect to the form of justice, but he'll be like it."

"He'll be like it," he said.

"But the city seemed to be just because each of the three classes of natures present in it did what properly belonged to it, while it seemed also to be moderate, courageous, and wise on account of certain other attributes and characteristic activities of these same classes."

"True," he said.

c "Therefore, my friend, we'll regard a single person in this way too, as having these same forms in his soul, and as rightly deserving to have the same names applied to them as in the city as a result of the same attributes."

"There's every need to," he said.

"It's certainly a light question about the soul we've landed ourselves into now, you strange fellow," I said, "whether it has these three forms in it or not."

"It's not quite such a light one we seem to me to be in," he said. "It's probably because the saying is true, Socrates, that beautiful things are difficult."

d "So it appears," I said. "And know for sure, Glaucon, that it's my opinion we'll never get hold of this in a precise way along the sorts of paths we're now taking in our arguments, because there's another, longer and more rigorous road that leads to it. Maybe, though, we can get hold of it in a way worthy, at least, of the things that have already been said and considered."

"Isn't that something to be content with?" he said. "For me, at present anyway, it would be good enough."

"Yes, certainly," I said, "that will be quite sufficient for me too."

"Don't get tired, then," he said; "just examine it."

e "Well then," I said, "isn't there a great necessity for us to agree that the same forms and states of character are present in each of us as are in the city? Because presumably they didn't get there from anywhere else. It would be ridiculous if anyone imagined the spirited character didn't come to be in the cities from particular people who also have this attribute, like those in Thrace and Scythia, and pretty generally in the
436 northern region, or similarly with the love of learning, which one might attribute especially to the region round about us, or the love of money that one might claim to be not least round about the Phoenicians and those in Egypt."

"Very much so," he said.

"That's just the way it is," I said, "and it's not difficult to recognize."

"Certainly not."

b "But this now is difficult: whether we act each way by means of the same thing, or in the different ways by means of different things, of which there are three—whether we learn by means of one of the things in us, become spirited by means of another, and feel desires in turn by means of a third for the pleasures having to do with nourishment and procreation and as many things as are closely related to these,

or whether we act by means of the whole soul in each of them, once we're aroused. These are the things that will be difficult to determine in a manner worthy of the discussion."

"It seems that way to me too," he said.

"Then let's try to mark out whether they're the same as one another or different, in this way."

"How?"

"It's obvious that the same thing isn't going to put up with doing or undergoing opposite things in the same respect and in relation to the same thing at the same time, so presumably if we find that happen- c
ing in the things in question, we'll know that they're not the same but more than one thing."

"Okay."

"Then consider what I say."

"Say it," he said.

"Does the same thing have the power to stand still and move," I said, "at the same time in the same respect?"

"Not at all."

"Then let's agree about it in a still more precise way, so that we won't be quibbling as we go on. Because if anyone were to say of a person who was standing still but moving his hands and his head, that the same person was standing still and moving at the same time, I imagine we wouldn't consider that he d
ought to say it that way, but that some one thing about the person stands still while another moves. Isn't that so?"

"It's so."

"So if the one who said that were to get still more cute, making the subtle point that tops stand still as a whole and move at the same time, when they spin around with the point fixed in the same place, or that anything else going around in a circle on the same spot does that, we wouldn't accept it, since it's not with respect to the same things about themselves that such things are in that case staying in place and being e
carried around, but we'd claim that they have in them something straight and something surrounding it, and stand still with respect to the straight part, since they don't tilt in any direction, but move in a circle with respect to the surrounding part; and when the straight axis is leaning to the right or the left, or forward or back, at the same time it's spinning around, then it's not standing still in any way."

"You've got that right," he said.

"Therefore, when such things are said they won't knock us off course at all, any more than they'll persuade us that in any way, the same thing, at the same time, in the same respect, in relation to the same 437
thing, could ever undergo, be, or do opposite things."

"Not me at any rate," he said.

"Be that as it may," I said, "in order that we won't be forced to waste time going through all the objections of that sort and establishing that they aren't true, let's go forward on the assumption that this is how it is, having agreed that, if these things should ever appear otherwise than that, all our conclusions from it will have been refuted."

"That's what one ought to do," he said.

"Well then, would you place nodding 'yes' as compared to shaking one's head 'no' among things that b
are opposite to each other, and having a craving to get something as compared to rejecting it, and drawing something to oneself as compared to pushing it away, and everything of that sort? Whether they're things one does actively or experiences passively, there won't be any difference on that account."

"Sure," he said, "they're opposites."

"And what about thirst and hunger and the desires in general," I said, "as well as wishing and want- c
ing? Wouldn't you place all these things somewhere in those forms just mentioned? For example, wouldn't you claim that the soul of someone who desires either has a craving for what it desires, or draws to itself what it wants to become its own, or, in turn, to the extent it wishes something to be provided to it, nods its assent to this to itself as though it had asked some question, stretching out toward its source?"

"I would indeed."

"And what about this? Won't we place not wanting and not wishing and not desiring in with push- ing away and banishing from itself and in with all the opposites of the former things?"

"How could we not?"

"Now these things being so, are we going to claim that there's a form consisting of desires, and that d
among these themselves, the most conspicuous ones are what we call thirst and what we call hunger?"

"We're going to claim that," he said.

"And the one is for drink, the other for food?"

"Yes."

e "Now to the extent that it's thirst, would it be a desire in the soul for anything beyond that of which we say it's a desire? For instance, is thirst a thirst for a hot drink or a cold one, or a big or a little one, or in a word, for any particular sort of drink? Or, if there's any heat present in addition to the thirst, wouldn't that produce an additional desire for cold, or if cold is present, a desire for heat? And if by the presence of magnitude the thirst is a big one, that will add a desire for a big drink, or of smallness, for a little one? But being thirsty itself will never turn into a desire for anything other than the very thing it's naturally for, for drink, or being hungry in turn for food?"

"It's like that," he said; "each desire itself is only for the very thing it's naturally for, while the things attached to it are for this or that sort."

438 "Then let's not be unprepared, and let someone get us confused, on the grounds that no one desires drink, but decent quality drink, and not food but decent quality food, since everyone, after all, desires good things. So if thirst is a desire, it would be for a decent quality of drink, or of whatever else it's a desire for, and the same way with the other desires."

"Well, maybe there could seem to be something in what he's saying," he said, "when he says that."

b "But surely," I said, "with all such things that are related to something, the ones that are of particular kinds are related to something of a particular kind, as it seems to me, while the sorts that are just themselves are related only to something that's just itself."

"I don't understand," he said.

"Don't you understand," I said, "that what's greater is of such a sort as to be greater than something?"

"Certainly."

"Than a lesser thing?"

"Yes."

"And a much greater thing than one that's much less, right?"

"Yes."

"And also a thing that was greater than one that was less, and a thing that's going to be greater than one that's going to be less?"

"Yes, of course," he said.

c "And something more numerous is related to something that's fewer, and something twice as many to something that's half as many, and all that sort of thing, and also something heavier to something lighter and faster to slower, and in addition, hot things are related to cold things, and isn't everything like that the same way?"

"Very much so."

d "And what about the kinds of knowledge? Aren't they the same way? Knowledge just by itself is knowledge of what's learnable just by itself, or of whatever one ought to set down knowledge as being of, while a particular knowledge or a particular sort is of a particular thing or a particular sort of thing. I mean this sort of thing: when a knowledge of constructing houses came into being, didn't it differ from the other kinds of knowledge so that it got called housebuilding?"

"Certainly."

"And wasn't that because it's a particular kind of knowledge, and any of the others is a different sort?"

"Yes."

"And wasn't it because it was about a particular sort of thing that it too came to be of a particular sort, and the same way for the other arts and kinds of knowledge?"

"That's the way it is."

e "Well then," I said, "if you've understood it now, call that what I meant to say then, that with all the things that are such as to be about something, the ones that are only themselves are about things that are only themselves, while the ones that are of particular kinds are about things of particular kinds. And I'm not saying at all that the sorts of things they're about are the same sorts they themselves are, as a result of which the knowledge of what's healthy and sick would be healthy and sickly, and the knowledge of bad and good things would be bad and good; instead, I'm saying that when a knowledge came into being that was not just about the very thing knowledge is about, but about a particular thing, and that was what's healthy and sick, it too as a result came to be of a particular sort. And this made it no longer be called simply knowledge, but, with the particular sort included, medicine."

"I've understood it," he said, "and it does seem that way to me."

"So wouldn't you place thirst," I said, "among those things in which to be for something is exactly what they are? Thirst is, of course, for something." 439

"I would, yes," he said; "it's for drink anyway."

"And isn't a particular sort of thirst for a particular sort of drink, while thirst itself is not for a lot or a little, or for a good or a bad one, or, in a word, for any particular sort, but thirst itself is naturally just for drink itself?"

"Absolutely so."

"Therefore the soul of someone who's thirsty, to the extent he's thirsty, wants nothing other than to drink, and stretches out to this, and sets itself in motion toward it." b

"Clearly so."

"So if anything ever pulls it back when it's thirsty, it would be some different thing in it from the very thing that's thirsty, and that tows it like an animal toward drinking? Because we claim that the same thing couldn't be doing opposite things in the same part of itself in relation to the same thing at the same time."

"No, it couldn't."

"In the same way, I imagine, one doesn't do well to say about an archer that his hands push and pull the bow at the same time, but rather that one hand is the one pushing it and the other the one pulling it." c

"Absolutely so," he said.

"Now do we claim that there are some people who sometimes, while they're thirsty, aren't willing to drink?"

"Very much so," he said, "many people and often."

"Well what should one say about them?" I said. "Isn't there something in their soul telling them to drink and something preventing them from it that's different from and mastering what's telling them to?"

"It seems that way to me," he said.

"And doesn't the thing that prevents such things come about in it, when it does come about, from reasoning? But the things that tug and pull come to it from passions and disorders?" d

"It looks that way."

"So not unreasonably will we regard them as being two things and different from each other, referring to that in the soul by which it reasons as its reasoning part, and that by which it feels erotic love, hunger, and thirst, and is stirred with the other desires, as its irrational and desiring part, associated with certain satisfactions and pleasures."

"No, we'd regard them that way quite reasonably," he said.

"So let these two forms be marked off in the soul," I said. "But is the part that has to do with spiritedness, and by which we're spirited, a third thing, or would it be of the same nature as one of these two?" e

"Maybe the same as one of them," he said, "the desiring part."

"But I once heard something that I believe," I said, "about how Leontius, Aglaion's son, was going up from Piraeus along the outside of the north wall, and noticed dead bodies lying beside the executioner. He desired to see them, but at the same time felt disgust and turned himself away; for a while he struggled and covered his eyes, but then he was overcome by his desire, and running toward the bodies holding his eyes wide open, he said, 'See for yourselves, since you're possessed! Take your fill of the lovely sight.'" 440

"I've heard that myself," he said.

"This story certainly indicates," I said, "that anger sometimes makes war against the desires as though it were one thing acting against another."

"It does indicate that," he said.

"And don't we often observe it in many other ways as well," I said, "when desires overpower someone contrary to his reasoning part, that he scolds himself and is aroused against the part in him that's overpowering him, and just as if there were a pair of warring factions, the spiritedness of such a person becomes allied with his reason? But as for its making a partnership with the desires to act in defiance when reason has decided what ought not to be done, I don't suppose you'd claim you'd ever noticed such a thing happening in yourself, or, I imagine, in anyone else." b

"No, by Zeus!" he said.

"Then what about when someone thinks he's being unjust?" I said. "The more noble he is, won't he be that much less capable of getting angry at being hungry or cold or suffering anything else at all of the c

sort from the person he thinks is doing those things to him justly, and won't he be unwilling, as I'm saying, for his spirit to be aroused against that person?"

"That's true," he said.

d "But what about when he regards himself as being treated unjustly? Doesn't the spirit in him seethe and harden and ally itself with what seems just, and submitting to suffering through hunger and cold and all such things, it prevails and doesn't stint its noble struggles until it gains its end or meets its death, or else, called back, like a dog by a herdsman, by the reason that stands by it, it becomes calm?"

"It is very much like what you describe," he said. "And certainly in our city we set up the auxiliaries like dogs obedient to the rulers, who were like shepherds of the city."

"You conceive what I want to say beautifully," I said, "especially if you've taken it to heart in this respect in addition to that one."

"In what sort of respect?"

e "That it's looking the opposite of the way it did to us just now with the spirited part, because then we imagined it was something having to do with desire, but now we're claiming that far from that, it's much more inclined in the faction within the soul to take arms on the side of the reasoning part."

"Absolutely," he said.

441 "Then is it different from that too, or some form of the reasoning part, so that there aren't three but two forms in the soul, a reasoning one and a desiring one? Or just as, in the city, there were three classes that held it together, moneymaking, auxiliary, and deliberative, so too in the soul is there this third, spirited part, which is by nature an auxiliary to the reasoning part, unless it's corrupted by a bad upbringing?"

"It's necessarily a third part," he said.

"Yes," I said, "as long as it comes to light as something differing from the reasoning part, the same way it manifested itself as different from the desiring part."

b "But it's not hard to make that evident," he said, "since one could see this even in small children, that they're full of spiritedness right from birth, while some of them seem to me never to get any share of reasoning, and most get one at a late time of life."

"Yes, by Zeus," I said, "you put it beautifully. And also in animals one could see that what you're describing is that way. And in addition to these things, what we cited from Homer in some earlier place in the conversation will bear witness to it:

Striking his chest, he scolded his heart with words.

c Here Homer has clearly depicted that which reflects on the better and the worse as one thing rebuking another, that which is irrationally spirited."

"You've said it exactly right," he said.

"Well, with a lot of effort we've managed to swim through these waters, and we're tolerably well agreed that the same classes in the city are present in the soul of each one person, and are equal in number."

"They are."

"Isn't it already a necessary consequence, then, that a private person is wise in the same manner and by the same means that a city was wise?"

"How else?"

d "And the means by which and manner in which a private person is courageous is that by which and in which a city was courageous, and everything else related to virtue is the same way for both?"

"Necessarily."

"So, Glaucon, I imagine we'll claim also that a man is just in the very same manner in which a city too was just."

"This too is entirely necessary."

"But surely we haven't forgotten somewhere along the way that the city was just because each of the three classes that are in it do what properly belongs to them."

"We don't seem to me to have forgotten that," he said.

e "Therefore we need to remember also that for each of us, that whoever has each of the things within him doing what properly belongs to it will be just himself and be someone who does what properly belongs to him."

"It needs to be remembered very well indeed," he said.

"Then isn't it appropriate for the reasoning part to rule, since it's wise and has forethought on behalf of the whole soul, and for the spirited part to be obedient to it and allied with it?"

"Very much so."

"Then as we were saying, won't a blending of music with gymnastic exercise make them concordant, tightening up the one part and nourishing it with beautiful speeches and things to learn while relaxing the other with soothing stories, taming it with harmony and rhythm?" 442

"Exactly so," he said.

"So once this pair have been nurtured in this way, and have learned and been educated in the things that truly belong to them, they need to be put in charge of the desiring part, which is certainly the largest part of the soul in each person and by nature the most insatiable for money. This part needs to be watched over so that it doesn't get filled with the so-called pleasures of the body and, when it becomes big and strong, not do the things that properly belong to it, but try to enslave and rule over things that are not of a kind suited to it, so that it turns the whole life of all the parts upside-down." b

"Very much so," he said.

"And wouldn't this pair also stand guard on behalf of the whole soul and body against their external enemies in the most beautiful way," I said, "one part deliberating while the other goes to war, following its ruler and accomplishing with its courage the things that have been decided?"

"That's the way it is."

"And I imagine we call each one person courageous on account of this part, when the spirited part of him preserves through pains and pleasures what's been passed on to it by speeches as something to be feared or not." c

"Rightly so," he said.

"And wise by that little part, the one that ruled in him and passed those things on, and it in turn has knowledge in it of what's advantageous for each part and for the whole consisting of the three of them in common."

"Very much so."

"And what next? Isn't each person moderate by the friendship and concord among these same things, when the ruling part and the pair that are ruled are of the same opinion that the reasoning part ought to rule and aren't in revolt against it?" d

"Moderation is certainly nothing other than that," he said, "in a city or a private person."

"But each person will be just on account of the thing we repeat so often, and in that manner."

"That's a big necessity."

"Then what about this?" I said. "Surely it hasn't gotten fuzzy around the edges for us in any way, has it, so it would seem to be some other sort of justice than the one that came to light in the city?"

"It doesn't seem to me it has," he said.

"Well," I said, "we could establish this beyond all doubt, if anything in our soul still stands unconvinced, by applying the commonplace standards to it." e

"What sort of standards exactly?"

"For example, if we were asked to come to an agreement about that city and the man who's like that by nature and upbringing, as to whether it seemed such a man would steal a deposit of gold or silver he'd accepted in trust, do you think anyone would imagine he'd be more likely to do that than all those not of his sort?" 443

"No one would," he said.

"And wouldn't temple robberies, frauds, and betrayals, either of friends in private or cities in public capacities, be out of the question for this person?"

"Out of the question."

"And in no way whatever would he be unfaithful to oaths or other agreements."

"How could he?"

"And surely adultery, neglect of parents, and lack of attentiveness to the gods belong more to any other sort of person than to this one."

"Any other sort for sure," he said.

"And isn't the thing responsible for all that the fact that each of the parts within him does what properly belongs to it in connection with ruling and being ruled?" b

"That and nothing else."

"So are you still looking for justice to be anything other than the power that produces men and cities of that sort?"

"By Zeus," he said, "not I."

c "So our dream has come to complete fulfillment; we said we suspected, right from when we started founding the city, that by the favor of some god we were liable to have gotten to an origin and outline of justice."

"Absolutely so."

"And what it was in fact, Glaucon—and this is why it was so helpful—was an image of justice, that it was right for the natural leatherworker to do leatherwork and not do anything else, and for the carpenter to do carpentry, and the same way for the rest."

"So it appears."

d "And the truth is, justice was something like that, as it seems, but not anything connected with doing what properly belongs to oneself externally, but with what's on the inside, that truly concerns oneself and properly belongs to oneself, not allowing each thing in him to do what's alien to it, or the classes of things in his soul to meddle with one another, but setting his own house in order in his very being, he himself ruling over and bringing order to himself and becoming his own friend and harmonizing three things, exactly like the three notes marking a musical scale at the low end, the high end, and the middle; and if any
e other things happen to be between them, he binds all of them together and becomes entirely one out of many, moderate and harmonized. Only when he's in this condition does he act, if he performs any action having to do with acquiring money, or taking care of the body, as well as anything of a civic kind or having to do with private transactions; in all these cases he regards an action that preserves that condition and
444 helps to complete it as a just and beautiful act, and gives it that name, and regards as wisdom the knowledge that directs that action. Anything that always breaks down that condition, he regards as an unjust action, and the opinion that directs that, he regards as ignorance."

"You're absolutely telling the truth, Socrates," he said.

"Okay," I said, "if we were to claim that we've discovered the just man and the just city, and exactly what justice is in them, I imagine we wouldn't seem to be telling a total lie."

"By Zeus, certainly not," he said.

"Shall we claim that, then?"

"Let's claim it."

"So be it," I said. "What needs to be examined after this, I imagine, is injustice."

"Clearly."

b "Doesn't it in turn have to be some sort of faction among these three things, a meddling and butting in and an uprising of a certain part of the soul against the whole, in order to rule in it when that's not appropriate, because it's of such a kind by nature that it's only fitting for it to be a slave? I imagine we'll claim something like that, and that the disorder and going off course of these parts is injustice as well as intemperance, cowardice, foolishness, and all vice put together."

c "Those are the very things it is," he said.

"Then as for doing unjust things and being unjust," I said, "and in turn doing just things, isn't it by now patently obvious exactly what all these are, if indeed that's so for both injustice and justice?"

"How so?"

"Because," I said, "they don't happen to be any different from what's healthy or diseased; what those are in a body, these are in a soul."

"In what way?" he said.

"Presumably, healthful things produce health and diseased things produce disease."

"Yes."

d "Then is it also the case that doing just things produces justice, while doing unjust things produces injustice?"

"Necessarily."

"And producing health is settling the things in the body into a condition of mastering and being mastered by one another in accord with nature, while producing disease is settling them into ruling and being ruled one by another contrary to nature."

"That's it."

"Then in turn, as for producing justice," I said, "isn't that settling the things in the soul into a condition of mastering and being mastered by one another in accord with nature, while producing injustice is settling them into ruling and being ruled one by another contrary to nature?"

“Exactly,” he said.

“Therefore, it seems likely that virtue would be a certain health, beauty, and good condition of the soul, while vice would be a disease, deformity, and weakness.”

“That’s what they are.”

“And don’t beautiful practices lead to the acquisition of virtue, and shameful ones to vice?”

“Necessarily.”

“So what remains at this point, it seems, is for us to consider next whether it’s profitable to perform just actions, pursue beautiful practices, and be just, whether or not it goes unnoticed that one is of that sort, or to do injustice and be unjust, so long as one doesn’t pay the penalty or become better by being corrected.”

“But Socrates,” he said, “the question already appears to me to have become laughable, whether, when life doesn’t seem worth living with the body’s nature corrupted, even with all the foods and drinks and every sort of wealth and political rule, it will then be worth living with the nature of that very thing by which we live disordered and corrupted, even if someone does whatever he wants, but not the thing by which he’ll get rid of vice and injustice and acquire justice and virtue, seeing as how it’s become obvious that each of them is of the sort we’ve gone over.”

“It is laughable,” I said. “Nevertheless, since we’ve come this far, far enough to be able to see clearly that this is the way it is, it wouldn’t be right to get tired out.”

“By Zeus,” he said, “getting tired out is the last thing we ought to do.”

“Come up to the mark now,” I said, “so you too can see how many forms vice has, the way it seems to me, at least the ones that are even worth looking at.”

“I’m following,” he said; “just speak.”

“Well,” I said, “as though from a lookout spot, since we’ve climbed up to this point in the discussion, there appears to me to be one look that belongs to virtue and infinitely many to vice, but some four among them that are even worth mentioning.”

“How do you mean?” he said.

“There are liable to be as many dispositions of a soul,” I said, “as there are dispositions among polities that have looks to them.”

“How many, exactly?”

“Five for polities,” I said, “and five for a soul.”

“Say which ones,” he said.

“I say that one,” I said, “would be this type of polity we’ve been going over, but it could be named in two ways, since if one exceptional man arose among the rulers it would be called kingship, but aristocracy if there were more than one.”

“True,” he said.

“This, then,” I said, “is one form that I’m talking about, since whether one or more than one man arose, it wouldn’t change any of the laws of the city worthy of mention, since the upbringing and education they got would be the way we went over.”

“Likely not,” he said.

BOOK V

“Well, I call that kind of city and polity, and that kind of man, good and right, and if this sort are right, the rest are bad and wrong, in the ways the cities are managed and the way the soul’s disposition is constituted in private persons, and the badness takes four forms.”

“What sorts are they?” he said.

And I was going on to describe them in order, the way it appeared to me they change out of one another in each case, but Polemarchus, who was sitting a little way from Adeimantus, reached out his hand and grabbed him from above by his cloak at the shoulder, drew him near, stretching himself forward, and was saying something while stooping toward him, of which we heard nothing but this: “Shall we let it go, then,” he said, “or what shall we do?”

“Not in the least,” said Adeimantus, now speaking loudly.

And I said, “What in particular won’t you let go?”

“You,” he said.

“Because of what in particular?” I said.

"You seem to us to be taking the lazy way out," he said, "and to be cheating us out of a whole form that belongs to the argument, and not the least important one, to avoid going over it, and you seem to have imagined you'd get away with speaking of it dismissively, saying it's obvious, about women and children, that what belongs to friends will be shared in common."

"And wasn't I right, Adeimantus?" I said.

"Yes," he said, "but this 'right' needs explanation, like the rest of it, about what the manner of the sharing would be, since there could be many. So don't pass over which of them you're talking about, since we've been waiting all this time imagining you'd make some mention somewhere about the procreation of children, how they'll be produced and once they're born how they'll be raised, and of this whole sharing of women and children you're talking about. Because we think it has a big bearing, in fact a total impact, on whether the polity comes into being in the right way or not. But now, since you're taking on another polity before you've determined these things sufficiently, it seemed right to us to do what you've heard, to refuse to let you go until you've gone over all these things just like the rest."

"Me too," said Glaucon; "put me down as a partner in this vote."

"Don't worry," said Thrasymachus, "consider these things as having seemed good to all of us, Socrates."

"Oh what you folks have done by ambushing me," I said. "So much discussion about the polity you're setting in motion again, as though from the beginning, when I was rejoicing at having already gotten to the end of it, feeling content if anyone would leave these things alone and accept them the way they were stated then. You have no idea what a big swarm of arguments you've stirred up with the things you're now demanding; since I saw that at the time I passed it by, fearing it would cause a lot of trouble."

"What!" said Thrasymachus. "Do you imagine these people have come this far now to fritter away their time looking for gold rather than to listen to arguments?"

"All well and good," I said, "but within measure."

"The measure in hearing such arguments, Socrates," said Glaucon, "for anyone who has any sense, is a whole life. So give up on that as far as we're concerned; just see that you don't get tired in any way of going all through the way it seems to you about the things we're asking, what the sharing of children and women will be among our guardians, and about the rearing of those who are still young that takes place in the time between birth and education, which seems to be the most troublesome time. So try to say in what way it needs to happen."

"It's not easy to go through, you happy fellow," I said, "because it has a lot of doubtful points, even more than the things we went through before. It could even be doubted that what's spoken of is possible, and even if it came about as much as it possibly could, there will also be doubts even in that case that this would be the best thing. That's why there was a certain reluctance to touch on these things, for fear, dear comrade, the argument would seem to be only a prayer."

"Don't be reluctant at all," he said, "since your listeners won't be unfair or disbelieving or ill-disposed."

And I said, "Most excellent fellow, I take it you're saying that to give me courage?"

"I am," he said.

"Well you're doing exactly the opposite," I said. "If I believed I knew what I was talking about, your pep talk would have been a beautiful one; to speak when one knows the truth, among people who are intelligent and friendly, about things that are of greatest importance and dear to us, is secure and encouraging, but to make one's arguments at the same time one is doubtful and searching, which is exactly what I'm doing, is a frightening and perilous thing. It's not because I'm liable to be laughed at—that's childish—but from fear that I'll not only tumble away myself from the truth, about things one least ought to fall down on, but that I'll also be lying in ruins with the friends I've dragged down with me. So instead I'll fall on my face in obeisance to Adrasteia, Glaucon, for her favor for what I'm about to say. I hope it's a lesser sin to become an unwilling murderer of someone than a deceiver about what's beautiful and good and just and lawful. That's a risk it's better to run among enemies rather than friends, so it's a good thing you gave me encouragement."

And Glaucon, with a laugh, said, "Okay, Socrates, if we experience anything discordant from what you say, we'll release you like someone purified from being a murderer and cleared as no deceiver of us. Just speak up boldly."

"Well, certainly someone who's released even in that situation is purified," I said, "as the law says, so it's likely that if it's that way there, it is here too."

"Speak, then," he said, "with that assurance."

"It's necessary to go back again now," I said, "and say what probably should have been said then in the proper place. And maybe this would be the right way, after the male drama has been completely finished, to finish the female drama in turn, especially since you're calling for it this way. To my way of thinking, for human beings born and educated in the way we went over, there is no other right way for them to get and treat children and women than to hasten down that road on which we first started them. We tried, I presume, in the argument, to set the men up like guardians of a herd."

"Yes."

"Then let's follow that up by giving them the sort of birth and rearing that closely resemble that, and consider whether it suits us or not."

"How?" he said.

"This way. Do we imagine that the females among the guard dogs ought to join in guarding the things the males guard, and hunt with them and do everything else in common, or should they stay inside the house as though they were disabled by bearing and nursing the puppies, while the males do the work and have all the tending of the flock?"

"Everything in common," he said, "except that we'd treat the females as weaker and the males as stronger."

"Is it possible, then," I said, "to use any animal for the same things if you don't give it the same rearing and training?"

"It's not possible."

"So if you're going to make use of women at the same tasks as men, they'll also have to be taught the same things."

"Yes."

"Music and gymnastic exercise were given to the men."

452

"Yes."

"Therefore this pair of arts needs to be made available to the women too, as well as the things connected with war, and they need to be applied in the same manner."

"It's likely, based on what you're saying," he said.

"Probably," I said, "many of the things being talked about now would look absurd if they're done the way they're being described, just because they're contrary to custom."

"Very much so indeed," he said.

"Do you see which of them would be most absurd?" I said. "Isn't it obvious that it would be for the women to be exercising naked in the wrestling schools alongside the men, and not just the young ones but also those who're already on the older side, like the old men who're still devoted to exercising in the gyms when they're wrinkled and not a pleasant sight?"

"By Zeus," he said, "that would look absurd, at least the way things are at present."

"But as long as we've got ourselves started talking about it, we shouldn't be afraid, should we, of all the jokes of whatever sort from witty people at the advent such a change in both gymnastic exercise and music, and not least about having war 'tools' and 'mounting' horses?"

c

"You've got that right," he said.

"Instead, since we have started to talk about it, we need to pass right to the tough part of the law, asking these guys not to do what properly belongs to them but to be serious, and to recall that it's not much time since it seemed to the Greeks the way it does now to many of the barbarians, that it's shameful and absurd to look at a naked man, and when the people of Crete first introduced gymnasiums, and then the Spartans, the fashionable people of the time took the opportunity to ridicule all that. Don't you imagine they did?"

d

"I do."

"But since it appeared to those who adopted the practice, I imagine, that it was better to uncover all such things than to hide them, what had been absurd in their eyes was stripped away by what was exposed as best in their reasoning. And this reveals that one who considers anything absurd other than what's bad is empty-headed, as is one who tries to get a laugh by looking at any other sight as laughable than one that's senseless and bad, or who takes seriously any mark of what's beautiful that he's set up other than what's good."

e

"Absolutely so," he said.

"Well then, isn't this the first thing that needs to be agreed about these things: whether they're possible or not? And shouldn't a chance for disputes be given to anyone who wants to dispute it, whether it's

453 someone fun-loving or the serious type, as to whether female human nature is capable of sharing in all the work that belongs to the nature of the male kind, or not in any at all, or in some sorts and not others, and whether in particular this last applies to things connected with war? Wouldn't someone be likely to get to the end of the subject most beautifully by starting off the most beautifully in this way?"

"By far," he said.

"Then do you want us to carry on the dispute ourselves against ourselves, on behalf of the others,"

I said, "so that the opposing argument won't be under siege undefended?"

"There's no reason not to," he said.

b "So let's say, on their behalf, 'Socrates and Glaucon, there's no need for anyone else to dispute with you, because you yourselves, at the beginning of the process of settling the city that you founded, agreed that each one person had to do the one thing that properly belonged to him by nature.'"

"Suppose we did agree to that; how could we not?"

"Well is there any way that a woman isn't completely different from a man in her nature?"

"How could she not be different?"

"Then isn't it also appropriate to assign each of them different work that's in accord with their nature?"

"Of course."

c "So why aren't you mistaken now and contradicting yourselves, when you also declare that men and women ought to do the same things, despite having the most diverse natures? Will you be able to make any defense against this, you amazing fellow?"

"Not very easily, just on the spur of the moment," he said; "but I'll ask you, in fact I am asking you, to be the interpreter of the argument on our side too, whatever it is."

"This is what I was afraid of a long time ago, Glaucon," I said, "as well as many other things I foresaw,

d and I was reluctant to touch on the law about the way of having and bringing up women and children."

"No, by Zeus," he said, "it seems like it's no easy matter to digest."

"No, it's not," I said. "But it's like this: whether one falls into a little swimming tank or into the middle of the biggest sea, all the same one just swims none the less."

"Quite so."

"Well then, don't we too have to swim and try to save ourselves from the argument, and just hope for some dolphin to pick us up on his back or for some other sort of rescue that's hard to count on?"

"It looks that way," he said.

e "Come on then," I said, "let's find a way out somewhere if we can. Because we're agreed that a different nature needs to follow a different pursuit, and that a woman and a man are different in nature; but we're claiming now that these different natures need to follow the same pursuits. Are these the things we're accused of?"

"Precisely."

454 "Oh Glaucon," I said, "what a noble power the debater's art has."

"Why in particular?"

"Because many people even seem to me to fall into it unwillingly," I said, "and imagine they're not being contentious but having a conversation, because they're not able to examine something that's being said by making distinctions according to forms, but pounce on the contradiction in what's been said according to a mere word, subjecting one another to contention and not conversation."

"That is exactly the experience of many people," he said, "but that surely doesn't apply to us in the present circumstance, does it?"

b "It does absolutely," I said. "At any rate, we're running the risk of engaging in debate unintentionally."

"How?"

"We're pouncing, in an altogether bold and contentious manner, on 'the nature that's not the same' as a result of a word, because that's what's required not to have the same pursuits, but we didn't give any consideration whatever to what form of different or same nature we were marking off, and how far it extended, at the time when we delivered up different pursuits to a different nature and the same ones to the same nature."

"No, we didn't consider that," he said.

c "Well, according to that, then," I said, "it seems like we're entitled to ask ourselves whether it's the same nature that belongs to bald people as to longhaired ones, and not the opposite one, and whenever we agree that it's opposite, if bald people do leatherwork, not allow longhaired people to, or if the longhaired ones do, not allow the others."

"That would certainly be ridiculous," he said.

"Well is it ridiculous for any other reason," I said, "than because we weren't reckoning on every sort of same and different nature at the time, but only watching out for that form of otherness and likeness that was relevant to the pursuits themselves? For example, with a male doctor and a female doctor, we meant that it's the soul that has the same nature. Don't you think so?" d

"I do."

"But with a male doctor and a male carpenter, it's different?"

"Completely different, I presume."

"So," I said, "if the men's or women's kind is manifestly superior in relation to any art or other pursuit, won't we claim that this needs to be given over to that one of the two? But if they apparently differ only in that the female bears the young and the male mounts the female, we'll claim instead that it hasn't yet been demonstrated in any way that a woman differs from a man in respect to what we're talking about, and we'll still believe that our guardians and the women with them ought to pursue the same activities." e

"Rightly so," he said.

"Now after this, don't we invite the one who says the opposite to teach us this very thing, what art or what pursuit it is, among those involved in the setup of the city, for which the nature of a woman is not the same as but different from that of a man?" 455

"That's the just thing to do, anyway."

"And perhaps someone else as well might say the very thing you were saying a little while ago, that it's not easy to say anything adequate on the spot, but not hard if someone has been considering it."

"He would say that."

"Then do you want us to ask the person who contradicts this sort of thing to follow us, if we somehow show him that no pursuit related to the running of a city is uniquely for a woman?" b

"Certainly."

"'Come on then,' we'll say to him, 'answer: is this the way you meant that one person is naturally fitted for something and another isn't, that in it the one learns something easily, the other with difficulty? And that the one, on the basis of a brief study, would be apt to discover a lot about what he'd learned, while the other, even when he's gotten a lot of study and practice, couldn't even hang on to what he'd learned? And for the one, the aptitudes of his body would adequately serve the purposes of his thinking, while for the other it would be the opposite? Are there any other things than these by which you marked off the one naturally suited for each thing from the one who's not?'" c

"No one's going to claim there're any others," he said.

"Then do you know of anything practiced by human beings in which the man's kind isn't of a condition that surpasses the woman's in all these respects? Or shall we make a long story out of it, talking about the art of weaving, and tending to things that are baked or boiled, the activities in which the female kind is held in high repute and for which it's most absurd of all for it to be outdone?" d

"You're telling the truth," he said, "that the one kind is dominated by the other by far in everything, as one might put it. But many women are certainly better than many men at many things, though on the whole it's the way you say."

"Therefore, my friend, there isn't any pursuit of the people who run a city that belongs to a woman because she's a woman or to a man because he's a man, but the kinds of natures are spread around among both kinds of animal alike, and by nature a woman takes part in all pursuits and a man in them all, but in all of them a woman is weaker than a man." e

"Quite so."

"So are we going to assign all of them to men and none to women?"

"Really, how could we?"

"But we'll claim, I imagine, that there's a woman with an aptitude for the medical art and another without it, and a woman with an aptitude for music and another who's unmusical by nature."

"Of course."

"Then isn't there a woman with an aptitude for gymnastic training and warfare, and one who's unwarlike and not fond of gymnastic exercise?" 456

"I imagine so."

"What else? Is one woman philosophic and another antiphilosophic? Is one spirited and another lacking in spirit?"

"These things are possible too."